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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§§34A-l-303(2)(b); 34A-l-303(6); 34A-2-801(7); 34A-2-801(8)(a); 63-46B-16; and 78-
2a-3(2)(a). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: The only issue Appellant Ameritemps (hereinafter "Ameritemps") raised 
prior to the filing of its brief on appeal is in its Docketing Statement1. It can be 
paraphrased: "Is there "substantial evidence" of record supporting the Labor 
Commission's finding that the "direct cause"2 of Johnny Albert's permanent total 
disability is the accidental injuries to his left lower extremity experienced June 16, 1997, 
in the accident arising out of and in the course of his employment for Ameritemps? 
Standard of Review: 
Ameritemps presents authority supportive of an intermediate standard of review. 
However, if it argues only the weight to be given facts, not interpretations of law or 
applications of fact to law, the Labor Commission's findings should not be disturbed. In 
other words, if Ameritemps argues that other injuries suffered by Johnny Albert should 
have been found by the Labor Commission to have been the "direct causes" of his 
inability to work, it is asking this Court to differentiate among many potential injuries that 
1
 Ameritemps' Docketing Statement is found in its entirety in Appendix 7. 
2Utah Code Ann.§34A-2-413(l)(b)(iii)) 
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may arguably have directly caused Albert not to be able to work. That is the function of a 
fact finder, not an appellate court. The same facts presented in Ameritemps brief were 
argued to and weighed by the administrative law judge and the Board of Review. The 
Commission's factual findings should be affirmed by the Court of Appeals whenever they 
are "supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before 
the court." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g). Findings that are supported by 
"substantial evidence" will not be overturned even if another conclusion from the 
evidence is permissible." Hurley v. Board of Review of Indus, Comm yn, 767 P.2d 524, 
526-27 (Utah 1988). (Emphasis added.) The burden is on the party seeking to overturn 
the Commission's factual findings to "...marshall [sic] all of the evidence supporting the 
findings and show that despite the supporting facts, and in light of the conflicting or 
contradictory evidence, the findings are not supported by substantial evidence." Grace 
Drilling Co. v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm 'n, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (UT App 1989). 
(Emphasis added.) See also Whitear vs. Labor Commission; Brown & Root, Inc., 
Highlands Insurance, and Employers' Reinsurance Fund, 973 P.2d 982 (UT App 1998). 
The Appellant fails in the marshaling burden if there is a "../scintilla' of evidence 
supporting the [Labor Commission's] finding." Parduhn v. Bennett et al, 2005 Ut 22, f 
25. 
Issue 2: Did Ameritemps preserve its claim that the Court of Appeals does 
not have jurisdiction over this matter because the Commission's order is not a final order 
-3-
of permanent total disability for its alleged failure to invoke the rehabilitation procedures 
called for in Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(6)? A corollary issue is, did Ameritemps 
waive its right to raise this issue by stipulating at the time of the evidentiary hearing that 
Johnny Albert is permanently and totally disabled? 
Standard of Review: Issues not raised in proceedings before administrative 
agencies are not subject to judicial review except in exceptional circumstances. Pease v. 
Industrial Comm 'n, 694 P.2d 613, 616 (UT 1984); Alvin G. Rhodes Pump Sales v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 681 P.2d 1244, 1249 (UT 1984). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
1. Utah Code Ann. Section 34A-2-413.Permanent total Disability - Amount of 
payments - Rehabilitation3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Statement of the Nature of the Case 
Johnny Albert brought multiple workers compensation claims against various of 
his employers. He claims to have been injured by accidents arising out of and in the 
course of his multiple employments. The first of the accidents occurred in 1982 and the 
last occurred in 1997. As applicable to this appeal, Albert filed amended Applications for 
Hearing for six different accidents claiming entitlement to permanent total disability 
3Appendix 8. Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-413 Permanent total disability -Amount of 
payments - Rehabilitation. 
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compensation on each application.4 The Appellant herein, Ameritemps, is the respondent 
in the last Application for Hearing for an accident that occurred June 16, 1997. Appellee, 
American Asbestos Abatement and Workers Compensation Fund (hereinafter referred to 
as "AAA") is the respondent for an accident that occurred July 28, 1991. 
Statement of the Course of the Proceedings 
The six Applications were consolidated for hearing. An evidentiary hearing was 
conducted by a Labor Commission Administrative Law Judge December 17, 2002. The 
parties did not contest the issue of whether Albert is totally disabled5. The issues as 
relevant to this appeal were two as posed by the administrative law judge: 
4For the convenience of the Court, please see a copy of the six Applications without 
the attachments found in Appendix 9. With attachments, the Applications can be found 
beginning at R. 325 for the 1982 accident, R. 280 for the 1986 accident, R. 278 for the 
1990 accident, R. 276 for the 1991 accident with Barnard & Burk, R. 274 for the 1991 
accident with American Asbestos Abatement and R. 272 for the June 16, 1997 accident 
with Ameritemps. 
5The following exchange took place between the administrative law judge and counsel 
for Ameritemps at the evidentiary hearing: 
THE COURT: Let me ask you this, Mr. Kanell: Do you agree that Mr. Albert 
is permanently and totally disabled or just disputing the cause 
of that, in addition to the... 
MR. KANELL: Well, you know, it's hard to say, Your Honor. I don't have 
any proof to the contrary. I'm not here to submit proof on that 
issue. I would only say that this is a guy who's had a dozen 
industrial accidents and has been on industrial compensation 
pretty much most of his work life. 
Appendix 2. R. 835, Page 17. 
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1. What is the direct cause of Johnny Albert's permanent total disability? 
2. Which of the respondents, if any, owe Johnny Albert permanent total 
disability compensation?.6 
Following the evidentiary hearing, the judge found the petitioner, Johnny Albert 
had met his burden of proof to show that his permanent total disability was "directly"7 
caused by his left foot injury of June 16, 1997 which arose out of and in the course of his 
employment with Ameritemps.8 
Administrative Law Judge LaJeunesse found the "...injuries suffered by Mr. Albert 
from the July 28, [1991] industrial accident did not constitute the direct cause of his 
permanent total disability. Therefore, American Asbestos and WCF did not owe Mr. 
Albert permanent total disability compensation"9 
Ameritemps filed a motion for review arguing "...insufficiency of evidence to 
support the conclusion that the Petitioner is permanently and totally disabled as a result of 
industrial injury to his toe he incurred while employed by Ameritemps...[T]he injury to 
6See Appendix 3, "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order" at page 5, R. 499. 
Also, for the discussion of the issues among counsel and the administrative law judge 
before the evidentiary hearing, please refer to the excerpt from the transcript that is found 
in Appendix 2, R. 835, pages 12-29 
7See Utah Code Ann.§ 34A02-413, App. 8 
8See Judge LaJeunesse's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, at R. 524-
527, Appendix 3 hereto.. 
9See Judge LaJeunesse's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order at R. 508, 
Appendix 3 hereto. 
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his left big toe is not the reason he is currently not in the workforce and is not even the 
injury causing him the most difficulties." 10 
None of the parties challenged the findings of fact and conclusions of law as they 
applied to AAA. 
The Appeals Board affirmed Judge LaJeunesse's findings and order as they 
applied to Ameritemps and denied its Motion for Review.11 
On an issue dealing with limitations on compensation and medical expense 
benefits not relevant to this brief, Barnard and Burk filed a Motion for Reconsideration 
before the Appeals Board. The motion was denied.12 
Thereafter, Ameritemps filed a Petition for Writ of Review with the Court of 
Appeals.13 Ameritemps Docketing Statement was filed November 4, 2004. It designated 
one issue—whether Albert's injury of June 16, 1997, was the "direct cause" of his total 
disability.14 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts to follow are presented in accordance with the standards of review 
10See Motion for Review and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Respondent Ameritemps Motion For Review R. 589-598; Appendix 4 hereto. 
11
 See "Order on Motions for Review", R. 696-704, Appendix 5 hereto. 
12See Appendix 6. 
13R. 853-854 
14Appendix 7 hereto. 
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hereinbefore in mind. It should be noted that Ameritemps Statement of the Facts found at 
pages 6-9 of its brief do not constitute the marshaling contemplated by the Hurley, Grace 
Drilling, Whitear, Brown & Root and Parduhn, cases cited earlier herein. Rather, 
Ameritemps argues facts it believes supportive of its case and not those from which the 
Labor Commission drew its findings. The question the facts that follow are directed at 
resolving is: What was the "direct cause" of Johnny Albert's conceded disability? 
The Labor Commission based its order on the following facts among others. 
1. Albert suffered a number of work related injuries through the years.15 
Ultimately, the parties conceded total disability, but not the cause therefor, at the 
evidentiary hearing because of the multitude of work related as well as non work related 
mental and physical impairments suffered by Albert.16 
2. Of significance to the appeal, Albert injured his right amkle in an accident 
while in the employ of American Asbestos Abatement on July 28, 1991. He was awarded 
temporary total disability benefits, permanent partial disability benefits and medical 
expense benefits. At an earlier contested hearing, the Labor Commission found Albert 
15For the convenience of the Court, please see Appendix 9 for a copy of the six 
Applications for Hearing which chronicle accidents accepted by the parties. R. 325 for a 
back injury in 1982 accident at Transwest Construction; R. 280 for a back injury in 1986 
at Transwest Construction; R. 278 for a back injury in 1990 at Quality Plating; R. 276 for 
a back injury in 1991 at Barnard & Burk; R. 274 for a right foot, knee, back and hip in 
1991 at American Asbestos Abatement; and R. 272 for a left foot June 16, 1997 at 
Ameritemps. 
I6R. 835, pages 12-29. Appendix 3, "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order" 
at page 5, R.499. 
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reached maximum medical improvement from those injuries July 20, 1993. 
3. No party to this appeal has challenged the finding of the Labor Commission 
that July 28, 2001 industrial accident Albert experienced while he was employed by AAA 
did not constitute the direct cause of his permanent total disability. Therefore, AAA and 
WCF did not owe Albert permanent total disability compensation.18 
4. Albert then went to work for Ameritemps sometime in 1996. Ameritemps 
sent him on assignment to work for Sysco Foods. He worked for Sysco about nine 
months. He was working there "pulling food off the stock shelves and putting it on a 
pallet jack." (R. 835, page 52.) 
5. On June 16, 1997, Albert was driving a pallet jack around a sharp corner of 
the warehouse. He cut a comer too sharply. He caught his left foot between an "I" beam 
and the forklift or pallet jack. He crushed his left big toe in the process19. He had four 
surgeries on it. (R. 835, pages 52-54) 
6. No party challenged the finding by the Commission that "With the 
exception of one day at Erickson Construction, Mr. Albert never worked again after the 
I7See Appendix 1. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order" by Benjamin A. 
Sims, dated February 4, 1994. R. 65-71. 
18See Appendix 3, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. R. 508. 
l9A "significantly angulated fracture of the first proximal phalanx with probable intra-
articular extension". Vol. 8 of 10. R. 834 page 322. 
- 9 -
June 16, 1997 industrial accident."20 
7. June 30, 1997, Dr. William Burleigh performed an "Open-reduction internal 
fixation, left hallux.21 November 14, 1997, Dr. Burleigh performed a ""arthroplasty 
hallux left foot."22. 
8. Albert's left foot continued to cause him great difficulty. He sought care 
from Dr. David J. Howe. On March 11, 1998, Dr. Howe found, "Traumatic arthritis to 
proximate interphalangeal joint of left great toe." Dr. How performed a third surgery on 
the "Left great toe proximal interphalangeal joint fusion with bone graft from left tibia."23 
9. Still Albert's foot failed to heal properly. By July 31, 1998, Dr. Howe 
determined that there was a "Failed fusion left great toe interphalangeal joint."24 A fourth 
surgery on the left foot was a repeat "Fusion of left great toe interphalangeal joint with 
bone graft from left tibia."25 
10. By February 25, 1999, Dr. Howe determined there was not anymore he 
could do to correct the left foot problem Albert was experiencing. He found his condition 
20R. 511 
21Vol. 8 of 10 R. 834, pages 354-355. 
22Vol. 8 of 10 R. 834, page 342. 
23Vol. 8 of 10 R. 834, page 368. 
24Vol. 8 of 10 R. 834, page 365. 
25Vol.8oflOR. 834, page 365. 
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to be stable and gave him an impairment rating.26 The impairment for the left foot was 
from 2-4% whole person.27 
11. Albert has been diagnosed with other serious physical and mental 
impairments that have complicated his life.28 However, it is not necessary to do a 
complete outline of all of those facts. It suffices as the Commission held to state: 
Yet at the end of the day, the preponderance of the evidence in this case 
revealed that despite the legion of medical and psychological impairments 
accumulated by Mr. Albert during the course of his life, he remained able to 
work until the injury he sustained on June 16„ 1997 with 
Ameritemps...Hence, the preponderance of the evidence in this case 
established that Mr. Albert's industrial accident of June 16, 1997 acted as 
the direct cause of his permanent total disability.29 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Ameritemps raises two issues for this Court to consider. (1) The first is the only 
one presented at the administrative level. In essence Ameritemps argues that the evidence 
does not support a finding that the crushing injury to Albert's left big toe is the "direct 
cause" of his total disability. (Utah Code Ann. 34A-2-413(1 )(b)(iii)) On appeal it is 
Ameritemps burden to marshal the evidence that supports that finding. It must then show 
26See the rating ordered by Judge LaJeunesse R. 509-510. Appendix 3. 
27Vol. 8 of 10 R. 834, page 148 and 115. 
28For an outline of those matters, please refer to the administrative law judge's 
summary contained at his discussion of Permanent Total Disability Compensation R. 511-
515, Appendix 3 hereto. 
29See Appendix 3, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, Judge LaJeunesse, 
July 22, 2003, R. 515. 
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there is no "substantial evidence" supportive of the Commission's finding that the direct 
cause of Albert's total disability is the accident of June 16, 1997. It fails in that burden. 
Rather, it presents a nice summary of the facts it argued below. But that is not enough. 
There is "substantial evidence" supporting the Commission's findings. 
Further, no party has challenged the finding that the accident Albert experienced 
while employed by AAA July 28, 1991, was not the direct cause of his total disability. 
Therefore, regardless of the outcome of the current appeal, AAA has no liability for 
permanent total disability compensation if any is owed to Albert. 
(2) On appeal Ameritemps raises a second issue for the first time. It claims this 
Court does not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal because it has not been given the 
opportunity to present a re-employment plan pursuant to Utah Code .Ann. § 34A-2-413(6). 
Therefore the Commission's order is not yet a final appealable order. AAA has no 
objection to Ameritemps presenting a re-employment plan. However, in the natural 
course of the proceedings, that should have been presented as an issue to the Commission 
at an appropriate time in the proceedings below. Further, it appears to be an ill-conceived 
and tardy gesture that may well have been waived when all of the parties conceded that 
Albert is totally disabled at the evidentiary hearing. It should not be allowed as a means 
to reopen the issue of whether another predecessor accident was the "direct cause" of the 
total disability. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
AMERITEMPS FAILED IN ITS BURDEN OF PERSUASION. IF ITS 
APPEAL IS AN ARGUMENT AMERICAN ASBESTOS 
ABATEMENT and/or WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND ARE 
LIABLE FOR JOHNNY ALBERT'S PERMANENT TOTAL 
DISABILITY, IT FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVTOENCE 
AGAINST IT AND THEN SHOW THAT THE COMMISSION'S 
FINDINGS TO THE CONTRARY ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY 
"SUBSTANTIAL EVDDENCE". THERE IS "SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE" THAT THE ACCIDENTAL INJURY TO ALBERT'S 
LEFT FOOT ON JUNE 16,1997, ARISING OUT OF AND IN THE 
COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT FOR AMERITEMPS WAS THE 
"DIRECT CAUSE" OF HIS PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY. 
As presented in Statement of Issue 1 earlier, the Commission's factual findings 
should be affirmed by the Court of Appeals whenever they are "supported by substantial 
evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the court." Utah Code Ann. § 
63-46b-16(4)(g). Findings that are supported by "substantial evidence" will not be 
overturned even if another conclusion from the evidence is permissible." Hurley v. Board 
of Review of Indus. Comm 'n, 767 P.2d 524, 526-27 (Utah 1988). The burden is on the 
party seeking to overturn the Commission's factual findings to "...marshall [sic] all of 
the evidence supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting facts, and in 
light of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the findings are not supported by 
substantial evidence." Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm 'n, 776 
P.2d63, 68(UTAppl989). 
The Legislature has given us direction regarding the discretion of the commission 
- 1 3 -
and what constitutes "substantial evidence": 
(1) ...The commission may make its investigation in such 
manner as in its judgment is best calculated to ascertain 
substantial rights of the parties and to carry out justly the 
spirit of the chapter. 
(2) ...The commission may receive as evidence and use as 
roof of any fact in dispute all evidence deemed material and 
relevant including, but not limited to the following: 
(b) reports of attending or examining physicians, or of 
pathologists; 
(e) hospital records in the case of an injured or diseased 
employee.30 
Therefore, the Commission properly weighed the reports of treating physicians 
the testimony of Johnny Albert as outlined above. That evidence alone is sufficient 
evidence to support the findings of the Commission on the issue of "direct causation". 
Recall the Appeals Board Order On Motions For Review explained that it was 
Albert's burden by Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-413 to show by a preponderance of the 
evidence that he: 
(I) ...sustained a significant impairment or combination of impairments as a 
result of the industrial accident...that gives rise to the permanent total 
disability entitlement;31 
30Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-802(l), (2)(b) &(e). 
31
 Appendix 8 
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(iii) the industrial accident...was the direct cause of the...permanent total 
disability.32 
Initially, it is Albert's burden to show by the preponderance of the evidence that 
one of his work related accidental impairments directly caused his permanent total 
disability. See also Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15, 27 (Utah 1986) It is also 
his burden to show the medical nexus of his injuries to his employment. 
The Commission's Board of Review found : "After the numerous surgeries, 
additional impairment, and extended time away from the labor force that resulted from 
the Ameritemps accident, he [Albert] was no longer able to work. The Appeals Board 
therefore agrees with Judge LaJeunesse that Mr. Albert has established 1) a significant 
impairment resulting from the Ameritemps accident and 2) that the Ameritemps accident 
was the direct cause of his permanent total disability."33 On appeal, it then becomes 
Ameritemps marshaling burden. It fails to meet its marshaling burden. 
In a slightly different context, the Utah Supreme Court most recently emphasized 
an appellant's burden in challenging the finder of fact: 
...an appellant must first marshal all the evidence in support of the finding 
and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the 
finding even when viewing it is a light most favorable to the court below, 
[citations omitted.] An appellant "must present, in comprehensive and 
fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial 
which support the very findings the appellant resists." [Citation omitted] 
Moreover, an appellant may not simply review the evidence presented at 
32
 Appendix 3 
33Appendix 5, R. 701. 
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trial, nor may she "reargue the factual case [she] presented in the trial 
court." [Citation omitted.] If an appellant argues that no evidence supports a 
factual finding, the burden to marshal does not then shift to the appellee; 
rather, the appellee may prove that the appellant did not meet her 
marshaling burden by presenting a "scintilla" of evidence supporting the 
district court's finding... 
Parduhn v. Bennett et al, 2005 Ut 22, \ 25 
POINT II 
AMERICAN ASBESTOS ABATEMENT and/or WORKERS 
COMPENSATION FUND IS NOT OPPOSED TO AMERITEMPS' 
DESIRE TO ESTABLISH A REEMPLOYMENT PLAN FOR 
JOHNNY ALBERT. HOWEVER, THAT ISSUE WAS NOT RAISED 
BEFORE THE LABOR COMMISSION. IT SHOULD NOT BE 
CONSIDERED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL AS A BASIS 
FOR REVERSD3LE ERROR. IT SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED 
AS A BASIS TO NEGATE THE FINDING OF FACT THAT 
ALBERT'S ACCDDENTAL INJURY ARISING OUT OF AND IN 
THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT FOR AMERITEMPS WAS 
THE "DIRECT CAUSE" OF HIS PERMANENT TOTAL 
DISABILITY. 
Ameritemps made no argument to the administrative agency that Albert could be 
rehabilitated. Actually, at the evidentiary hearing, each of the parties acknowledged that 
Mr. Albert is totally disabled as a result of his multiple psychological and physiological 
disorders. Such an effort would at best be a futile gesture. Social Security has rather 
summarily so found. The office chart entries in the medical records sound of a deeply 
disturbed individual. That being said, AAA most certainly would not be opposed to any 
efforts to assist an individual to get back into a working and functional existence. 
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However, if the claim that this Court lacks jurisdiction to make final the 
Commission's determination that the June 16, 1997, Ameritemps accident is the "direct" 
cause of Albert's total disability, AAA must state its opposition. Ameritemps waived that 
claim. The Court of Appeals succinctly analyzed the concept of a waiver of issues for 
appeal if they are not raised at the trial court or administrative court level in Hart vs. Salt 
Lake County Commission et aL9 945 P.2d 125 (Utah App. 1997): 
To preserve a substantive issue for appeal, a party must first raise the issue 
before the trial court. (Citation omitted.)...[TJhe issue must be raised in a 
timely fashion....[First] "Issues not raised in the trial court in timely fashion 
are deemed waived, precluding [the appellate court] from considering their 
merits on appeal." (Citations omitted)...Second, the issue must be 
specifically raised, (Citation omitted), such that the issue is sufficiently 
raised to a "level of consciousness" before the trial court...(Citation 
Omitted)... Third, the party must introduce to the trial court "supporting 
evidence or relevant legal authority" to support its argument. (Citations 
omitted.)...The mere mention of an issue in the pleadings...is insufficient to 
raise an issue at trial and thus insufficient to preserve the issue for appeal. 
(Citation omitted.) 
The arguments Ameritemps made below did not include a request for or a 
suggestion of a reemployment plan. No plan was requested at the evidentiary hearing. In 
fact, one could argue that it was waived at the hearing34 The suggestion for a plan was not 
raised in the Motion for Review. The suggestion of the existence of a jurisdictional issue 
having to do with a reemployment plan was not raised in Ameritemps Docketing 
Statement.35 Accordingly, having failed to raise any reemployment plan before the Labor 
See Footnote 5 and Appendix 2. 
See Appendix 7. Docketing Statement. 
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Commission, Ameritemps has waived his right to raise the issue for the first time before 
this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Ameritemps raises two issues for this Court to consider. The first is whether the 
acknowledged injury Johnny Albert suffered arising out of and in the course of his 
employment on June 16, 1997, was the direct cause of his total disability. In that 
accident, Albert injured his toe. He had four surgeries to the toe. He was never able to 
return to the work force after that accident. 
AAA was an earlier employer. Albert injured his right ankle in an accident while 
working for AAA in 1991. Albert had a great many other mental and physical 
impairments all of which combined to make him unemployable. 
The Labor Commission found that the "direct cause" of Albert's disability was the 
Ameritemps accident. There is substantial evidence to support that finding. Ameritemps 
failed to "...marshall [sic] all of the evidence supporting the Commission's findings and 
then show that despite the supporting facts, and in light of the conflicting or contradictory 
evidence, the findings are not supported by substantial evidence." Ameritemps appeal 
should be dismissed. 
On appeal Ameritemps raises its second issue for the first time. It claims this 
Court does not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal because it has not been given the 
opportunity to present a re-employment plan pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(6). 
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Therefore the Commission's order is not yet a final appealable order. AAA has no 
objection to Ameritemps presenting a re-employment plan. However, in the natural 
course of the proceedings, that should have been presented as an issue to the Commission 
at an appropriate time in the proceedings below. Further, it appears to be an ill-conceived 
and tardy gesture that was waived at the evidentiary hearing when all of the parties 
conceded that Albert is totally disabled. It should not be allowed as a means to reopen the 
issue of whether another predecessor accident was the "direct cause" of the total 
disability. 
DATED this 8th day of June, 2005. 
BLACK & INGLEBY 
ylty/fames R. Black 
/ Co-counsel for Workers Compensation 
L/rund and American Asbestos Abatement 
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APPENDIX 1 
Albert v. American Asbestos Abatement and/or 
Workers Compensation Fund, "Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order" by Judge Benjamin 
A. Sims, dated February 4,1994. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OP UTAH 
Case No. 93-895 
JOHNNY ALBERT, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
AMERICAN ASBESTOS ABATEMENT 
and/or WORKERS COMPENSATION 
FUND, 
Defendants. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
HEARING: 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
Hearing Room 3 34, Industrial Commission of Utah, 
160 East 3 00 South, Salt Lake City, Utah on 
November 15, 1993 at 8:30 o'clock a.m.. Said 
hearing pursuant to Order and Notice of the 
Commission. 
Benjamin A. Sims, Administrative Law Judge. 
The applicant, Johnny Albert, was present and 
represented by Hans Scheffler, Attorney at Law. 
The defendant employer, American Asbestos 
Abatement, and its insurer, Workers Compensation 
Fund, were represented by Mark Dean, Attorney at 
Law. 
The applicant, Johnny Albert, is requesting temporary total 
disability from April 25, 1991, to November 5, 1992, and again for 
the period May 1, 1993 through May 11, 1993. The Workers 
Compensation Fund has indicated that it has records which show that 
the applicant has received worker's compensation benefits for much 
of this period and was granted additional time to supply data to 
this effect. No additional data was received as of the date of 
this order concerning worker's compensation benefits which were 
paid, and so the file will be considered based upon its current 
state. 
Mr. Albert also requests additional permanent partial 
disability benefits (PPD). The Workers Compensation Fund has paid 
a 12 percent lower extremity impairment rating to the applicant; 
the applicant claims a 15 percent lower extremity PPD. The 
applicant further asks for medical and prescription expenses. 
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At the time of the hearing, the applicant presented evidence 
that he had been working for the employer, American Asbestos 
Abatement, on July 28, 1991. The applicant does not recall when he 
began working for them; however, the Workers Compensation Fund 
claims that it was about six weeks prior to the industrial injury. 
At the time of the injury, the applicant was working at Hill 
Air Force Base, tearing off an overhang on a roof. Mr. Albert was 
paid three different rates, depending on whether he was "suited-up" 
or doing other tasks. He was paid at a rate of $9„00 per hour for 
tasks which were not specific; he was paid $10.38 an hour for work 
of a "preparatory" nature, and he was paid $21.52 an hour for work 
directly related to the actual asbestos abatement which required 
the applicant to be "suited-up." 
The applicant claimed that he was earning $800 - $1,000 per 
week at the time of injury. Since the evidence is inconclusive as 
to when the applicant began work for the employer, U.C.A. Sections 
35-1-75(1) (g) (ii) and (iii) will be used to determine the wage 
since the applicant was earning three different wages based on the 
type of work he did for the employer. 
The time sheet submitted by the employer apparently is 
incomplete, and does not show all the hours worked. It (Ex. A-l) 
shows that on August 26, 1992, the applicant received five hours at 
the "preparatory rate" of $10.38 an hour; and 5.5 hours at the rate 
of $21.52 per hour. On Saturday, the applicant received 9.5 hours 
at the rate of $21.52. At the time of the industrial accident, on 
August 28th, the applicant received two hours at the $21.52 rate. 
A notation on the sheet shows that apparently the employer had 
to correct the "first check," and was required to increase the 
number of hours being paid at the higher rate. The notation does 
not say to what rate the increase pertained. However, another 
notation on the time sheet shows that the applicant worked "all . . . 
[the following hours] and wages": 
"5 hours at 10.38 
17 hours at 21.52 
26.16 hours at 9.00" 
Exhibit A-l. 
Based upon the time record submitted for the period ending 
August 1, 1991, it appears that the applicant was working nine 
percent of the time doing nonspecific tasks for which he was paid 
$10.38 per hour; he was working 29 percent of the time doing 
abatement work for which he was being paid $21.52 per hour, and he 
was working 62 percent of the time doing preparatory work for which 
he was being paid $9 per hour. 
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Based upon a 40 plus hour week which the applicant claims to 
have been working on the date on which he was injured, based upon 
the percentages listed in the previous paragraph, the applicant 
would have earned 3.6 hours at $10-38, 11.6 hours at $21.52, and 
24.8 hours at $9 per hour. The total of these hours is $510.20 per 
week. The evidence therefore shows that he would have earned 
$510.20 in the week in which he was injured had he completed the 
entire week based upon his earnings previously. He was not 
married, and had one child dependent upon him. 
At the time of the industrial accident, the applicant recites 
that he was "up on a scaffold about 40 feet off the ground, the 
wind caught the polyethylene sheet and pulled the scaffolding off." 
The applicant injured his right heel, and had back pain as well. 
It was determined that the applicant had a comminuted calcaneus 
fracture of the right ankle, but the lumbar spine showed nothing 
remarkable. 
The applicant had treatment as well as surgery to his right 
ankle by Dr. Jee. Dr. Jee released the applicant to return to work 
on April 22, 1992, and rated the applicant/s whole person 
impairment at five percent. During this time, the applicant was 
also treated by a social worker for situational anxieties, 
depression, and concerns about safety factors on return to work. 
In July 1992, the applicant sought further treatment from Dr. 
Howe. Dr. Howe determined that the applicant's right ankle needed 
additional treatment, and completed a subtalar arthrodesis with a 
bone graft from the right anterior iliac crest on September 14, 
1992. Subsequent to that date, among other treatment, the 
applicant had some hardware removal on or about March 17, 1993. 
In May 1993, the applicant complained of right knee pain, and 
Dr. Howe determined that there was chondromalacia of the 
patellofemoral joint, especially over the medial facet. The 
applicant was returned to light duty with maximum lifting of five 
to ten pounds, and no prolonged ambulation or climbing. Dr. Howe 
determined that the applicant's right ankle problems were caused by 
his industrial injury. Further, he determined that the applicant 
was medically stabilized on July 20, 1993 with a 16 percent lower 
extremity impairment or six percent of the whole person impairment. 
Significantly, the defendants had an independent medical 
examination (IME) completed on the applicant on November 3, 1993. 
The defendants sent a copy of the IME to the applicant's counsel on 
November 30, 1993, but for some reason, the IME was not received by 
the Commission until January 24, 1994. 
Dr. Knoebel, the IME physician, determined that the right 
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calcaneus fracture as well as the right patellofemoral knee 
complaints are secondary to the industrial injury of July 28, 1991. 
The causation and apportionment of what Dr. Knoebel determined to 
be a psychiatric disorder was deferred by him to the appropriate 
specialist. 
Further, Dr. Knoebel concluded that the applicant was 
precluded from heavy lifting, but that the applicant could lift up 
to 3 5 pounds occasionally, and 20 pounds frequently. The applicant 
was precluded from "climbing ladders or working at heights and . . . 
from frequent walking, squatting, kneeling and stair climbing 
activities.»' 
The evidence shows that the applicant cannot return to his job 
duties which he was performing as an asbestos remover. He needs 
vocational rehabilitation. 
Dr. Knoebel agreed with Dr. Howe that the calcaneus fracture 
with intra-articular subtalar bone displacement reasonably resulted 
in a 16 percent lower extremity impairment. However, Dr. Knoebel 
determined that the applicant's symptoms warranted a subsequent 
subtalar arthrodesis, and that the applicant alsoN had some 
additional restriction of ankle flexion and extension. Based upon 
Table 42 of the AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent 
Impairment, 4th Edition (Guides), Dr. Knoebel gave the applicant a 
combined impairment of 22 percent of the lower extremity. 
Dr. Knoebel did not give us the whole person rating, but 
Paragraph 3.2 of the Guides tell us that in order to arrive at a 
whole person impairment, " [multiplying a lower extremity 
impairment percent by 0.4 yields the whole-person impairment 
percent." Multiplying 22 percent by 0.4 yields .088 which when 
rounded gives us a nine percent whole person rating. 
Dr. Knoebel also determined that the applicant reached maximum 
medical stabilization on July 20, 1993, and that he was temporarily 
and totally disabled from July 28, 1991 to July 20, 1993. The 
applicant drew unemployment benefits of $5,060 from May 17, 1992 
through May 29, 1993 even though he was temporarily and totally 
disabled. The applicant is entitled to temporary and total 
disability compensation for this period, but th€» unemployment 
benefits which were paid for this period must be paid back to the 
Utah Department of Employment Security. This is a separate matter 
outside my jurisdiction, and must be resolved between the applicant 
and the Utah Department of Employment Security. 
With regard to future medical treatment, the applicant may 
need a bone scan or C-T scan to evaluate his fusion. If there is 
no problem with the fusion, the applicant may need high top shoes, 
a SACH heel and/or rocker bottom sole to aid him in walking. With 
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regard to any psychological problems which may be related to the 
industrial accident, there is a hint in the records that such may 
be the__case, and. in the interest _of fairness this issue will be 
reserved in the event that the applicant chooses to present 
evidence of such. 
Dr. Knoebel's IME which was provided by the insurance carrier 
is thorough, understandable, and explains why he believes that his 
rating was arrived at using the correct analysis. Dr. Knoebel's 
IME will therefore be adopted for these reasons. 
Although there was a prior compensation agreement between the 
applicant and the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah in this case, 
it appears that the compensation amount was inadequate under the 
revelation of subsequent information, and the Commission has 
continuing jurisdiction under U.C.A. Section 35-1-78 (1953 as 
amended 1990) can modify its former findings and orders. 
There was no evidence that the applicant has inhaled large 
amounts of asbestos, or that he inhaled any job related asbestos*in 
the course of his employment. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
Based on a preponderance of evidence, the employer American 
Asbestos Abatement is liable to Johnny Albert for compensation and 
medical expenses due to an industrial injury which arose out of and 
in the course of employment on July 28, 1991. There was no 
credible evidence presented that the applicant inhaled any asbestos 
in the course of his employment for American Asbestos Abatement, 
therefore American Asbestos Abatement is not liable for any 
asbestos related medical expenses. This claim will be dismissed 
without prejudice since the merits of the issue was not presented. 
ORDER: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the claim of asbestos injury be 
dismissed without prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that American Asbestos Abatement and/or 
the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah pay to Johnny Albert 
temporary total compensation at the rate of $345 per week for 
103.143 weeks for a total of $35,584.35 for temporary total 
disability during the period July 28, 1991 through July 20, 1993. 
American Asbestos Abatement and/or the Workers Compensation Fund of 
Utah shall be given credit for any temporary total disability 
payments previously made. These benefits are accrued and shall be 
paid in a lump sum with interest of eight percent per annum 
commencing effective the date each payment became due. 
JOHNNY ALBERT 
ORDER 
PAGE SIX 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that American Asbestos Abatement and/or 
the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah pay all medical expenses to 
_in_Ql_ud.e_medical .treatment providers, travel, prescriptions, and 
other lawful expenses incurred as a result of the industrial 
accident, said expenses to be paid in accordance with the Medical 
and Surgical Fee Schedule of this Commission. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that American Asbestos Abatement and/or 
the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah pay to Johnny Albert 
permanent partial disability of nine percent of the whole person, 
or $252 per week for 28.08 weeks, for a total of $7,076.16; said 
amount is accrued and is to be paid in a lump sum, plus interest at 
eight percent per annum commencing effective July 21, 1993. 
American Asbestos Abatement and/or the Workers Compensation Fund of 
Utah shall be given credit for any permanent disability payments 
previously made. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that American Asbestos Abatement and/or 
the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah pay to Hans Scheffler, 
attorney for the applicant, the sum of $3,175.62, plus ten percent 
of the interest paid to Johnny Albert, for services rendered in 
this matter. Said fees represent a percentage of the compensation 
generated, pursuant to Commission rule, and are to be deducted from 
the aforesaid award and remitted directly to Mr. Scheffler's 
office. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any issue related to psychological 
impairment is reserved. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the 
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and 
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not 
subject to review or appeal. In the event a Motion for Review is 
*. timely filed, the parties shall have 15 days from the date of 
"filing with the Commission, in which to file a written response 
with the Commission in accordance with U.C.A. Section 63-46b-12(2) . 
DATED THIS / day of February 1994. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the V day of February, 1994, the 
attached ORDER in the case of Johnny Albert was mailed, postage 
pre-paid to the following persons at the following addresses: 
Johnny Albert 
738 Jackson Ave 
Salt Lake City UT 84116 
Hans Scheffler, Atty 
311 S State #380 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Workers Compensation Fund 
Attn: Mark Dean, Atty 
Department of Employment Security 
Attn: Even Mattinson 
Benefit Payment Control 
PO Box 11249 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0249 
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5, The June 16,1997 Industrial Accident with Ameritemps, Inc. Case 
Nos. 991213 and 20011073. 
a. Injuries Caused by the June 16,1997 Industrial Accident at 
Ameritemps, Inc. 
Again, no dispute existed concerning the factual circumstances of Mr. Albert's June 16,1997 
industrial accident with Ameritemps. On June 16,1997 Mr. Albert worked for Ameritemps at 
Cisco Foods driving a self-propelled pallet jack. Mr. Albert crushed his left great toe between 
the pallet jack and a steel "I" beam. 
On June 30,1997 Dr. Stephen Shultz M.D. took an x-ray of Mr. Albert's left foot and 
discovered: 
Significantly angulated fracture of the first proximal phalanx with probable intra-
articular extension. [Exhibit "J-l" at 322]. 
Also on June 30,1997 Dr. William Burleigh DPM operated on Mr. Albert's left foot, which 
consisted of an: "Open-reduction internal fixation, left hallux.9" [id. at 354-355]. On November 
14,1997 Dr. Burleigh performed a second operation on Mr. Albert's left foot that involved: 
"Arthroplasty hallux left foot." [id. at 342]. 
On March 11, 1998 Dr. Howe diagnosed Mr. Albert with; 'Traumatic arthritis to proximate 
interphalangeal joint of left great toe." [id. at 368]. Dr. Howe operated on Mr. Albert's left foot 
for the third surgical procedure: "Left great toe proximal interphalangeal joint fusion with bone 
graft from left tibia." [id.]. 
On July 31,1998 Dr. How determined that Mr. Albert had a: "Failed fusion left great toe 
interphalangeal joint." [id. at 365]. Consequently, Dr. Howe performed the fourth operation on 
Mr. Albert's left foot a repeat: "Fusion of left great toe interphalangeal joint with bone graft from 
left tibia." [id.]. 
On February 25,1999 Dr. Howe gave Mr. Albert an impairment rating for his left foot injuries 
sustained in the June 16,1997 industrial accident, [id. at 148]. Dr. Howe found: 
9
 Great toe. 
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In trying to find a partial impairment for the great toe of Johnny's left foot I have 
had to go to the American Medical Association's Guides to the Evaluation of 
Permanent Impairment 3rd Edition. The 4th Edition only talks about the MP joint 
of the great toe, it does not talk about the IP joint of the great toe. From table 24 
on page 56, with the IP joint fused at 0 degrees he deserves a 45% impairment of 
the great toe. Table 27, page 59 of this correlates to an 8% impairment of the foot 
which using table 36 page 65 con-elates to a 6% lower extremity impairment 
which according to table 46 page 72 correlates to a 2% whole person impairment, 
[id.]. 
On August 15,2002 Dr. Joel Dall provided an impairment rating for Mr. Albert's left foot 
injuries sustained in the June 16,1997 industrial accident, [id. at 115]. Dr, Dall concluded that: 
In regards to the toe injury, the Fifth Edition refers to Table 17-30 for impairment 
due to ankylosis10 in the toes. His great toe is ankylosed in a position of function 
which provides a four percent whole person impairment, [id.]. 
Because Dr. Dall used the more current and applicable Fifth Edition to the American Medical 
Associations Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, I found his impairment rating 
to be better supported than that given by Dr. Howe based on the Third Edition. Accordingly, the 
preponderance of the better supported medical evidence in this case favored the rating supplied 
by Dr. Dall with respect to Mr. Albert's left foot injuries sustained in the June 16,1997 industrial 
accident. Therefore the preponderance of the evidence in this case established that Mr. Albert's 
industrial accident with Ameritemps on June 16,1997 caused him a 4% whole person 
impairment due to his left foot injury.11 
b. Temporary Total and Permanent Partial Disability 
Compensation Benefits Owed by Ameritenips, Inc. and/or 
Hartford Ins. as a Result of Johnny Albert's June 16,1997 
Industrial Accident 
10
 Bone fusion. 
11
 Ameritemps questioned Mr. Albert concerning a number of incidents where Mr. Albert 
sustained trauma to his left great toe after the June 16,1997 industrial accident. However, no 
medical evidence existed that demonstrated a causal connection between the subsequent 
incidents referred to by Ameritemps and a significant, or ratable, impairment to Mr. Albert's left 
foot other than that caused by his June 16,1997 industrial accident. 
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With the exception of one day at Erickson Construction, Mr. Albert never worked again after the 
June 16,1997 industrial accident. Ameritemps claimed that it paid Mr. Albert $25,098.00 in 
temporary total disability compensation from June 16,1997, to February of 1999. Mr. Albert did 
not contradict the assertions of Ameritemps with respect to the payment of temporary total 
disability compensation. Neither party addressed the payment of permanent partial disability 
compensation with respect to Mr. Albert's June 16,1997 industrial accident. Because of the 
resolution of the permanent total disability claim herein, I deferred further consideration of the 
issues concerning temporary total disability compensation and permanent partial disability 
compensation. 
C. Permanent Total Disability Compensation. 
1. Permanent Total Disability, 
As set forth in Section IF. supra, the respondents conceded that Mr. Albert was permanently and 
totally disabled. However, each of the respondents denied that the respective industrial accident 
associated with that particular respondent caused Mr. Albert's permanent total disability. 
2. The Cause of Johnny Albert's Permanent Total Disability. 
Mr. Albert incurred a 2Vz % whole person impairment as a result of the low back injury he 
sustained on June 18,1990 while employed for Quality Plating, [see: Section IILB.2. supra]. Mr. 
Albert remained off work only one week following his June 18,1990 industrial injury then 
returned to regular employment with Quality Plating, [see: Section DI.B.2.a. supra]. 
Mr. Albert also incurred a 2Vi % whole person impairment as a result of the low back injury he 
sustained on January 21,1991 while employed for Barnard & Burk. [see: Section DI.B.3. supra]. 
Mr. Albert did not identify any lost time from work as a result of his January 21, 1991 industrial 
accident, [see: Section IH.B.3.b. supra]. 
Mr. Albert's industrial accident with American Asbestos on July 28,1991 resulted in a 9% whole 
person impairment as a result of injuries to his right foot caused by the accident, [see: Section 
IELBAa. supra]. Because of the injuries cause to Mr. Albert's right foot by his industrial accident 
on July 28,1991, Dr. Jee stated: 
He should be retrained for an occupation that will not involve prolonged walking 
or standing. Furthermore, he cannot climb up ladders, or heights, due to risk of 
falling. An ideal position would either involve a job at a work bench sitting or a 
desk job. Exhibit "J-l" at 233]. 
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On November 30,1993 Dr. Howe described Mr. Albert's "Functional Work Capacity" as result 
of his right foot injuries from the July 28,1991 industrial accident: 
Preclusion from heavy lifting, climbing ladders, working at heights and from 
frequent walking, squatting, kneeling and stair climbing, [id. at 212]. 
Nevertheless, after a lengthy convalescence Mr. Albert sallied forth again into the work force at 
Ameritemps. Mr. Albert's industrial accident with Ameritemps on June 16,1997 resulted in a 
4% whole person impairment as a result of injuries to his left foot caused by the accident, [see: 
Section III.B.5.a. supra]. Because of the injuries caused to Mr. Albert's left foot by his industrial 
accident on June 16, 1997, Dr. Howe stated: 
Johnny has worked a heavy labor type job. I told him in theory he could return to 
a light duty job, basically a sit-down job. He cannot walk much except to and 
from work, should not be doing any carrying, lifting, etc. [Exhibit "J-1" at 156]. 
Unfortunately, Mr. Albert also suffered from serious psychological problems that caused him 
considerable difficulty in learning new tasks or performing jobs that required any mental acuity. 
After Mr. Albert's industrial accident with American Asbestos on July 28,1991, Barry Richards 
LCSW noted that: 
At this time Johnny's primary (expressed) symptoms are indicative of a normal 
post-traumatic stress response (survival honey moon), with no apparent major 
PTSD symptoms, [id. at 251]. 
On November 30,1993 Dr. Richard Knoeble M.D. diagnosed Mr. Albert with "Severe 
Depression." [id. at 212]. On March 30, 1994 Ralf Gant PhD. completed a full scale 
psychological assessment of Mr. Albert that revealed: 
Johnny produced ... a full scale IQ Score of 83 placing him, by DSM DI-R 
Standards, in the borderline range of intellectual functioning. 
A review of the WAIS-R psychograph indicates severe deficits in long term 
memory, general verbal knowledge., short term memory and attention, general use 
of the language, arithmetic and concentration, impulse control and judgment and 
abstract and logical thinking, [id, at 195]. 
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not. 
worked on 
Your Honor 
a regular 
, the last 
sustained 
date 
basis 
that 
was 
Mr. 
the 
Albert 
date of his 
accident with Ameritemps. That's 6/16 of '97. We would 
ask that you enter an interim finding or temporary 
finding, as it were, of permanent total disability 
benefits beginning CLS of that date running forward 
through the present and continuing, according to—you 
know, how you sort this case out, depending on which 
employer is found responsible. 
Mr. Albert is also interested in having some of 
his medical bills paid, especially for his back pairi sand 
his doctor visits. 
Your Honor, I think that's what we've got by 
way of opening and I wish you luck in sorting out this 
potentially complicated case. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Holm. 
MR. HOLM: Very briefly, Your Honor. I agree 
with Counsel that we're not here to decide whether 
Mr. Albert is disabled. He's clearly permanently and 
totally disabled. Social security has found that to be 
the case and I don't--at least as far as American 
Asbestos and Workers Compensation Fund are concerned, as 
to the accident of July--I think it's 21st or 28th of 
1991, he is disabled. But we, of course, dispute that 
12 
1 that particular accident is the cause of his disability 
2 and that's what we're here about today. 
3 We would offer that there are--that you also 
4 consider that there may be nonindustrial causes to his 
5 condition. The medical report indicates probably a 20 
6 percent preexisting psychological condition of 
7 Mr. Albert that we believe could very well be the cause 
8 of his disability, as opposed to any of the industrial 
9 accidents that occurred. So we do want to offer that 
10 that's also an option that's open and available to Your 
11 Honor, is that none of the accidents that we're here to 
12 talk about today are in fact the cause of Mr. Albert's 
13 disability. 
14 I think based on what I've just said about that 
15 2 0 percent preexisting condition, if you do ultimately 
16 find that the July of 1991 accident is the cause of 
17 disability, then of course we believe we're entitled to 
18 a limitation of our liability to the first 156 weeks, 
c19 there being at least ten percent preexisting, and a 
20 limitation on our obligation to pay medical expenses of 
21 half of those that exceed $20,000. Thank you. 
22 THE COURT: Mr. Kanell. 
23 MR. KANELL: Your Honor, as I mentioned before, 
24 I'm here on the accident which was industrial on 
25 June 16, 1997. And the medical records clearly show 
13 
1 this was not his last accident. And contrary to 
2 Applicant's counsel's statement, we did not crush his 
3 left foot. All we did was--well, it's hard to say, but 
4 we~broke his big tee which required a fusion of the big 
5 toe. 
6 I think the medical records are pretty clear 
7 that nothing that occurred on June 16, 1997 had anything 
8 to do with Mr. Albert's back problem. And so this 
9 injury lasted--we did pay him about $25f000 in f 98 — 
10 25,000 '98 dollars in temporary total disability from 
11 June '97 through February of '99. That's when he was 
12 released, in February of '99, and according to the 
13 medical records released back to work that he could do 
14 before, based upon his big toe. So the doctors are not 
15 saying that his big toe is what is causing him--the 
16 medical records are replete with back problems. 
17 Then we have some subsequent injuries, one in 
18 June of '99 where he reinjured his back and toe, 
19 tripping over some uneven ground or something like that. 
20 And we now--looks like we have some other injuries that 
21 are nonindustrial in 2002. There's also some evidence 
22 in the record that in 1998, while he was still 
23 recuperating, there was an injury at home when he kicked 
24 his daughter, which caused significant more problems 
25 with his big toe. 
14 
1 So at least it's our position there are several 
2 intervening problems. And one of the things that Your 
3 Honor is going to have to deal with in this case is the 
4 differing standards of proof for permanent total 
5 disability. The claims prior to 1994 have one standard, 
6 based upon the statutes that were in existence at that 
7 time. The claim in 1997 is based upon a totally 
8 different statute which requires a direct causal 
9 relationship between the industrial accident and his 
10 permanent total disability and a substantial impairment. 
11 We don't have either one of those in this case. 
12 I think the medical records bear that fact out. And so 
13 even though we are the last industrial accident, I would 
14 just as Your Honor to remember we are not the last 
15 accident. Nor are we the direct cause of his present 
16 condition, because the medical records are clear that 
17 this depression problem was ongoing. And I don't think 
18 you can find any increase in the depression until after 
*-19 the June '99 accident, which was totally nonindustrial. 
20 And that's why I would agree with Mr. Holm in 
21 stating that Mr. Albert's condition may be totally 
22 nonindustrial as this stage, because the psychological 
23 preexisted and then got worse after a nonindustrial 
24 accident. And I don't see that you can see how any 
25 increase in his problem occurred from the '97 accident. 
15 
1 Plus the back problem, contrary to Mr. Burke's 
2 statement that it just got worse over time, there were a 
3 lot of nonindustrial accidents along the way. The 
--4- medical records are replete with trips and falls and all 
5 sorts of things, none of them, of course, related to the' 
6 1997 injury at Ameritemps. 
7 So we would just ask that Your Honor remember 
8 that there are different standards of proof for each 
9 claim here and that the statutes are pretty clear on 
10 what's required for the proof, and submit it with that. 
11 There is one other dispute, Your Honor, that 
12 needs to be resolved with our claim. And it's only a 
13 dispute created by Mr. Burke, because the Application 
14 for Hearing which was filed in our case says that 
15 Mr. Albert was making $8 an hour, working 32 hours per 
16 week. That's pretty accurate. 
17 According to our--he was just a temporary for 
18 us and according to our pay records, the week before 
19 this injury he made $290. The week of this injury, he 
20 made $176. And so there needs to be a determination on 
21 that- But, I mean, we agree basically with the 
22 application. Where he says he was making $8 an hour, 
23 that's accurate, and working about 32 hours a week, 
24 that's pretty accurate based on the records. He only 
25 worked for us for five weeks prior to this accident, so 
16 
1 we don't have much of a history. 
2 THE COURT: Let me ask you this, Mr. Kanell: 
3 Do you agree that Mr. Albert is permanently and totally 
4 disabled or just disputing the cause of that, in 
5 addition to the... 
6 MR. KANELL: Well, you know, it's hard to say, 
7 Your Honor. I don't have any proof to the contrary. 
8 I'm not here to submit proof on that issue. 
9 I would only say that this is a guy who's had 
10 dozen industrial accidents and has been on industrial 
11 compensation pretty much most of his work life. 
12 THE COURT: Mr. Morris. 
13 MR. MORRIS: Thank you, Your Honor. 
14 Representing Quality Plating Company, an employer who 
15 employed Mr. Albert for three months in the summer of--
16 spring and summer of 1990. On June 18th, Mr. Albert 
17 went to work and was lifting some 35-pound pieces of 
18 metal off the floor in his capacity as an electroplater 
**19 and felt some discomfort in his back. 
20 He received some chiropractic treatment for 
21 that injury, a couple of days off work. Actually, he 
22 was off work about a week, according to our records, but 
23 because of a three-day deductible he received 
24 compensation for approximately two or three days. And 
25 that was the extent of our involvement on that injury. 
1
 We believe that the evidence that you will 
2 receive today, either through medical records exhibits 
3 or through testimony, a combination of both, will not 
4 implicate the June 18, 1990 incident as the direct cause 
5 or a significant cause or whatever causal standard is 
6 required under the pre-1995 perm total statute, but that 
7 this incident will not be implicated as the cause of 
8 Mr. Albert's disability. 
9 I agree with Mr. Kanell's statement that the 
10 legislature somewhat reordered the burden of proof, if 
11 you will, and further defined the elements that need to 
12 be proved in order to uphold a finding of permanent 
13 total disability. This was done in 1995 and postdates 
14 our particular injury claim. 
15 However, I would submit that even under 
16 Marshall and Hardman, Norton and Hoskings, the case law 
17 that arises out of the pre-1995 permanent total 
18 disability law that there still has to be a causal 
19 connection. Call it direct cause, call it significant 
20 contributing cause, whatever, what have you, there still 
21 has to be a causal connection and it has to flow 
22 naturally from the accident to the disability.-
23 I think the previous summations have fairly 
24 accurately described the work history and the injury 
25 history that Mr. Albert has undergone since June of 
18 
1 1990. I would direct your attention to two reports--two 
2 evaluations, one done at the request of Mr. Albert's 
3 attorney and one done at the request of Workers 
4 Compensation Fund and AIG. 
5 Dr. Dahl evaluated--recently1 evaluated 
6 Mr. Albert regarding his back problems. And according 
7 to Dr. Dahl, Mr. Albert has a five percent impairment. 
8 Two-and-a-half percent of that, or half of the 
9 impairment rating, was attributed to the June 18, 1990 
10 accident at Quality Plating, my client. And the other 
11 half of that two-and-a-half percent--or I mean the other 
12 half of that five percent rating, or a two-and-a-half 
13 percent impairment, was attributed to Mr. Albert's 
14 accident at Barnard & Burk which occurred in January of 
15 1991, approximately seven months after our accident. 
16 Dr. Knorpp, on the other hand, attributed what 
17 impairment might be found--and Dr. Knorpp was not at all 
18 certain that Mr. Albert had an industrial impairment, 
"1.9 but for the sake of argument if he did, Dr. Knorpp I 
20 believe gave him three to five percent but attributed it 
21 all to the preexisting accident that occurred in 1982 or 
22 perhaps 1986. The date of that accident is somewhat in 
23 doubt. 
24 This was an incident where Mr. Albert was 
25 struck by some trusses. He was working for American 
19 
1 Truss, I think. Is that the name of the employer? I'm 
2 not sure. But in any event, it was Dr. Knorpp's opinion 
3 that that represented--if one could find a significant 
" 4 | "triggering incident, it would have to go back to that 
5 original back injury-back in the early to mid-'80s, 
6 which predates his injury at Quality Plating. 
7 There is ample reference to that incident in 
8 the medical records, although the actual records for 
9 treatment for that early incident have been destroyed. 
10 We attempted to get those records from Able Chiropractic 
11 but they are no longer in existence. 
12 However, there is, in some information that the 
13 Labor Commission provided to the parties, reference to 
14 that accident. There was a packet sent out on November 
15 19th from Sarah Danielson to all of the parties, and in 
16 that packet there is--there are documents that were 
17 submitted to the Labor Commission that do document that 
18 accident. I think it's in 1982. Is that what P-l 
,19 shows? 
20 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: (Inaudible.) 
21 MR. KANELL: It shows an accident date of 
22 November 18, 1982, I believe. And so, under either 
23 Dr. Knorpp's theory or Dr. Dahl' s theory, we submit that 
24 the June 18, 1990 accident cannot be viewed as the 
25 direct or significant--as a direct or significant cause 
20 
1 of Mr. Albert's permanent total disability. 
2 Should, however, Your Honor make that finding, 
3 we would adopt Mr. Holmrs argument as well that our 
4- compensation liability in this case is limited to 50 
5 percent of the first 312 weeks of disability, or 156 
6 weeks, due to the existence of at least a ten percent 
7 preexisting condition. 
8 Responding to Mr. Burke's argument about 
9 whether or not the new perm total statute sanctions 
10 apportionment, I don't believe it does. The case law 
11 that predates that statute is quite solid in affirming 
12 that there is no legislative authority for apportionment 
13 of permanent total disability benefits in accident cases 
14 --sequential accident cases. 
15 I believe that under fundamental rules of 
16 statutory construction and stare decisis that all of us 
17 learned in law school that unless the legislature 
18 specifically overrules that pronouncement by the courts, 
19 that that rule of law continues. There is nothing in 
20 the new perm total statute or the 1995 statute that 
21 specifically overrules the Utah Supreme Court and Court 
22 of Appeals' prior pronouncements as to apportionment. 
23 And I think that if we are going to say that 
24 there is apportionment now, you would have to find 
25 something that specifically--specifically sanctions that 
21 
1 rule of law. Otherwise, the rule of construction is 
2 that stare decisis is not overruled unless there is some 
3 specific legislative act that clearly does so. So I 
4 think Marshall, Hardman, Duane Brown Chevrolet, Mountain 
5 States Steely these cases that go way back into my 
6 distant memory are still good law on the issue of 
7 whether or not you can apportion it. 
8 I think, unfortunately, Your Honor, your task 
9 here today is to wade through the--sift through the 
10 exhibits and determine which of these accidents, if. any, 
11 are the direct or significant cause of his permanent 
12 total disability. 
13 Finally, thesre is one little housecleaning 
14 matter with regard to Quality Plating. If further 
15 benefits are awarded against my client, we need to come 
16 to an agreement or finding on the compensation rate. In 
17 the materials supplied by the Labor Commission there is 
18 a 141 form that was filed by the Workers Compensation 
19 Fund, signed by its adjuster. The date stamp on it from 
20 the Labor Commission is July 9, 1990. It's a 
21 computation of benefit form indicating that Mr. Albert's 
22 average weekly wage at the time of his June 19^-excuse 
23 me, June 18, 1990 accident was $180.42. Compensation 
24 was based on that average weekly wage. 
25 I freely acknowledge that given the age of this 
22 
claim that I have no payroll records or anything to 
support that filing. However, I would argue that that 
filing is contemporaneous and represents a business 
record submitted to the Labor Commission in the ordinary 
course of business from the Workers Comp Fund. 
If Your Honor does not consider that to be the 
best evidence of what his compensation rate should be 
for this accident, I would fall back upon the First 
Report of Injury that was signed by the president of 
Quality Plating on June 26, 1990, which indicated an 
average--which indicated a weekly wage rate of $5.50 an 
hour for a 40-hour week. That is what is alleged in the 
Application for Hearing and we would submit that in no 
case could benefits be awarded at a rate higher than 
that, both pled in the Application for Hearing and 
indicated in the Employer's First Report of Injury. 
And so we submit our case on that basis. 
THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Taylor. 
MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, I'd like to respond to 
the January 21, 1991 injury with Barnard & Burk. 
Essentially, that injury resulted in two chiropractic 
visits and less than $200 in medical expenses paid. 
There was no lost time from that accident, no ongoing 
medical care. 
The records in the exhibits will show that the 
23 
day following the injury with Barnard & Burk, the 
Applicant filed an Application for Hearing with the 
Labor Commission involving the injury with Quality 
Plating and that his focus at that time and the 
treatment for his back was what he would attribute to 
his injury with Quality Plating. 
I think it's significant that there is this 
1982 injury and we have been able to locate some records 
for that. That was with Transwest Buildings Supply. 
All the records that we've been able to locate indicate 
Hartford as the carrier. And I don't believe that ^
 v 
Hartford is here or a representative from Transwest 
Builder. I'm not sure if Ms. Hayashi is entering an 
appearance on behalf of this particular injury. 
The injury date on the record is November 4, 
1982. And there's a record from MedFirst on page 305 
for treatment for that injury. Also, there is 
chiropractic records from 30--on page 308. And 
according to those records, he was injured on 
November 4th and was off work until November 22nd. So 
he was off work from that '82 injury for a longer period 
of time than his injury with Quality Plating. And 
again, his injury with Barnard & Burk resulted in no 
time loss. 
I think it's significant that Dr. Knorpp 
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1 attributed the three percent rating that he came up with 
2 to the 1982 accident. He describes that accident as a 
3 sentinel event in the Applicant's life and that he had a 
4- documented chronic low back problem from that accident 
5 forward. 
6 Your Honor, following the injury with Barnard & 
7 Burk, the Applicant went back to regular duty and worked 
8 in a heavy industry thereafter with no permanent work 
9 restrictions. It's interesting that Dr. Dahl assigned 
10 the five percent rating to the low back, but he 
11 apportioned it 50 percent to the June '90 injury and 50 
12 percent to the January '91 injury. But he also notes in 
13 his report that he thinks it's very difficult to even 
14 come up with that rating and I think he's giving the 
15 Applicant the benefit of the doubt in doing that. 
16 I have some concerns that I think Transwest 
17 Builders Supply needs to be here, that Hartford 
18 Insurance or whoever their carrier is also needs to be 
19 here. I think that accident in '82 was significant in 
20 terms of causing the Applicant's back problems. 
21 And I would echo the remarks of Mr. Kanell that 
22 he has had multiple intervening injuries that have 
23 aggravated his back in the more recent past. It's also 
24 significant that his social security award was given for 
25 his psychiatric condition and not his lower back. And 
25 
1 we would submit that he will not be able to sustain his 
2 burden of proof for permanent total disability benefits 
3 with respect to the January 1991 accident. 
4-4 THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Hayashi. 
5 MS. HAYASHI: Yes, Your Honor. _ I'm going to 
6 first address the Uninsured Employers Fund issue. I 
7 would echo Ms. Taylor • s concerns about the fact that 
8 Transwest and/or its insurance carrier are not here. 
9 The Uninsured Employers Fund was named as a party and 
10 the Commission's not (inaudible) to verify coverage on 
11 behalf of Hartford. 
12 Unfortunately, I haven't been able to confirm' 
13 whether or not Hartford--whether or not Transwest was 
14 insured by Hartford or not. There are some Labor 
15 Commission records which would indicate policy coverage, 
16 other than the Employers First Report which was filed on 
17 a Hartford claim form, and also the records that were 
18 referenced by Ms. Taylor which are on pages 3 05, 306 and 
19 3 08 of the medical records also indicate that Hartford 
20 was the insurance carrier at the time. 
21 And also particularly when we had (inaudible) 
22 Mr. Albert's deposition, he did indicate that someone 
23 did pay for his medical expenses. I think probably 
24 (inaudible) for the case but had those medical expenses 
25 and time off not been paid by somebody, the Uninsured 
26 
1 Employers Fund would have--it would have somehow come "to 
2 the attention of somebody, although there are no 
3 compensation reports that are filed with the Labor 
4 Commission. 
5 As far as the medical evidence, Dr. Dahl does 
6 not apportion any impairment to that f82 injury, 
7 although I realize that Dr. Knorpp does. And I would 
8 say that both of those doctors were limited by the 
9 medical information that they were given or asked to 
10 review due to the fact that those records just were not 
11 available. And especially with Hartford not--or 
12 (inaudible) Transwest's insurance carrier has not been a 
13 part of these proceedings, that we would have no record 
14 (inaudible). 
15 And on behalf of the Employers Reinsurance 
16 Fund, of course the Employers Reinsurance Fund would 
17 only have a portion of liability for any pre-1994 
18 (inaudible) which would include the '82 injury, the 1990 
t9 (inaudible), the June 28th of 1991 injury. 
20 MR. HOLM: July 2 8th. 
21 MS. HAYASHI: July 28th, I'm sorry. 
22 (Inaudible.) 
23 The Employers Reinsurance Fund would also 
24 contend that there are various nonindustrial causes that 
25 could be the cause of Mr. Albert's inability to continue 
27 
1 working. We also don't have any evidence to show that 
2 he's unable to work (inaudible) period that he has 
3 J (inaudible) and that he is unable to engage in gainful 
4 employment. 
5 But we'd also co'ntend that the 1997 injury was 
6 significant, although he only received a (inaudible) 
7 percent impairment rating (inaudible) postsurgery. I 
8 believe if you look at Dr. McCann's report, he 
9 attributes ten percent to all industrial accidents. He 
10 doesn't simply place them on the 1991 injury-or the 
11 nineteen--July 28th, 1991 injury or the January 21st 
12 (inaudible). He apportioned it to all the industrial 
13 injuries. 
14 And so the Employers Reinsurance Fund would ask 
15 that you consider the fact that Mr. Albert has 
16 repeatedly requested an amputation of his toe, although 
17 he realizes that there are no doctors that are 
18 recommending the amputation. But in fact Mr. Albert 
19^ 1 sees it as a very significant cause for what his current 
20 medical condition is. 
21 And the fact that the social security awarded 
22 his onset date as of the date of injury (includible) --I 
23 believe it was September 17th of 1997. We believe that 
24 that is a significant cause of his being unable to 
25 return to work. 
28 
1 I'd also like to address an issue about 
2 Dr. McCann's report. Dr. McCann has attributed 30 
3 percent to psychological causes, ten percent of 
4 (inaudible)--ten percent of--I forget how he phrased it. 
5 But I would contend that he did not say that 20 percent 
6 of his medical condition is preexisting. The Employers 
7 Reinsurance Fund will stipulate to a ten percent 
8 preexisting for purposes of the Employers Reinsurance 
9 Fund apportionment of liability. 
10 But I would suggest that you read Dr. McCann's 
11 report carefully. He does not attribute all of his 2 0 
12 percent nonindustrial to preexisting causes (inaudible) 
13 I believe he says that they're nonindustrial causes. 
14 And I would concur with (inaudible). This 
15 really is a case of just, you know, which injury caused 
16 or--which injury or (inaudible). 
17 THE COURT: Okay. 
18 MR. HOLM: Your Honor, I just wanted to add one 
19 thing. With regard to the compensation rate on our 
20 accident, that is the law of the case based on the 
21 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order of 
22 February 4 of 1994, which was affirmed ultimately by the 
23 Court of Appeals. He was earning $510.20 per week, 
24 which would compute to a maximum permanent total 
25 disability rate of $321 per week. 
29 
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Albert v. American Asbestos Abatement et al, 
"Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law, and Order" by 
Judge Richard M. La Jeunesse, dated July 22, 2003. 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
P.O. BOX 146615 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615 
Case Nos. 97576,991213,991214,20011070,20011071,20011072,20011073, and 2002595 
JOHNNY ALBERT, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
* 
AMERICAN ASBESTOS ABATEMENT * 
and/or WORKERS COMPENSATION * 
FUND; QUALITY PLATING and/or * 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND; * 
BARNARD &BURK GROUP, INC. * 
and/or NATIONAL UNION FTRE INS.; * 
AMERITEMPS, INC. and/or * 
HARTFORD INS.; TRANSWEST * 
CONSTRUCTION; UNINSURED * 
EMPLOYERS' FUND; EMPLOYERS' * 
REINSURANCE FUND, * 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND ORDER 
Judge: Richard M. La Jeunesse 
Respondents, * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
HEARING: Room 334, Labor Commission, 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
on December 17,2002 at 08:30 a.m. Said Hearing was pursuant to Order 
and Notice of the Commission. 
BEFORE: Richard M. La Jeunesse, Administrative Law Judge. 
APPEARANCES: The petitioner, Johnny Albert, was present and represented by his attorney 
Richard Burke. 
The respondents, Quality Plating and Workers Compensation Fund 
(hereinafter collectively referred to as Quality), were represented by 
attorney Elliott K. Morris. 
The respondents, American Asbestos Abatement and Workers 
Compensation Fund (hereinafter collectively referred to as American 
Asbestos), were represented by attorney Floyd W. Holm. 
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The respondents, Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. and National Union Fire 
Ins. (hereinafter collectively referred to as Barnard & Burk), were 
represented by attorney Carrie Taylor. 
The respondents, Ameritemps, Inc. and Hartford Ins. (hereinafter 
collectively referred to as Ameritemps), were represented by attorney 
Theodore E. Kanell. 
The respondents, Uninsured Employers' Fund and Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund (hereinafter referred to as UEF and ERF respectively), 
were represented by attorney Sherrie Hayashi. 
The respondent, Transwest Construction (hereinafter Transwest), was a 
defunct corporation and did not appear at the hearing. However, the 
Uninsured Employers' Fund defended the issues that involved Transwest 
at the hearing. 
L STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, 
A. Claims against Quality Plating and Workers Compensation Fund in 
Case Nos. 91000124 and 20011070. 
Johnny Albert filed two "Applications For Hearing" with the Utah Labor Commission against 
Quality. Mr. Albert filed his first "Application for Hearing" against Quality on January 24, 1991 
(Case No. 91000124), and claimed entitlement to the payment of medical expenses associated 
with an industrial accident he suffered at Quality on June 18,1990. On July 2, 1991 Judge 
Timothy Allen entered an Order (hereinafter the 1991 Order) that resolved the issues raised in 
Case No. 91000124. 
Mr. Albert filed his second "Application For Hearing" against Quality on October 3,2001 (Case 
No. 20011070), and claimed entitlement to the following workers' compensation benefits: (1) 
medical expenses; (2) temporary total disability compensation, and; (3) permanent partial 
disability compensation. Mr. Albert's claim for workers' compensation benefits in Case No. 
20011070 arose out of the same industrial accident with Quality that occurred on June 18,1990. 
On May 21, 2002 Mr. Albert filed an "Amended AppUcation for Hearing" in Case No. 20011070 
to include a claim for permanent total disability. Mr. Albert's claims against Quality in Case No. 
20011070 are the claims currently under consideration in the present matter. 
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B. Claims Against American Asbestos Abatement and Workers 
Compensation Fund in Case Nos. 93895,97576,991214, and 
20011072. 
Mr. Albert filed four "Applications For Hearing" with the Utah Labor Commission against 
American Asbestos. Mr. Albert filed his first "Application for Hearing" against American 
Asbestos" on July 15,1993 (Case No. 93895), and claimed entitlement to: (1) medical expenses; 
(2) recommended medical care; (3) temporary total disability compensation, and; (4) permanent 
partial disability compensation. Mr. Albert's claim for workers' compensation benefits against 
American Asbestos arose out of an industrial accident that occurred on July 28,1991. On 
February 4,1994 Judge Benjamin Sims entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order 
(hereinafter the 1994 Order) that resolved the issues raised in Case No. 93895. 
Mr. Albert filed his second "Application For Hearing" against American Asbestos on July 15, 
1997 (Case No. 97576), and claimed entitlement to the following workers' compensation 
benefits: (1) medical expenses; (2) recommended medical care, and; (3) permanent partial 
disability compensation. Mr. Albert's claim for workers' compensation benefits in Case No. 
97576 arose out of the same industrial accident with American Asbestos that occurred on July 
28,1991. 
Mr. Albert filed his third "Application For Hearing" against American Asbestos on December 
22,1999 (Case No. 991214), and claimed entitlement to the following workers' compensation 
benefits: (1) medical expenses; (2) recommended medical care, and; (3) permanent partial 
disability compensation. Mr. Albert's claim for workers' compensation benefits in Case No. 
991214 again arose out of the same industrial accident with American Asbestos that occurred on 
July 28, 1991. 
Mr. Albert filed his fourth "Application For Hearing" against American Asbestos on October 3, 
2001 (Case No. 20011072), and claimed entitlement to the following workers' compensation 
benefits: (1) medical expenses; (2) temporary total disability compensation, and; (3) permanent 
partial disability compensation. Mr. Albert's claim for workers' compensation benefits in Case 
No. 20011072 also arose out of the same industrial accident with American Asbestos that 
occurred on July 28,1991. 
On May 21,2002 Mr. Albert filed an "Amended Application for Hearing" in Case Nos. 97576, 
991214, and 20011072 to include a claim for permanent total disability. Mr. Albert's claims 
against American Asbestos in Case Nos. 97576,991214, and 20011072 are the claims currently 
under consideration in the present matter. 
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C. Claims against Ameritemps, Inc. and Hartford Ins. in Case Nos. 
991213 and 20011073. 
Mr. Albert filed two "Applications For Hearing" with the Utah Labor Commission against 
Ameritemps. Mr. Albert filed his first "Application for Hearing" against Ameritemps on 
December 22,1999 (Case No. 991213), and claimed entitlement to the paiyment of medical 
expenses together with recommended medical care related to an industrial accident he suffered at 
Ameritemps on June 16,1997. 
Mr. Albert filed his second "Application For Hearing" against Ameritemps on October 3,2001 
(Case No. 20011073), and claimed entitlement to the following workers' compensation benefits: 
(1) medical expenses; (2) temporary total disability compensation, and; (3) permanent partial 
disability compensation. Mr. Albert's claim for workers' compensation benefits in Case No. 
20011073 arose out of the same industrial accident with Quality that occurred on June 16,1997. 
On May 21, 2002 Mr. Albert filed an "Amended Application for Hearing" in Case Nos. 991213 
and 20011073 to include a claim for permanent total disability. Mr. Albert's claims against 
Ameritemps in Case Nos. 991213 and 20011073 are the claims currently under consideration in 
the present matter. 
D. Claims against Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. National Union Fire Ins. 
in Case No. 20011071. 
Mr. Albert filed one "Application For Hearing" against Barnard & Burk with the Utah Labor 
Commission on October 3,2001 (Case No. 20011071). Mr. Albert claimed entitlement to the 
following workers' compensation benefits: (1) medical expenses; (2) temporary total disability 
compensation, and; (3) permanent partial disability compensation. Mr. Albert's claim for 
workers' compensation benefits in Case No. 20011071 arose out of an industrial accident that 
occurred while employed by Barnard & Burk on January 1,1991. 
On May 21, 2002 Mr. Albert filed an "Amended Application for Hearing" in Case No. 20011071 
to include a claim for permanent total disability. Mr. Albert's claims against Barnard & Burk in 
Case No. 20011071 remained under consideration in the present matter. 
E. Claims against Transwest Construction and Uninsured Employers' 
Fund in Case No. 2002595. 
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Mr. Albert filed one "Application For Hearing" against Transwest with the Utah Labor 
Commission on May 21,2002 (Case No. 2002595). Mr. Albert claimed entitlement to 
permanent total disability compensation. Mr. Albert's claim for workers' compensation benefits 
in Case No. 2002595 arose out of an industrial accident that occurred while employed by 
Transwest on November 4,1982. 
F. Position of the Respondents. 
The respondents conceded that Mr. Albert was permanently and totally disabled. However, each 
of the respondents alleged that an injury other than the one respectively defended by the 
individual respondents directly caused Mr. Albert's permanent total disability. Quality Plating 
also claimed that the industrial accident of June 8,1990 came up short as the legal cause of Mr. 
Albert's back problems. 
G. The Hearing on December 17,2002. 
At the conclusion of the hearing on December 17,2002,1 agreed to leave the evidentiary record 
open 30 days for the receipt of some additional medical records. On January 14,2003 I received 
the anticipated medical records and closed the evidentiary record. 
II. ISSUES. 
1. What is the direct cause of Johnny Albert's permanent total disability? 
2. Which of the respondents, if any, owe Johnny Albert permanent total disabihty 
compensation? 
HI. FINDINGS OF FACT 
A. Employment and Compensation Rates. 
1. Transwest Construction. 
No dispute existed that Transwest employed Mr. Albert on November 4,1982. At the time of 
the November 4,1982 industrial accident at Transwest, Mr. Albert was not married and had no 
dependent children. 
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Mr. Albert listed on his "Application for Hearing" against Transwest a wage rate of $9.00 per 
hour, and a 40 hour per workweek average. At the hearing Mr. Albert testified that he earned 
$8.00 per hour from Transwest, and worked a 40 hour week on average. When confronted with 
the wage rate set forth on the Employers' First Report of Injury in Exhibit "6," Mr. Albert 
conceded he probably earned $4.00 per hour and worked 40 hours per week on average. 
The preponderance of the more credible evidence in this case established that at the time of his 
industrial accident with Transwest on November 4,1982, Mr. Albert earned $4.00 per hour and 
worked 40 hours per week on average. Accordingly, Mr. Albert's appropriate workers' 
compensation rate with Transwest equaled $107.00 per week. [$4.00/hour x 40 hours/week = 
$160.00/week x 2/3 = $107.00/week]. 
2. Quality Plating. 
No dispute existed that Quality employed Mr. Albert on June 18,1990. At the time of the June 
18,1990 industrial accident at Quality, Mr. Albert was not married, but had one dependent child. 
In Case No. 20011070 involving Quality, Mr. Albert listed on his "Application for Hearing" a 
wage rate of $5.50 per hour together with a 40 hour per workweek average. At the hearing Mr. 
Albert testified that he earned $9.00 per hour from Quality, and worked a 40 hour week on 
average. Exhibit "7," The Employers' First Report of Injury filed by Quality with respect to the 
June 18,1990 industrial accident, listed a wage rate for Mr. Albert of $5.50 per hour. 
The preponderance of the more credible evidence in this case established that at the time of his 
industrial accident with Quality on June 18,1990, Mr. Albert earned $5.50 per hour and worked 
40 hours per week on average. Accordingly, Mr. Albert's appropriate workers' compensation 
rate with Quality equaled $152.00 per week. [$5.50/hour x 40 hours/week = $220.00/week x 2/3 
= $146.66/week + 5.00/week (dependent's allowance) = $152.00/week (rounded to nearest whole 
dollar)]. 
3. Barnard & Burk. 
No dispute existed that Barnard & Burk employed Mr. Albert on January 21,1991. At the time 
of the January 21,1991 industrial accident at Barnard & Burk, Mr. Albert was not married, but 
had one dependent child. 
Mr. Albert's testimony at the hearing on December 17,2002 provided the unrefuted evidence 
concerning his wage rate with Barnard & Burk on January 21,1991. Mr. Albert earned an 
average weekly wage of $473.20 from Barnard & Burk. Accordingly, Mr. Albert's appropriate 
temporary total disability compensation rate equaled $320.00 per week. [$473.20 x 
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2/3 = 315.46/week + $5.00/week (dependent's allowance) = $320.00 rounded to the nearest 
whole dollar)]. The maximum permanent partial disability compensation rate as of January 21, 
1991 equaled $243.00 per week. The maximum permanent total disability compensation rate as 
of January 21,1991 equaled $309.00 per week. 
4. American Asbestos Abatement 
Judge Sims in his February 4,1994 Order determined the appropriate workers' compensation 
rates for Mr. Albert's July 28,1991 industrial accident with American Asbestos. Judge Sims 
concluded that Mr. Albert's weekly wage rate equaled $510.20 per week as of July 28,1991 
[1994 Order at p. 3], which yielded: (1) a temporary total disability compensation rate of $345.00 
per week [id. at p. 5]; (2) a permanent partial disability compensation rate of $252.00 per week 
[id. at p. 6], and; (3) a permanent total disability compensation rate of $252.00 per week. I 
adopted the findings and conclusions of the 1984 Order insofar as consistent with the present 
Order. 
5. Ameritemps, Inc. 
No dispute existed that Ameritemps employed Mr. Albert on June 16,1997. At the time of the 
June 16,1997 industrial accident at Ameritemps, Mr. Albert was not married, but had two 
dependent children. 
Mr. Albert provided four different wage rates with respect to his employment at Ameritemps. In 
Case No. 991213 involving Ameritemps, Mr. Albert listed on his "Application for Hearing" a 
wage rate of $9.00 per hour together with a 50 hour per workweek average. In case No. 
20011073 against Ameritemps, Mr. Albert set forth in his "Application for Hearing" a wage rate 
of $8.00 per hour, and a 32 hour per workweek average. In his "Amended Application for 
Hearing" filed in Case No. 20011073 Mr. Albert claimed his appropriate temporary total 
disability compensation rate should equal $292.33 per week consistent with a "Compensation 
Agreement" between Mr. Albert and Ameritemps executed on March 29,1999. At the hearing 
Mr. Albert testified that he earned $9.00 per hour from Ameritemps, and worked a 40 hour week 
on average. 
Ameritemps introduced into evidence Exhibit "2," a payroll history of Mr. Albert with 
Ameritemps from May 17,1997, to June 21,1997. Exhibit "2" set forth precise information 
concerning Mr. Albert's wages in the five weeks leading up to his industrial accident on June 16, 
1997: 
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Pay Day 
May 17,1997 
May 24,1997 
May 31,1997 
June 7,1997 
June 14, 1997 
Total 
Weekly Gross Pay 
$399.20 
$262.40 
$370.40 
$400.16 
$290.40 
$1,722.561 
The best evidence in this case concerning Mr. Albert's average weekly wage with Ameritemps at 
the time of his industrial accident on June 16,1997 came from his actual payroll history 
contained in Exhibit "2." The preponderance of the more credible evidence in this case 
established that Mr. Albert's weekly wage with Ameritemps at the time of his industrial accident 
on June 16,1997 averaged $344.51. [$1,722.56 -*• 5 weeks = $344.51/week]. Accordingly, Mr. 
Albert's appropriate workers' compensation rate with Ameritemps equaled $240.00 per week. 
[$344.51/week x 2/3 = $229.67/week + 10.00/week (dependents' allowance) = $240.00/week 
(rounded to nearest whole dollar)]. 
B. The Respective Industrial Accidents and Consequent Injuries. 
1. The November 4,1982 Industrial Accident with Transwest 
Construction Case No. 2002595. 
The essential facts of Mr. Albert's November 4,1982 industrial accident at Transwest stood 
undisputed by the parties. On November 4,1982 Mr. Albert worked at Transwest building 
trusses. A stack of the trusses fell over on his low back. Mr. Albert pushed himself out from 
under the trusses. 
Mr. Albert remained off of work with low back pain for one week following the November 4, 
1982 industrial accident at Transwest Mr. Albert claimed that between 1982, and 1990, he 
sustained no further injuries to his low back. 
11 did not factor in the last check received by Mr. Albert on June 21,1997, because his 
industrial accident occurred on June 16,1997 affecting the number of hours he worked that 
week. 
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a. Injuries Caused by the November 4,1982 Industrial Accident 
at Transwest Construction. 
The parties concurred that no contemporaneous medical records could be located with respect to 
the injuries caused by Mr. Albert's November 4,1982 industrial accident. Of the many medical 
opinions in this case, only Dr. Joel Dall M.D. and Dr. Scott Knorp M.D. addressed Mr. Albert's 
low back problems in connection with the November 4,1982 industrial accident at Transwest. 
On August 15,2002 Dr. Dall diagnosed Mr. Albert with "Chronic low back pain, 
multifactoral...." [Exhibit "J-l" at 113]. Dr. Dall rated Mr. Albert's low back condition: 
[c]omplaints of low back pain.... [b]ased on his description and my examination 
today, I feel he would best fall into Category 1C (see page 16 in Utah's 2002 
Impairment Guides) which is awarded five percent whole person impairment, [id. 
at 115]. 
Dr. Dall determined that: 
[b]ased on the fact that he lost no time from work I would apportion 0 percent of 
his back injury to the incident at Tram Core2 on 11-18-19S23." [id.]. 
On November 25,2002 Dr. Knorp also diagnosed Mr. Albert with '^ Nonspecific subjective low 
back pain...." [id. at 21]. Dr. Knorp commented concerning a rating for Mr. Albert's low back 
condition; 
Quite frankly, it is my best medical judgment that there is no objective medical 
evidence, and certainly no consistent or reliable historical information to support 
any ratable impairment offered on behalf of Mr. Albert with respect to his spinal 
complaints, [id. at26].4 
2
 Actually Transwest. 
3
 As determined supra Mr. Albert's industrial accident at Transwest in fact occurred on 
November^ 1982. 
4
 Dr. Knorp in another portion of his opinion seemed to hedge his bets with a facetious 
3% whole person impairment rating postulated by cynically disregarding all of what Dr. Knorp 
deemed valid objective medical and historical evidence, [id. at 26]. Accordingly, I gave no 
consideration to Dr. Knoip's ironic 3% impairment rating. 
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Albert v. American Asbestos Abatement et al 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order 
page 10 
The preponderance of the more credible evidence in this case supported the opinion rendered by 
Dr. Dall that Mr. Albert suffered from chronic low back pain, which resulted in a 5% whole 
person impairment.5 The medical record in this case contained a consistent chronology of 
treatment for back pain suffered by Mr. Albert over a span df years, [see gen: id. at pp. 147-148, 
150,254-258, 260-300, 302, 310-318]. However, Dr. Dall apportioned none of Mr. Albert's 5% 
permanent partial impairment to his industrial accident of November 4,1982. Therefore, while 
Mr. Albert suffered from chronic back pain that resulted in a 5% whole person impairment, none 
of his rated low back problems derived from the remote November 1982 industrial accident at 
Transwest. 
b. Workers' Compensation Benefits Owed by Transwest 
Construction and/or Uninsured Employers' Fund as a Result 
of Johnny Albert's November 4,1982 Industrial Accident 
Mr. Albert's single "Application for Hearing" against Transwest and UEF as represented in Case 
No. 2002595 claimed only permanent total disability compensation. As set forth in Section 
IH.C.l .a. supra Mr. Albert suffered no permanent impairment from his November 4,1982 
industrial accident with Transwest. Consequently, Mr. Albert's November 4,1982 industrial 
accident could not have caused his permanent total disability. Therefore, Mr. Albert's claim 
against Transwest and UEF for permanent total disability compensation must be dismissed with 
prejudice. 
2. The June 18,1990 Industrial Accident with Quality Plating Case No. 
20011070. 
a. Injuries Caused by the June 18,1990 Industrial Accident at 
Quality Plating. 
No dispute existed concerning the essential facts of Mr. Albert's industrial accident at Quality. 
On June 18,1990 Mr. Albert picked up a stack of metal plates that weighed 30 to 40 pounds, and 
put them on a table. While he lifted the plates Mr. Albert felt his low back pop. Mr. Albert 
remained off work for one week and treated with a chiropractor for his low back problems 
sustained in the June 18,1990 industrial accident. Dr. Dall apportioned half of Mr. Albert's 5% 
whole person impairment from his chronic low back pain to the June 18,1990 incident. 
5
 Utah Administrative Code R. 602-2-2.A.2. requires that a medical controversy over an 
impairment rating over 5% be sent to a medical panel for consideration. In the present matter the 
discrepancy between Dr. Knorp's 0% impairment rating and Dr. Dall's 5% whole person 
impairment rating did not exceed 5%. Therefore no necessity existed for the referral of this issue 
to a medical panel. 
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b. The Issue of Legal Causation as Applied to Johnny Albert's 
June 18,1990 Industrial Accident. 
On June 18,1990 Mr. Albert lifted a stack of steel plates that weighed 30 to 40 pounds and put 
them on a table. Mr. Albert felt his low back pop. Mr. Albert went to Dr. Theodore Conger D.C. 
for treatment of his low back. [id. at 289]. Dr. Conger filed a "Physician's Initial report of Work 
Injury" on June 23,1990. [id.]. 
Quality argued that Mr. Albert could not establish legal causation between his industrial accident 
on June 18,1990, and the low back problems he complained of thereafter. As set forth in 
Section HLC.l.a. no contemporary records existed that documented the nature of Mr. Albert's 
low back injury on November 4,1982. Further, Dr. Dall apportioned none of Mr. Albert's 
ratable low back impairment to the November 4,1982 industrial accident. Finally, no medical 
records existed that showed Mr. Albert suffered from any ongoing low back problems between 
his accident on November 4,1982, and the accident of June 18,1990. In short, Quality failed to 
establish that Mr. Albert suffered from preexisting low back problems of the nature and kind he 
sustained on June 18,1990. Therefore, Mr. Albert had no need to jump the higher legal 
causation hurdle enunciated by the Utah Supreme Court in Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 
P. 2d 15, 24-25 (Utah 1986). 
c. Temporary Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by 
Quality Plating and/or Workers compensation Fund as a 
Result of Johnny Albert's June 18,1990 Industrial Accident 
Mr. Albert remained off work from Quality six days from June 19,1990, to June 25,1990, when 
Dr. Conger released him back to work. [Exhibit "J-l" at 289], Consequently, Qaulity and/or 
WCF owed Mr. Albert $65.36 in temporary total disability compensation for the six days, minus 
three, he missed work due to the June 18,1990 industrial accident at Quality.6 [$152.00/week x 
$.43 weeks (three days) = $65.36]. 
d. Permanent Partial Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by 
Quality Plating and/or Workers compensation Fund as a 
Result of Johnny Albert's June 18,1990 Industrial Accident. 
6
 Utah Code §34A-2-408, formerly Utah Code §35-1-64, does not allow temporary total 
disability compensation for the first three days of the disability unless the disability lasts more 
than 14 days. 
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Dr. Dall apportioned half of Mr. Albert's 5% whole person impairment due to chronic low back 
pain to the June 18,1990 industrial accident at Quality. [Exhibit "J-l" at 115]. As set forth in 
Section m.C.l.a. the preponderance of the evidence in this case favored the opinion of Dr. Dall 
as to Mr. Albert's low back impairment. Therefore, Quality and/or WCF owed Mr. Albert 
$1,185.60 in permanent partial disability compensation for a 2lA % whole person impairment 
caused by the June 18,1990 industrial accident. [$152.00/week x 312 weeks x 0.025 = 
$1,185.60]. 
e. Permanent Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by 
Quality Plating and/or Workers compensation Fund as a 
Result of Johnny Albert's June 18,1990 Industrial Accident 
For the reasons set forth in Section IHC.2. infra the injuries suffered by Mr. Albert from the June 
18,1990 did not constitute the direct cause of his permanent total disability. Therefore, Quality 
and WCF did not owe Mr. Albert permanent total disability compensation. 
3. The January 21,1991 Industrial Accident with Barnard & Burk 
Group, Inc. Case No. 20011071. 
a. Injuries Caused by the January 21,1991 Industrial Accident at 
Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. 
The essential facts of Mr. Albert's January 21,1991 industrial accident at Barnard & Burk came 
in undisputed. On January 21,1991 Mr. Albert worked for Barnard & Burk removing asbestos 
at the Chevron Refinery. Mr. Albert slipped, fell, and landed on a pipe with his low back. Mr. 
Albert described his low back as "all messed up" and went to a chiropractor for treatment. On 
January 22, 1991 Dr. Conger filed a "Physician's Initial report of Work Injury" with respect to 
Mr. Albert's January 21,1991 industrial accident with Barnard & Burk. [id. at 260]. 
b. Temporary Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by 
Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. and/or National Union Fire Ins. 
as a Result of Johnny Albert's January 21,1991 Industrial 
Accident 
At the hearing, Mr. Albert did not identify any periods of time he missed work due to the January 
21,2001 industrial accident at Barnard & Burk. Accordingly, Barnard & Burk owed Mr. Albert 
no temporary total disability as a result of the January 21,1991 industrial accident. 
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c. Permanent Partial Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by 
Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. and/or National Union Fire Ins. 
as a Result of Johnny Albert's January 21,1991 Industrial 
Accident. 
Dr. Dall apportioned half of Mr. Albert's 5% whole person impairment due to chronic low back 
pain to the January 21,1991 industrial accident at Barnard & Burk. [id. at 115]. As set forth in 
Section ULC.l.a. the preponderance of the evidence in this case favored the opinion of Dr. Dall 
as to Mr. Albert's low back impairment. Therefore, Barnard & Burk and National Union owed 
Mr. Albert $1,895.40 in permanent partial disability compensation consequent to the January 21, 
2001 industrial accident. [$243.00/week x 312 weeks x 0.025 = $1,895.40]. 
d. Permanent Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by 
Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. and/or National Union Fire Ins, 
as a Result of Johnny Albert's January 21,1991 Industrial 
Accident 
For the reasons set forth in Section IQ.C.2. infra the injuries suffered by Mr. Albert from the 
January 21, 2001 industrial accident did not constitute the direct cause of his permanent total 
disability. Therefore, Barnard & Burk and National Union did not owe Mr. Albert permanent 
total disability compensation. 
4. The July 28,1991 Industrial Accident with American Asbestos 
Abatement Case Nos. 97576,991214, and 20011072. 
a. Injuries Caused by the July 28,1991 Industrial Accident at 
American Asbestos Abatement 
No dispute existed concerning the facts of Mr. Albert's July 28,1991 industrial accident. On 
July 28,1991 Mr. Albert worked for American Asbestos at Hill Air Force Base. Mr. Albert fell 
more than twenty feet from a scaffold and landed primarily on his right foot. 
On July 30,1991 Dr. Kenneth Jee M.D. diagnosed Mr. Albert with a: "right comminuted 
calcaneus7 fracture." [id. at 377]. Also on July 30,2001 Dr. Jee operated on Mr. Albert and 
performed a: 
Closed reduction with percutaneous pin manipulation and fixation right 
comminuted calcaneus fracture, [id.]. 
7
 Largest of the tarsal bones that form the heel of the foot. 
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On July 24,1992 Dr. David Howe M.D. concluded that Mr. Albert still suffered from: 
"Traumatic arthritis subtalar joint right foot" [id. at 367]. Also on July 24,1992 Dr. Howe 
performed the second operation on Mr. Albert's right foot a: "Subtalar arthrodesis8 with bone 
graft from right illiac crest." On March 17,1993 Dr. Howe in a third operative procedure on Mr. 
Albert's right foot removed the hardware from the second operation, [id. at 370]. 
Judge Sim's 1994 Order concluded that Mr. Albert's right foot injur/ caused by his industrial 
accident of July 28,1991 resulted in a "nine percent whole person impairment" [1994 Order at 
p. 4]. As noted in Section LB. supra, I adopted the findings and conclusions contained in the 
1994 Order insofar as consistent with the present Order. Accordingly, Mr. Albert's right foot 
injury caused by his industrial accident of July 28,1991 resulted in a "nine percent whole person 
impairment." 
b. Temporaiy Total and Permanent Partial Disability 
Compensation Benefits Owed by American Asbestos 
Abatement and/or Workers Compensation Fund as a Result of 
Johnny Albert's July 28,1991 Industrial Accident. 
As set forth in Section LB. supra, the 1994 Order resolved the issues concerning temporary total 
and permanent partial disability compensation owed by American Asbestos and WCF to Mr. 
Albert as a result of the July 28, 1991 industrial accident. Mr. Albert did not identify any 
additional periods of temporary total disability, nor any additional permanent partial impairment, 
resultant from the July 28, 1991 industrial accident. Accordingly, American Asbestos and WCF 
owed Mr. Albert no additional temporary total, nor permanent partial, disability compensation 
for the July 21, 1991 industrial accident beyond that set forth in the 1994 Order. 
c. Permanent Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by 
American Asbestos Abatement and/or Workers Compensation 
Fund as a Result of Johnny Albert's July 28,1991 Industrial 
Accident 
For the reasons set forth in Section DI.C.2. infra the injuries suffered by Mr. Albert from the July 
28,2001 industrial accident did not constitute the direct cause of his permanent total disability. 
Therefore, American Asbestos and WCF did not owe Mr. Albert permanent total disability 
compensation. 
Fusion. 
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Dr. Gant diagnosed Mr. Albert with: u[r]eactive major depression to Johnny's work-related 
injuries and his perceived losses." [id. at 198]. Dr. Gant further noted the causal connection 
between Mr. Albert's industrial injuries and many of his psychological problems when he 
observed that: 
As a consequence of his reactive depression there is marked restriction in his 
activities of daily living. He experiences marked difficulties in maintaining social 
functioning. There are constant deficiencies of concentration. With his 
unresolved physical conditions there is significant deficiency of persistence or 
pace resulting in his inability to complete tasks in a timely manner, particularly in 
a work setting. There has been a continual process of deterioration and 
decompensation since his work injuries, leaving him to withdraw from work. His 
adaptive behavior since his injuries has been very poor. [id.]. 
Dr. Gant concluded with cautious optimism that: 
[w]ith assistance from a rehabilitation program, Johnny could utilize his average 
to high average residual skills. With appropriate intervention Johnny might yet be 
restored to his role as a productive worker, [id.]. 
Mr. Albert attended Vocational Rehabilitation and with all of his physical and psychological 
problems did in fact return to work with Ameritemps until his final industrial accident on Junel6, 
1997. However, after Mr. Albert fractured his left great toe on June 16,1997, followed by four 
consequent surgeries, Mr. Albert did not return to work. 
On October 25,2002 Leslie Cooper PhD. performed another full scale psychological assessment 
of Mr. Albert that disclosed: 
Shiply Institute of Living Scale - Weschsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised Full 
Scale IQ of 75 which falls at the 5th percentile and falls at the Borderline Mentally 
Deficient range of intellectual functioning, [id. at 84]. 
The Beck Depression Inventory-E ... His obtained raw score of 29 suggested 
moderate depression, [id. at 85]. 
On October 22,2002 Dr. David McCann M.D. comprehensively diagnosed Mr. Albert's 
psychological problems as: 
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Axis I - (Clinical Psychiatric Disorders) 
1. Depressive Disorder.... 
2. Learning Disorder, Reading. 
3. Written Communication Disorder, Spelling. 
4. Cognitive Disorder.... [id. at 41]. 
Axis II - (Personality Disorder or Disordered Personality Traits) 
1. Personality Disorder, not otherwise specified, with Paranoid, 
Borderline, and Antisocial Traits. 
2. Borderline Intellectual Functioning 
Axis V - (Global Assessment of Functioning) 
The patient is not able to understand the complexities of his current 
situation and is significantly out of touch with reality. He exhibits anger 
impairment in work, family relations, judgment, and mood.... [id. at 42]. 
Dr. McCann proceeded to give Mr. Albert the only impairment rating for Ms psychological 
problems, and apportioned the impairment: 
According to the American Medical Association Guides to the Evaluation of 
Permanent Impairment Fifth Edition, he has a Class 2 or mild impairment in 
activities of daily functioning: Class 3 or moderate impairment in social 
functioning: Class 3 or moderate impairment in concentration and Class 4 or 
marked impairment in ability to adapt. Using traditional Utah concepts of 
percentages, his overall estimated psychiatric impairment is Class 3 or probably in 
this case about a 30% whole person impairment 
Of the patient's 30% impairment 10% is caused by his preexisting borderline 
intellectual functioning, 10% is caused by his disordered personality traits and 
lack of ability to conceptualize reality and about 10% is related to his injuries and 
chronic pain.12 [id. at 43]. 
12
 Dr. McCann did not further appoition the 10% psychological impairment caused by 
Mr. Albert's industrial injuries between those respective injuries. 
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In sum, Mr. Albert sustained a 5% whole person impairment from his back injuries caused half 
and half respectively by the June 8,1990 industrial accident at Quality, and the January 21,1991 
industrial accident at Barnard & Burk. Mr. Albert incurred a 9% whole person impairment from 
his right foot injuries caused by his July 28,1991 industrial accident at American Asbestos. Mr. 
Albert sustained a 4% whole person impairment from his left foot injuries caused by his June 16, 
1997 industrial accident with Ameritemps. Finally, Mr. Albert had a 30% whole person 
impairment from psychological problems. Of Mr. Albert's psychological impairment, 20% 
preexisted his industrial accidents, and 10% derived undifferentiated from his industrial injuries. 
Mr. Albert's collective physical and psychological problems left him 48% impaired as to the 
whole person. 
Yet at the end of the day, the preponderance of the evidence in this case revealed that despite the 
legion of medical and psychological impairments accumulated by Mr. Albert during the course 
of his life, he remained able to work until the injury he sustained on June 16,1997 with 
Ameritemps. The fractured great toe on June 16,1997, with the subsequent four surgeries and 
4% whole person permanent impairment, proved to be the proverbial straw that broke the 
camel's back. Mr. Albert never returned to work after the June 16,1997 industrial accident, and 
thereafter by consensus remained permanently and totally disabled. Hence, the preponderance of 
the evidence in this case established that Mr. Albert's industrial accident of June 16,1997 acted 
as the direct cause of his permanent total disability. 
3. Permanent Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by 
Ameritemps, Inc. and Hartford Ins. as a Result of Johnny Albert's 
June 16,1997 Industrial Accident. 
Mr. Albert's industrial accident of June 16,1997 directly caused his permanent total disability, 
[see: Section III.C.2.supra]. Mr. Albert never worked again after his industrial accident on June 
16,1997. The preponderance of the evidence in this case confirmed that Mr. Albert became 
permanently and totally disabled on June 16, 1997. Therefore, Ameritemps and Hartford owed 
Mr. Albert permanent total disability compensation at the rate of $240.00 per week from June 16, 
1997, to June 17,2003. After June 17,2003, Ameritemps and Hartford owed Mr. Albert on an 
ongoing basis permanent total disabihty compensation at the rate of $240.00 less 50% of any 
Social Security retirement benefits received by Mr. Albert during the same period. Ameritemps 
and Hartford are additionally entitled to an offset for any amounts of temporary total, or 
permanent partial, disability compensation paid to Mr. Albert for any time period that they also 
owed Mr. Albert permanent total disabihty compensation. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
A. Employment and Compensation Rates. 
1. Transwest Construction. 
Transwest employed Mr. Albert on November 4,1982. At the time of the November 4,1982 
industrial accident at Transwest, Mr. Albert was not married and had no dependent children. 
At the time of his industrial accident with Transwest on November 4,1982, Mr. Albert earned 
$4.00 per hour, and worked 40 hours per week on average. Accordingly, Mr. Albert's 
appropriate workers' compensation rate with Transwest equaled $107.00 per week. [$4.00/hour x 
40 hours/week = $160.00/week x 2/3 = $107.00/week]. 
2. Quality Plating. 
Quality employed Mr. Albert on June 18,1990. At the time of the June 18, 1990 industrial 
accident at Quality, Mr. Albert was not married, but had one dependent child. 
At the time of his industrial accident with Quality on June 18, 1990, Mr. Albert earned $5.50 per 
hour, and worked 40 hours per week on average. Accordingly, Mr. Albert's appropriate 
workers' compensation rate with Quality equaled $152.00 per week. [$5.50/hour x 40 
hours/week = $220.00/week x 2/3 = $146.66/week + 5.00/week (dependent's allowance) = 
$152.00/week (rounded to nearest whole dollar)]. 
3. Barnard & Burk. 
Barnard & Burk employed Mr. Albert on January 21,1991. At the time of the January 21, 1991 
industrial accident at Barnard & Burk, Mr. Albert was not married, but had one dependent child. 
Mr. Albert earned an average weekly wage of $473.20 from Barnard & Burk. Accordingly, Mr. 
Albert's appropriate temporary total disability compensation rate equaled $320.00 per week. 
[$473.20 x 2/3 = 315.46/week + $5.00/week (dependent's allowance) = $320.00 rounded to the 
nearest whole dollar)]. The maximum permanent partial disability compensation rate as of 
January 21,1991 equaled $243.00 per week. The maximum permanent total disability 
compensation rate as of January 21,1991 equaled $309.00 per week. 
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4. American Asbestos Abatement. 
Mr. Albert's weekly wage rate with American Asbestos equaled $510.20 per week as of July 28, 
1991, which yielded: (1) a temporary total disability compensation rate of $345.00 per week; (2) 
a permanent partial disability compensation rate of $252.00 per week, and; (3) a permanent total 
disability compensation rate of $252.00 per week. 
5, Ameritemps, Inc. 
Ameritemps employed Mr. Albert on June 16,1997. At the time of the June 16,1997 industrial 
accident at Ameritemps, Mr. Albert was not married, but had two dependent children. 
Mr. Albert's weekly wage with Ameritemps at the time of his industrial accident on June 16, 
1997 averaged $344.51. Accordingly, Mr. Albert's appropriate workers' compensation rate with 
Ameritemps equaled $240.00 per week. [ $344.51/week x 2/3 = $229.67/week + 10.00/week 
(dependents' allowance) = $240.00/week (rounded to nearest whole dollar)]. 
B. The Respective Industrial Accidents and Consequent Injuries. 
1. The November 4,1982 Industrial Accident with Transwest 
Construction Case No. 2002595. 
On November 4,1982 Mr. Albert worked at Transwest building trusses. A stack of the trusses 
fell over on his low back. Mr. Albert remained off of work with low back pain for one week 
following the November 4,1982 industrial accident at Transwest. Between 1982, and 1990, Mr. 
Albert sustained no further injuries to his low back. 
a. Injuries Caused by the November 4,1982 Industrial Accident 
at Transwest Construction. 
Mr. Albert suffered from chronic low back pain, which resulted in a 5% whole person 
impairment. While Mr. Albert suffered from chronic back pain that resulted in a 5% whole 
person impairment, none of his rated low back problems derived from the remote November 
1982 industrial accident at Transwest. 
b. Workers' Compensation Benefits Owed by Transwest 
Construction and/or Uninsured Employers' Fund as a Result 
of Johnny Albert's November 4,1982 Industrial Accident 
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Mr. Albert's single "Application for Hearing" against Transwest and UEF as represented in Case 
No. 2002595 claimed only permanent total disability compensation. Mr,. Albert suffered no 
permanent impairment from his November 4,1982 industrial accident with Transwest. 
Consequently, Mr. Albert's November 4,1982 industrial accident could not have caused his 
permanent total disability. Therefore, Mr. Albert's claim against Transwest and UEF for 
permanent total disability compensation must be dismissed with prejudice. 
2. The June 18,1990 Industrial Accident with Quality Plating Case No. 
20011070. 
a. Injuries Caused by the June 18,1990 Industrial Accident at 
Quality Plating. 
On June 18,1990 Mr. Albert picked up a stack of metal plates that weighed 30 to 40 pounds, and 
put them on a table. While he lifted the plates Mr. Albert felt his low back pop. Mr. Albert 
remained off work for one week and treated with a chiropractor for his low back problems 
sustained in the June 18,1990 industrial accident. 
b. The Issue of Legal Causation as Applied to Johnny Albert's 
June 18,1990 Industrial Accident 
The Utah Supreme Court held that: 
The language "arising out of or in the course of his employment"...was apparently 
intended to ensure that compensation is only awarded where there is sufficient 
causal connection between the disability and the working conditions. The 
causation requirement makes it necessary to distinguish those injuries which (a) 
coincidentally occur at work because a preexisting condition results in symptoms 
which appear during work hours without any enhancement from the workplace, 
and (b) those injuries which occur because some condition or exertion required by 
the employment increases the risk of injury which the worker normally faces in 
his everyday life. Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P. 2d 15,24-25 
(Utah 1986). 
The Court in Allen then adopted an analysis that involved a two part causation test to establish 
both legal causation and medical causation. Id. at 25. With respect to legal causation the Court in 
Allen held that: 
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To meet the legal causation requirement, a claimant with a preexisting condition 
must show that the employment contributed something substantial to increase the 
risk he already faced in everyday life because of his condition. This additional 
element of risk in the workplace is usually supplied by an exertion greater than 
that undertaken in normal everyday life. This extra exertion serves to offset the 
preexisting condition of the employee as a likely cause of the injury, thereby 
eliminating claims for impairments resulting from a personal risk rather than 
exertions at work. 
********************* 
Thus, where the claimant suffers from a preexisting condition which contributes 
to the injury, an unusual or extraordinary exertion is required to prove legal 
causation. Where there is no preexisting condition, a usual or ordinary exertion is 
sufficient. Id. at 25-26. 
On June 18,1990 Mr. Albert lifted a stack of steel plates that weighed 30 to 40 pounds and put 
them on a table. Mr. Albert felt his low back pop. Quality argued that Mr. Albert could not 
establish legal causation between his industrial accident on June 18,1990, and the low back 
problems he complained of thereafter. However, Quality failed to establish that Mr. Albert 
suffered from preexisting low back problems of the nature and kind he sustained on June 18, 
1990. Therefore, Mr. Albert had no need to jump the higher legal causation hurdle enunciated by 
the Utah Supreme Court in Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P. 2d at 24-25. 
c. Temporary Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by 
Quality Plating and/or Workers compensation Fund as a 
Result of Johnny Albert's June 18,1990 Industrial Accident. 
Mr. Albert remained off work from Quality six days from June 19,1990, to June 25,1990, when 
Dr. Conger released him back to work. Consequently, Qaulity and/or WCF owed Mr. Albert 
$65.36 in temporary total disability compensation for the six days, minus three, he missed work 
due to the June 18,1990 industrial accident at Quality. [$152.00/week x $.43 weeks (three days) 
= $65.36]. 
d. Permanent Partial Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by 
Quality Plating and/or Workers compensation Fund as a 
Result of Johnny Albert's June 18,1990 Industrial Accident. 
The June 18, 1990 industrial accident at Quality caused half of Mr. Albert's 5% whole person 
impairment due to chronic low back pain. Therefore, Quality and/or WCF owed Mr. Albert 
$1,185.60 in permanent partial disability compensation consequent to the June 18,1990 
industrial accident. [$152.00/week x 312 weeks x 0.025 = $1,185.60]. 
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e. Permanent Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by 
Quality Plating and/or Workers compensation Fund as a 
Result of Johnny Albert's June 18,1990 Industrial Accident. 
The injuries suffered by Mr. Albert from the June 18,1990 did not constitute the direct cause of 
his permanent total disability. Therefore, Quality and WCF did not owe Mr. Albert permanent 
total disability compensation. 
3. The January 21,1991 Industrial Accident with Barnard & Burk 
Group, Inc. Case No. 20011071. 
a. Injuries Caused by the January 21,1991 Industrial Accident at 
Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. 
On January 21,1991 Mr. Albert worked for Barnard & Burk removing asbestos at the Chevron 
Refinery. Mr. Albert slipped, fell, and landed on a pipe with his low back. 
b. Temporary Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by 
Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. and/or National Union Fire Ins. 
as a Result of Johnny Albert's January 21,1991 Industrial 
Accident 
Mr. Albert did not identify any periods of time he missed work due to the January 21, 2001 
industrial accident at Barnard & Burk. Accordingly, Barnard & Burk owed Mr. Albert no 
temporary total disability as a result of the January 21,1991 industrial accident. 
c. Permanent Partial Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by 
Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. and/or National Union Fire Ins. 
as a Result of Johnny Albert's January 21,1991 Industrial 
Accident 
The January 21,1991 industrial accident at Barnard & Burk caused half of Mr. Albert's 5% 
whole person impairment due to chronic low back pain. Therefore, Barnard & Burk and 
National Union owed Mr. Albert $1,895.40 in permanent partial disability compensation 
consequent to the January 21,2001 industrial accident. [$243.00/week x 312 weeks x 0.025 = 
$1,895.40]. 
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d. Permanent Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by 
Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. and/or National Union Fire Ins. 
as a Result of Johnny Albert's January 21,1991 Industrial 
Accident. 
The injuries suffered by Mr. Albert from the January 21,2001 industrial accident did not 
constitute the direct cause of his permanent total disability. Therefore, Barnard & Burk and 
National Union did not owe Mr. Albert permanent total disability compensation. 
4. The July 28,1991 Industrial Accident with American Asbestos 
Abatement Case Nos. 97576,991214, and 20011072. 
On July 28,1991 Mr. Albert worked for American Asbestos at Hill Air Force Base. Mr. Albert 
fell more than twenty feet from a scaffold and landed primarily on his right foot. Mr. Albert 
suffered a: "right comminuted calcaneus fracture." Mr. Albert underwent three surgeries on his 
right foot consequent to his July 28,1991 industrial accident. Mr. Albert's right foot injury 
caused by his industrial accident of July 28,1991 resulted in a 9% whole person impairment. 
b. Temporary Total and Permanent Partial Disability 
Compensation Benefits Owed by American Asbestos 
Abatement and/or Workers Compensation Fund as a Result of 
Johnny Albert's July 28,1991 Industrial Accident. 
The 1994 Order resolved the issues concerning temporary total and permanent partial disability 
compensation owed by American Asbestos and WCF to Mr. Albert as a result of the July 28, 
1991 industrial accident. Mr. Albert did not identify any additional periods of temporary total 
disability, nor any additional permanent partial impairment, resultant from the July 28,1991 
industrial accident. Accordingly, American Asbestos and WCF owed Mr. Albert no additional 
temporary total, nor permanent partial, disability compensation for the July 21,1991 industrial 
accident beyond that set forth in the 1994 Order. 
c. Permanent Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by 
American Asbestos Abatement and/or Workers Compensation 
Fund as a Result of Johnny Albert's July 28,1991 Industrial 
Accident 
The injuries suffered by Mr. Albert from the July 28,2001 industrial accident did not constitute 
the direct cause of his permanent total disability. Therefore, American Asbestos and WCF did 
not owe Mr. Albert permanent total disability compensation. 
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5. The June 16,1997 Industrial Accident with Ameritemps, Inc. Case 
Nos. 991213 and 20011073. 
a. Injuries Caused Dy me June 16,1997 Industrial Accident at 
Ameritemps, Inc. 
On June 16,1997 Mr. Albert worked for Ameritemps at Cisco Foods driving a self-propelled 
pallet jack. Mr. Albert crushed his left great toe between the pallet jack and a steel "F beam. 
Mr. Albert suffered an angulated fracture of the first proximal phalanx as a result of the June 16, 
1997 industrial accident. Mr. Albert underwent four surgeries with respect to the left great toe 
fracture sustained in June 16,1997 industrial accident. Mr. Albert's industrial accident with 
Ameritemps on June 16,1997 caused hira a 4% whole person impairment due to his left foot 
injury. 
b. Temporary Total and Permanent Partial Disability 
Compensation Benefits Owed by Ameritemps, Inc. and/or 
Hartford Ins. as a Result of Johnny Albert's June 16,1997 
Industrial Accident. 
Because of the resolution of the permanent total disability claim herein, I deferred further 
consideration of the issues concerning temporary total disability compensation and permanent 
partial disability compensation. 
C. Permanent Total Disability Compensation. 
1. Permanent Total Disability. 
Mr. Albert is permanently and totally disabled. 
2. The Cause of Johnny Albert's Permanent Total Disability. 
Mr. Albert sustained a 254 % whole person impairment as a result of a low back injury he 
sustained on June 18,1990 while employed for Quality Plating. Mr. Albert remained off work 
only one week following his June 18,1990 industrial injury then returned to regular employment 
with Quality Plating. 
Mr. Albert also sustained a 254 % whole person impairment as a result of a low back injury he 
sustained on January 21,1991 while employed for Barnard & Burk. Mr. Albert did not identify 
any lost time at work as a result of his January 21,1991 industrial accident 
Albert v. American Asbestos Abatement et al 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order 
page 29 
Mr. Albert's industrial accident with American Asbestos on July 28,1991 resulted in a 9% whole 
person impairment as a result of injuries to his right foot caused by the accident. Mr. Albert also 
suffered from serious psychological problems that caused him considerable difficulty in learning 
new tasks or performing jobs that required any mental acuity. Mr. Albert's psychological 
problems left him with 30% whole person impairment. Of Mr. Albert's psychological 
impairment, 20% preexisted his industrial accidents, and 10% derived undifferentiated from his 
industrial injuries. Mr. Albert's collective physical and psychological problems left him 48% 
impaired as to the whole person. 
Mr. Albert with all of his physical and psychological problems did in fact return to work with 
Ameritemps until his final industrial accident on June 16,1997. However, after Mr. Albert 
fractured his left great toe on June 16,1997 followed by four consequent surgeries, Mr. Albert 
did not return to work. Mr. Albert's industrial accident with Ameritemps on June 16,1997 
resulted in a 4% whole person impairment as a result of injuries to his left foot caused by the 
accident. 
The Utah Supreme Court specifically held that in permanent total disability cases it is the duty of 
the Labor Commission to determine the ultimate issue of disability. Hardman v. Salt Lake City 
Fleet Management, 725 P. 2d 1323,1326 (Utah 1986). Professor Larson stated that: 
Apart from apportionment statutes, the employer is generally held liable for the 
entire disability resulting from a combination of the prior disability and the 
present injury. ARTHUR LARSON and LEX LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
LAW § 90.01 (2002). 
Neither applicable Utah Code Amend § 35-1-67 (1995), nor its successors, nor its predecessors 
that deal with permanent total disability, contain any provisions for apportionment of liability. 
Utah Code Amend § 35-l-67(l)(b) (1995) provides in relevant part that: 
To establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensation, the employee 
has the burden of proof to show by a preponderance of the evidence that: 
*!• n* *l* *p *n *l* T* T* ^ T^ 
(ii) the industrial accident... was the direct cause of the employee's 
permanent total disability. 
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The Utah Court of Appeals held that: 
Under the 'odd lot' doctrine, the Commission may find permanent total disability 
when a relatively small percentage of impairment caused by an industrial accident 
is combined with other factors to render the claimant unable to obtain suitable 
employment. Hoskins v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 918 P. 2d 150, 154 (Utah 
App. 1996) (citing: Hardman v. Salt Lake City Fleet Management, 725 P. 2d 
1323,1326 (Utah 1986). 
The case of Smith v. MityLite presented facts similar to the present case. Smith v. MityLite, 939 
P. 2d 684 (Utah App. 1997). In Smith the claimant suffered from nonindustrial depression, 
somatoform pain disorder, opiate dependency, personality disorder and depression, id at 689. 
The Utah Court of Appeals held that the Labor Commission ought to have found permanent total 
disability where the claimant proved by a preponderance of the evidence the: "[industrial 
accident caused a portion of Smith's physical impairment; that he cannot perform his former job; 
that he is currently disabled." id. at 690. 
In the present case, despite the legion of medical and psychological impairments accumulated by 
Mr. Albert during the course of his life, he remained able to work until the injury he sustained on 
June 16,1997 with Ameritemps. The fractured great toe on June 16,1997, with the subsequent 
four surgeries and 4% whole person permanent impairment, proved to be the proverbial straw 
that broke the camel's back. Mr. Albert never returned to work after the June 16,1997 industrial 
accident, and thereafter remained permanently and totally disabled. Hence, Mr. Albert's 
industrial accident of June 16,1997directly caused his permanent total disability.13 
3. Permanent Total Disability Compensation Benefits Owed by 
Ameritemps, Inc. and Hartford Ins. as a Result of Johnny Albert's 
June 16,1997 Industrial Accident 
13
 Some of the respondents argued that Social Security Administration's determination of 
Mr. Albert's permanent total disability based on his psychological impairments should be 
determinative concerning the cause of his permanent total disability for workers' compensation 
benefits. Of course Social Security's determinations are not binding on the Labor Commission. 
Otherwise, the Labor Commission in every like case would simply await and adopt the decision 
of the Social Security Administration as to permanent total disability and the cause thereof. 
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Mr. Albert's industrial accident of June 16,1997 directly caused his permanent total disability. 
Mr. Albert never worked again after his industrial accident on June 16,1997. Mr. Albert became 
permanently and totally disabled on June 16,1997. Therefore, Ameritemps and Hartford owed 
Mr. Albert permanent total disability compensation at the rate of $240.00 per week from June 16, 
1997, to June 17,2003. After June 17,2003 Ameritemps and Hartford owed Mr. Albert 
permanent total disability compensation at the rate of $240.00 less 50% of any Social Security 
retirement benefits received by Mr. Albert during the same period. Ameritemps and Hartford are 
entitled to an offset for any amounts of temporary total, or permanent partial, disability 
compensation paid to Mr. Albert for any time period that they also owed Mr. Albert permanent 
total disability compensation. 
V. ORDER 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that all of Johnny Albert's claims against the respondent, 
Transwest Construction, in Claim No. 2002595 are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all of Johnny Albert's claims against the respondents 
Uninsured Employer's Fund and Employers' Reinsurance Fund in Case Nos. 97576, 
991213,991214,20011070,20011071, 20011072,20011073, and 2002595 are hereby 
dismissed with prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in Case No. 20011070, Quality Plating and/or Workers' 
Compensation Fund of Utah shall pay Johnny Albert temporary total disability 
compensation from June 18,1990, to June 25,1990, at the rate of $152.00 per week for 0.43 
weeks, for a total of $65,36. That amount is accrued, due and payable in a lump sum, plus 
interest at eight percent (8%) per annum. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in Case No. 20011070, Quality Plating and/or Workers' 
Compensation Fund of Utah shall pay Johnny Albert permanent partial disability 
compensation for a two and one half percent (2J/2 %) impairment rating at the rate of $152.00 
per week for a total of $1,185.60. That amount is accrued, due and payable in a lump sum, plus 
interest at eight percent (8%) per annum. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Johnny Albert's claims for permanent total disability 
compensation against Quality Plating and Workers' Compensation Fund in Case No. 
20011070 are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Quality Plating and/or Workers Compensation Fund 
shall with respect to Case No. 20011070 pay all medical expenses reasonably related to Johnny 
Albert's industrial accident of June 18,1990, plus interest at eight percent (8%) per annum. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Johnny Albert's claim against Barnard & Burk and/or 
National Union Fire Ins- for temporary total disability compensation in Case No. 20011071 
is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in Case No. 20011071 respondents, Barnard & Burk 
and/or National Union Fire Ins., shall pay Johnny Albert permanent partial disability 
compensation for a two and one half percent (214 %) impairment rating at the rate of $243.00 
per week for a total of $1,895.40. That amount is accrued, due and payable in a lump sum, plus 
interest at eight percent (8%) per annum. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Johnny Albert's claims against Barnard & Burk and 
National Union Fire Ins. in Case No. 20011071 for permanent total disability compensation 
are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondents, Barnard & Burk and/or National Union 
Fire Ins., shall with respect to Case No. 20011071 pay all medical expenses reasonably related 
to Johnny Albert's industrial accident of January 21,1991, plus interest at eight percent (8%) per 
annum. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Johnny Albert's claims against American Asbestos 
Abatement and/or Workers Compensation Fund in Case Nos. 97576,991214, and 20011072 
for additional temporary total disability compensation, permanent partial disability 
compensation, and permanent total disability compensation are hereby dismissed with 
prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondents, American Asbestos Abatement and/or 
Workers Compensation Fund shall with respect to Case Nos. 97576,991214, and 20011072 
pay all medical expenses reasonably related to Johnny Albert's industrial accident of July 28, 
1991, plus interest at eight percent (8%) per annum. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Ameritemps, Inc. and/or Hartford Ins. in Case Nos. 
991213 and 20011073 shall pay Johnny Albert permanent total disability compensation at the 
rate of $240.00 per week from the date of permanent total disability on June 16,1997, until June 
16,2003 in the total amount of $74,880.00, plus interest at eight percent (8%) per annum for 
each payment as it came due, less any compensation already paid by respondents Ameritemps, 
Inc. or Hartford Ins. After June 16,2003, respondents, Ameritemps, Inc. and/or Hartford Ins., 
shall continue to pay Johnny Albert permanent total disability compensation at the rate of 
$240.00 per week less fifty percent (50%) of any Social Security retirement benefits received by 
Johnny Albert for the same period. 
S-\ >-% w- r^% s-+ 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondents, Ameritemps, Inc. and/or Hartford Ins., shall 
with respect to Case Nos. 991213 and 20011073 pay all medical expenses reasonably related to 
Johnny Albert's industrial accident of June 16,1997, plus interest at eight percent (8%) per 
annum. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondents, Ameritemps, Inc. and/or Hartford Ins., shall 
pay statutory attorneys' fees of $10,352.00 directly to Richard Burke. That amount shall be 
deducted from Johnny Albert's award and sent directly to Richard Burke's office. 
Dated this 22nd day of July 2003, 
ard M. La Jeunesse 
strative Law Judge 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion For Review with the Adjudication 
Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific 
basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this 
decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their Responses to the Motion for Review 
within 20 days of the Motion for Review. 
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct 
the foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its 
Response. If none of the parties specifically requests review by the Appeals Board, the review 
will be conducted by the Utah Labor Commissioner. 
f\ /~v •» r^w-kJ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, Karla Rush, certify that I did mail by prepaid first class postage, except as noted below, a copy 
of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, And Order in the case of Johnny Albert v. 
American Asbestos Abatement et al, Case Nos. 97576,991213,991214, 20011070,20011071, 
20011072,20011073, and 2002595 on the ^ f day of July 2003, to the following: 
JOHNNY ALBERT 
2550 W 2780 S APT 171 
WEST VALLEY CITY UT 84119 
RICHARD BURKE ESQ 
648E100SSTE200 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84102 
CARRIE TAYLOR ESQ 
PO BOX 2465 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84110-2465 
ELLIOT MORRIS ESQ 
392 E 6400 S 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84107 
FLOYD HOLM ESQ 
392 E 6400 S 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84107 
THEODORE KANELL ESQ 
136 E SOUTH TEMPLE STE 1700 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
LORRIE LIMA ESQ 
160 E 300 S THIRD FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITYUT 841111 
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APPENDIX 4 
Ameritemp's "Motion for Review" and 
"Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support 
of Respondent Ameritemps Motion for Review" dated 
August 21,2003. 
THEODORE E. KANELL (1768) 
D. SCOTT BERRETT (9099) 
PLANT, WALLACE, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
Attorneys for Defendant 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone (801) 363-7611 
BEFORE THE LABOR COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOHNNY ALBERT, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
AMERICAN ASBESTOS ABATEMENT 
and/or WORKERS COMPENSATION 
FUN; QUALITY PLATING and/or 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND; 
BARNARD & BURK GROUP, INC. 
and/or NATIONAL UNION FIRE 
INSURANCE; AMERITEMPS, INC. 
and/or HARTFORD INSURANCE; 
TRANSWEST CONSTRUCTION; 
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND; 
EMPLOYERS7 REINSURANCE FUND, 
Respondents. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
• 
* 
* 
* 
* 
• 
* 
• 
* 
* 
* 
* 
MOTION FOR REVIEW 
Case Nos. 97576, 991213. 
991214, 20011070, 20011071, 
20011072, 20011073 and 
2002595 
Judge Richard M. LaJeunesse 
COMES NOW the Respondent, Ameritemps, and its insurance 
carrier, Hartford, and respectfully submits this Motion for Review 
of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order entered in 
the above-referenced matter on July 22, 2003. 
This Motion is based on the insufficiency of evidence to 
support the conclusion that the Petitioner is permanently and 
totally disabled as a result of the industrial injury to his toe he 
incurred while employed by Ameritemps. Specifically, the medical 
evidence and the Petitioner's own testimony clearly demonstrates 
nn^Qo 
that the injury to his left big toe is not the reason he." is 
currently not in the workforce and is not eveh/tHe dij.jjiry| causing 
r r t t * 
r r r r r r t • 
him the most difficulties. 
For the foregoing reasons, and those contained in the attached 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities, ther'Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Laws and Order which was entered in this case should 
be reviewed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ^ / day of August, 2003. 
PLANT, WALLACE, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
THEODORE E. KANELL 
D. SCOTT BERRETT 
Attorneys for Respondent Ameritemps 
THEODORE E. KANELL (1768) 
D. SCOTT BERRETT (9099) 
PLANT, WALLACE, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
Attorneys for Defendant 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone (801) 363-7611 
BEFORE THE LABOR COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOHNNY ALBERT, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
AMERICAN ASBESTOS ABATEMENT 
and/or WORKERS COMPENSATION 
FUN; QUALITY PLATING and/or 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND; 
BARNARD & BURK GROUP, INC. 
and/or NATIONAL UNION FIRE 
INSURANCE; AMERITEMPS, INC. 
and/or HARTFORD INSURANCE; 
TRANSWEST CONSTRUCTION; 
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND; 
EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND, 
Respondents. 
COMES NOW the Respondent, Ameritemps, and its insurance 
carrier, Hartford, and respectfully submits this Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in support of their Motion for Review. 
FACTS 
1. On November 4, 1982, Petitioner suffered an injury to 
his low back when a stack of trusses fell on him while 
he was employed by Transwest Construction. 
2. On June 18, 1990, Petitioner suffered an injury to his 
low back after lifting a stack of metal plates while 
* 
* 
* 
* MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
* AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
* RESPONDENT AMERITEMPS MOTION 
* FOR REVIEW 
* 
* Case Nos. 97576, 991213. 
* 991214, 20011070, 20011071, 
* 20011072, 20011073 and 
* 2002595 
* 
* 
* 
Judge Richard M. LaJeunesse 
* 
r < 
employed by Quali ty P l a t i ng . 
3 . On January 21, 1991, P e t i t i o n e r suf£&r4d van '[injury t o 
r r f * r 
*• - r r 
his 1 ow back after falling on a pipe while employed by 
Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. 
4. On July 28, 1991, Petitioner suffered an injury to his 
right foot and heel after falling approximately twenty 
feet from a scaffolding while employed by American 
Asbestos Abatement. 
5. On June 16, 1997, Petitioner suffered an injury to his 
left great toe after getting it caught between a steel] 
beam and a pallet jack while employed by Ameritemps. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Motion for Review by the Labor Commission of Utah 
A. Evidence Cited in Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Order of July 22, 2003 is Insufficient to Deem 
Petitioner Permanently and Totally Disabled Due to 
Injury While Working for Ameritemps 
Pursuant to the Order entered in this case, Petitioner was 
deemed to be permanently and totally disabled as a result of an 
industrial injury to his left great toe which occurred while he 
was employed by Ameritemps. However, a review of the medical 
evidence and the testimony of the Petitioner clearly establishes 
that the Ameritemps injury is not the true cause of his 
condition. 
Utah Code Annotated §34A-2-413 (1) (b) (iii) directs that in 
cases of permanent total disability, the petitioner must show by 
a preponderance of the evidence that "the industrial accident. 
. was the direct cause of the employee's permanent total 
nn^Q9 
disability." (Emphasis added). While the Commission declared" 
that the Petitioner's broken toe was the injury that^dau&ea him 
to reach permanent total disabled status, calling this injury the 
"straw that broke the camel's back," this assertion is in direct 
contradiction to significant and credible medical evidence. In 
fact, this evidence shows that not only is the toe injury not the 
direct cause, it is not even a significant cause, of his current 
state and his inability to work. 
Following his toe injury, the Petitioner's physicians 
repeatedly advised him that the condition of his toe would allow 
him to return to work. However, on several occasions when 
Petitioner was advised he could again assume employment, 
complaints about his back precluded him from doing so. 
Specifically, on October 21, 1997, Dr. Burleigh noted that the 
Petitioner could return to work if allowed to sit, however, 
Petitioner did not wish to return due to pain in his back. On 
August 18, 1998, Dr. Howe reported that Petitioner's could not 
only return to work if allowed to sit, he could also walk to and 
from work. Dr. Howe reiterated his belief that the Petitioner 
could undertake employment by indicating on September 8, 1998 
that the Petitioner could do light duty. On October 5, 1998 and 
November 5, 1998, Dr. Howe again told the Petitioner that he 
could perform light duty work if sitting down and that his toe 
would not preclude him from walking to and from work. 
On December 22, 1998, Dr. Howe indicated that although the 
Petitioner's toe hurt, this condition was overshadowed by his 
back. He continued by noting that the Petitioner's main problem 
was nis back and he was close to returning to work but could not 
( , / ( c r c 
do so due to h i s back. P e t i t i o n e r was d i r e c t e d 'tjo t^ficterCjo 
( i , r r r r t 
, i - t r r r 
physical therapy for his back which, per Dr. Howe's report, would 
"prevent him working or trying to work." On February 4, 1999, 
r 
f r 
the applicant was seen by Dr. Howe who indicated 'that 
Petitioner's toe was not bothering him much but he continued to 
have back pain. Petitioner was released to regular duty as of 
February 8, 1999 with respect to his toe, but would need to 
continue with physical therapy for his back. On February 25, 
1999, Petitioner was advised by Dr. Howe that he believed his 
feet would allow him to return to his previous job. 
Furthermore, the Commission adopted a 48% impairment rating 
for the Petitioner covering the variety of injuries he has 
incurred. However, a review of the percentages that make up this 
4 8% figure clearly establishes that the toe injury was a minor 
component of this rating. In fact, the Petitioner's toe injury 
was only deemed to be 4% of the total impairment. (It is arguable 
that the 2% impairment given for this injury on February 25, 1999 
by Dr. Howe should have been adopted when considering the 
"•..guidelines in the AMA Guide to the Evaluation of Permanent 
Impairments) . It is difficult to contend that an injury that 
comprises, at most, only 4% of a 48% rating could possibly be 
deemed the "direct cause" of the Petitioner's condition., 
While the medical evidence speaks clearly in establishing 
Petitioner's back injury as the true cause of his condition, this 
assertion is supported even further by Petitioner's own words. 
In testifying at the December 17, 2002 hearing of this matter, 
Petitioner stated that as far as working was concerned, his worst 
<• c c c ( t 
problems was his back. When asked if his bacV was Ir'ijjurfe^d in the 
c '- r r r r 
, i c r - r r f 
accident at Ameritemps, Petitioner indicated that he only hurt 
his left great toe. Petitioner's testimony was ^supported by the 
r * 
words of his own attorney who, during closing arguments, 
indicated that Petitioner's worst problem was his back as opposed 
to any other condition. 
If the Labor Commission is looking for the "straw that broke 
the camel's back," it should look at Petitioner's injury of June, 
1999. At this time, Petitioner reported that he was walking 
along and stumbled in a hole. (His testimony at hearing 
indicated it may have been a worm hole) . This non-industrial 
accident caused him to suffer further injury to not only his 
right leg but also his back which, according to his testimony, is 
his biggest problem. As such, it is arguable that this incident 
is the cause of his current difficulties. 
While the Commission, as noted above, has ruled that 
Petitioner's toe injury was the "straw that broke the camel's 
back," this is simply not borne out by the evidence. 
%.Petitioner's medical records and testimony clearly establishes 
that his back injury is causing him the most problems and it is 
this injury that is precluding him from working. As such, the 
injury which occurred at Ameritemps's simply cannot be cpnsidered 
the "direct cause" of Petitioner's condition and Ameritemps's 
cannot be held responsible for permanent total disability 
payments. 
nn^Qs; 
II. While the Injury Which Occurred at Ameritemps May Haye 
Caused an Impairment to the Petitioner^ It, EfcLff JNot 
Disable Him
 e-. ' r r
 r
 J - J r r 
r r c r r r 
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The permanent total compensation provisions of the Utah 
r 
Workers Compensation Act directs that before an Employee is 
t. r 
eligible for this compensation, he must be permanently disabled 
and not simply suffering from an impairment. While the nature of 
the impairments resulting from industrial accidents are the 
determining factors in deciding whether a petitioner is 
permanently and totally disabled, these two concepts are distinct 
and must be separately considered. 
In this case, Petitioner clearly injured his left great toe 
as a result of his accident at Ameritemps. This issue has not 
been contested and as such, appropriate medical treatment was 
covered and benefits paid. However, the fact is that Petitioner 
suffered an injury only to his toe. As a result of this injury, 
some of the motion in this toe was affected and therefore, it did 
not function in the same manner as before this incident. In 
other words, its normal function was impaired to a degree. 
This limitation of function was properly considered and 
-recognized by physicians providing impairment ratings. In fact, 
Respondents have no contention that an impairment rating is 
appropriate for this injury, as noted previously, it is arguable 
that it should be 2% and 4% at most. However, as this rating 
clearly establishes, this injury resulted in a relatively minor 
impairment to the Petitioner's overall condition but no actual 
disability. 
00596 
The fact that Petitioner's toe was injured did not preclude 
him from being able to work. As noted previously, 'npt dryly was 
Petitioner released to light duty work relatively early in the 
recovery process, he was released to full duty employment, with 
respect to the condition of his toe, as of February 8, 1999. 
Even with the impairment resulting from his injured toe, he was 
deemed by his treating physician to be able to work. 
An impairment such as this which results in a relatively 
minor impairment simply cannot be the cause of a permanent and 
total disability. Petitioner's toe, per his testimony and 
medical evidence, is not the most troublesome injury to him and 
is not the cause of his disability and inability to undertake 
further employment. Petitioner's toe is impaired, but he is not 
totally disabled as a result. 
As the Petitioner's toe injury only resulted in a relatively 
minor impairment and is not the cause of his permanent and total 
disability, Ameritemps should not held responsible for such 
benefits. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Ameritemps should not be deemed 
liable for permanent and total disability benefits. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this tff day of August, 2003. 
PLANT, WALLACE, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
THEODORE E. KANELL 
D. SCOTT BERRETT 
Attorneys for Respondent Ameritemps 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this L/\ d 
< ccc 
c r r. _ r 
day o.f"August/J ?CJ03, I 
* .• ' r r-1- .' r r r r 
sent, postage prepaid, a copy of the foregoing Motion and 
Memorandum, to the following: 
Richard Burke 
KING, BURKE & SCHAAP 
648 East 100 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Carrie Taylor 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Post Office Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Elliot Morris 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND 
392 East 6400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Floyd Holm 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND 
392 East 6400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Lorrie Lima 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE 
160 East 3 00 South, Third Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111s 
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APPENDIX 5 
"Order on Motions for Review" by the Appeals Board 
dated May 3,2004. 
APPEALS BOARD 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
JOHNNY ALBERT, 
Applicant, 
AMERICAN ASBESTOS ABATEMENT * 
and WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND; * 
QUALITY PLATING and WORKERS * 
COMPENSATION FUND; BARNARD & * 
BURK GROUP, INC. and NATIONAL * 
UNION FIRE INS.; AMERITEMPS, INC. * 
and HARTFORD INS.; TRANSWEST * 
CONSTRUCTION; UNINSURED * 
EMPLOYERS' FUND; EMPLOYERS' * 
REINSURANCE FUND, * 
* 
Defendants. * 
Quality Plating, Barnard & Burk, and Ameritemps, by and through their respective insurance 
carriers, ask the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to review Administrative Law Judge 
La Jeunesse's decision regarding Johnny Albert's claim for benefits under the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Ann.). 
The Appeals Board exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801(3) and Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1.M. 
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES PRESENTED 
Over the course of many years, while working for several different employers, Mr. Albert 
suffered a series of injuries to his low back, right foot and left foot. In addition to these work 
injuries, Mr. Albert is intellectually and emotionally challenged. He now seeks disability and 
medical benefits under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. 
The parties agree that Mr. Albert's physical, intellectual and emotional problems have left 
him permanently and totally disabled. They disagree over the specific benefits Mr. Albert is entitled 
to receive, and their respective liabilities for those benefits. To resolve these questions, Judge La 
Jeunesse held an evidentiary hearing on December 17,2002. On July 22,2003, Judge La Jeunesse 
issued his decision, which can be summarized as follows: 
ORDER ON 
MOTIONS FOR REVIEW 
Case Nos. 97-0576, 
99-1213,99-1214 
01-1070,01-1071, 
01-1072,01-1073, 
and 02-0595 
JOHNNY ALBERT 
ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR REVIEW 
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• Transwest, the Uninsured Employers' Fund, and the Employers' Reinsurance Fund were 
relieved of any liability for Mr. Albert's claims. 
• Quality Plating and its insurance carrier, Workers Compensation Fund (referred to jointly 
as "Quality"), were ordered to pay temporary total disability compensation, permanent partial 
disability compensation and medical expenses for low back injuries Mr. Albert suffered while 
working for Quality on June 18,1990. 
• Barnard & Burk and its insurance carrier, National Union Fire Insurance ("Barnard"), 
were ordered to pay permanent partial disability compensation and medical expenses for a 
second low back injury that Mr. Albert suffered while working for Barnard on January 21, 
1991. 
• American Asbestos Abatement and its insurance carrier, Workers Compensation Fund 
("American"), were ordered to pay medical expenses for a third low back injury Mr. Albert 
suffered while working for American on July 28,1991. 
• Ameritemps and its insurance carrier, Hartford Insurance ("Aineritemps"), were ordered 
to pay permanent total disability compensation beginning June 16, 1997, and medical 
expenses for a left foot injury Mr. Albert suffered while working for American on June 16, 
1997. 
Quality, Barnard and Ameritemps now request review of Judge La Jeunesse's decision. 
Quality contests its liability for medical expenses. Barnard contests its liability for medical expenses 
and permanent partial disability compensation. Ameritemps contends it is not liable for Mr. Albert's 
permanent total disability compensation. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Commission affirms and adopts Judge La Jeunesse's findings of fact. Those facts are 
summarized below and are also supplemented by the Appeals Board's additional findings relative to 
the specific issues raised in the parties' motions for review. 
Working for Quality on June 18, 1990, Mr. Albert injured his low back while lifting some 
metal plates. He received medical attention and was off work for one week. He incurred a 2 Vi % 
whole person impairment as a result of this back injury. Thereafter, Mr. Albert submitted no other 
medical expenses to Quality for payment. However, in his application for hearing against Quality, 
filed on October 3,2001, Mr. Albert claimed additional medical expenses. Quality's answer to Mr. 
Albert's application reported that "(t)he last benefits provided in this matter were paid on July 6, 
1990. Workers' Compensation Fund has received no other medical bills " Quality's answer 
then denied liability for further medical expense on the grounds such liability was barred "by the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. Section 34A-2-417." 
JOHNNY ALBERT 
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While working for Barnard on January 21, 1991, Mr. Albert slipped, fell on a pipe and 
injured his low back. He received medical attention at the time, but did not miss any work. This 
injury resulted in an additional 2 14 % permanent whole person impairment. In his application for 
hearing against Barnard filed on October 3, 2001, Mr. Albert claimed additional medical and 
disability benefits for the January 1991 injury. Barnard's answer included as its "Seventh Defense" a 
statement that "Defendants affirmatively allege the applicant's claims are or may be barred or limited 
by the statutes of limitation and/or notice provisions contained in Utah Code Annotated § 34A-2 et 
seq., § 34A-3 et seq. and § 35-1 et seq." 
On July 28, 1991, Mr. Albert injured his right foot while working at American Asbestos. 
This injury caused a 9% permanent whole person impairment. After a lengthy period of recovery, 
Mr. Albert was able to return to work, this time with Ameritemps. 
Nine months after beginning employment with Ameritemps, Mr. Albert crushed his left great 
toe in a work-related accident. This injury required four surgeries, over a period of 13 months. Mr. 
Albert did not reach medical stability until February 25, 1999, and then was left with p. 4% 
permanent whole person impairment. Mr. Albert has been unable to work since the accident at 
Ameritemps on June 16,1997. 
In addition to Mr. Albert's work-place injuries and resulting impairments, he has a low IQ 
and severe deficits in memory, concentration, judgment and other mental functions. He also suffers 
from significant depression that constitutes a 30% whole-person impairment, 1/3 of which is 
attributable to the injuries and chronic pain from his work accidents.. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
As already noted, Quality, Barnard and Ameritemps request review of Judge La Jeunesse's 
decision. Their respective arguments are addressed separately below. 
Quality's liability for medical expenses. The only part of Judge La Jeunesse's Order 
challenged by Quality is the directive that Quality pay ongoing medical expenses necessary to treat 
Mr. Albert's back injuries from his accident at Quality on June 18, 1990. In arguing that it has no 
further liability for these medical expense, Quality relies on the affirmative defense established by § 
417(1) of the Act: 
(1) Except with respect to prosthetic devices, in nonpermanent total disability 
cases an employee's medical benefit entitlement ceases if for a period of three 
consecutive years the employee does not: 
(a) incur medical expenses reasonably related to the industrial accident; and 
(b) submit the medical expenses incurred to the employee's employer or insurance 
carrier for payment. 
JOHNNY ALBERT 
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Quality contends that, because Mr. Albert did not submit any medical expenses for payment 
after 1990, the "three year" provision of § 417(1) ends his right to future payments of medical 
expenses. In response, Mr. Albert argues that Quality cannot assert § 417(1) as an affirmative 
defense because Quality failed to adequately raise that defense in its answer to Mr. Albert's 
application. 
Commission Rule R602-2-1 .D addresses the content requirements that apply to answers in 
workers' compensation proceedings: 
The employer or insurance carrier shall have 30 days following the date of the 
mailing of the application to file a written answer with the Commission, admitting or 
denying liability for the claim. The answer shall state all affirmative defenses with 
sufficient accuracy and detail that an applicant may be fully informed of the nature of 
the defense asserted.... (emphasis added) 
The objective of Rule R602-2-1.D is to give applicants reasonable advance notice of 
affirmative defenses so that they can investigate the facts and prepare a response. Quality asserted 
§417(l)asan affirmative defense not only by citing § 417 itself, but also by stating the factual basis 
that supported the defense. The Appeals Board finds that Quality's answer contained "sufficient 
accuracy and detail" to allow Mr. Albert to be "fully informed of the nature of the defense asserted," 
and thereby satisfied Rule R602-2-l.D's requirements 
Having concluded that Quality properly raised its §417(1) defense, the Appeals Board turns 
to the merits of that defense. There is no evidence that Mr. Albert submitted any medical expenses 
to Quality after 1990. Therefore, by operation of § 417(1), Quality's obligation to pay for medical 
treatment related to Mr. Albert's accident of June 18, 1990, has now ended. Judge La Jeunesse's 
order will be modified accordingly. 
Barnard's liability for medical and disability benefits. Judge La Jeunesse ordered Barnard to 
pay permanent partial disability compensation and medical expenses arising from the back injury Mr. 
Albert suffered at Barnard on January 21,1991. Barnard challenges Judge La Jeunesse's Order on 
the grounds that Mr. Albert's claim for medical expenses is barred by §417(1), and his claim for 
permanent partial disability compensation is barred by § 417(2). Mr. Albert responds by arguing 
that, because Barnard failed to adequately raise its §417 defenses in its answer, those defenses are 
waived. 
As already discussed in the preceding section of this decision, § 417(1) establishes an 
affirmative defense to ongoing liability for medical care if the injured worker does not, for a period 
of three years, 1) incur medical expenses reasonably related to the industrial accident and 2) submit 
the medical expenses incurred to the employee's employer or insurance carrier for payment. 
Similarly, § 417(2) provides an affirmative defense to claims for permanent partial disability 
compensation if no application for such compensation has been filed within six years from the date 
of the accident. But affirmative defenses are waived if not properly raised, and the Commission's 
JOHNNY ALBERT 
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Rule R602-2-1.D requires the employer or insurance carrier to state in their answers ". . . all 
affirmative defenses with sufficient accuracy and detail that an applicant may be fully informed of 
the nature of the defense asserted " 
In the previous part of this decision, the Appeals Board concluded that Quality had raised its 
§417(1) defense with sufficient accuracy and detail to satisfy Rule R602-2-1.D, in that Quality 
specifically cited the statute and also set out the factual basis for application of the statute. In 
contrast to Quality's specificity, Barnard's answer does not reference § 417, but instead refers in very 
broad terms to old and current versions of the entire Workers' Compensation Act and the entire 
Occupational Disease Act. Furthermore, Barnard's answer states no factual basis to support its § 417 
defenses. 
It bears repeating that the purpose behind Rule R602-2-1.D is to require parties relying on 
affirmative defenses to provide reasonable advance notice of those defenses so that the parties who 
must respond to those defenses have time to investigate the facts and present their evidence. 
Barnard's answer was too vague to meet either the spirit or the letter of the rule and, therefore, failed 
to preserve the § 417 defenses that would otherwise have been available to Barnard. 
Barnard contends that, even if its answer was inadequate to raise its §417 defenses, it 
nevertheless proffered evidence during the evidentiary hearing that was sufficient to raise those 
defenses. The Appeals Board disagrees. Rule R602-2-1.D requires that affirmative defenses be 
raised in a party's answer, rather than at hearing. But assuming for discussion that the defenses can 
be presented for the first time at the evidentiary hearing, nothing in the proffer that Barnard made 
during the evidentiary hearing in this case can reasonably be viewed as raising Barnard's § 417 
defenses. 
Having concluded that Barnard waived its §417 defenses, the Appeals Board turns to 
Barnard's contention that a medical panel must be appointed to evaluate Mr. Albert's need for future 
medical treatment for the back injury in question. Barnard has not established any of the 
circumstances identified by Commission Rule R602-2-2 as justifying appointment of a medical 
panel. For that reason, the Appeals Board declines to require appointment of a medical panel. 
Ameritemps' liability for permanent total disability compensation. Ameritemps contends it 
is not liable for Mr. Albert's permanent total disability compensation because the injury Mr. Albert 
suffered while working for Ameritemps is not the cause of his inability to work. Mr. Albert's right 
to permanent total disability compensation is governed by § 34A-2-413(b) of the Act, as follows: 
To establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensation, the 
employee has the burden of proof to show by a preponderance of the evidence that: 
(i) the employee sustained a significant impairment or combination of 
impairments as a result of the industrial accident... that gives rise to the permanent 
total disability entitlement; 
(ii) the employee is permanently totally disabled; and 
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(iii) the industrial accident 
permanent total disability. 
was the direct cause of the employee's 
Ameritemps concedes Mr. Albert satisfies § 413(b)(ii)'s requirement that he is "permanently 
and totally disabled." Consequently, the Appeals Board turns to the two remaining requirements of § 
413(b): subsection (i)'s requirement of a significant impairment resulting from the accident at 
Ameritemps that gives rise to the permanent total disability entitlement; and subsection (iii)'s 
requirement that the accident was the direct cause of Mr. Albert's permanent total disability. 
The Appeals Board agrees with and adopts Judge La Jeunesse's reasoning on the two points 
in question. Mr. Albert's accident at Ameritemps on June 16,1997, left him with a significant 4% 
whole person impairment and also contributed to his already-existing depression. Although Mr. 
Albert had other work-related impairments, mental limitations and emotional difficulties before his 
accident at Ameritemps, he still had been able to work. After the numerous surgeries, additional 
impairment, and extended time away from the labor force that resulted from the Ameritemps 
accident, he was no longer able to work. The Appeals Board therefore agrees with Judge La 
Jeunesse that Mr. Albert has established 1) a significant impairment resulting from the Ameritemps 
accident and 2) that the Ameritemps accident was the direct cause of his permanent total disability. 
ORDER 
The Appeals Board grants Quality's motion for review and hereby relieves Quality of liability 
for Mr. Albert's medical expenses by striking paragraph six of Judge La Jeunesse's "order," found 
at page 31 of Judge La Jeunesse's "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order." 
The Appeals Board affirms all other parts of Judge La Jeunesse's decision and denies the 
Motions for Review of Barnard and Ameritemps. 
It is so ordered. 
Dated this
 0i day of ^ p T , 2004. 
Colleen S. Colton, Chair 
i^ w*^  
kk^2^ 
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NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to reconsider this 
Order. Any such request for reconsideration must be received by the Appeals Board within 20 days 
of the date of this order. Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals 
by filing a petition for review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the 
court within 30 days of the date of this order. 
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APPENDIX 6 
"Order Denying Request for Reconsideration" by the 
Appeals Board dated October 18, 2004. 
APPEALS BOARD 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
JOHNNY ALBERT, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
AMERICAN ASBESTOS ABATEMENT 
and WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND; 
QUALITY PLATTING CO and 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND; 
BARNARD & BURK GROUP, INC. and 1 
NATIONAL UNION FIRE INS.; 
AMERITEMPS, INC. and HARTFORD 
INS.; TRANSWEST CONSTRUCTION; 
UNINSURANCED EMPLOYERS' FUND 
and EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND, 
Respondents. 
ORDER DENYING REQUEST 
FOR RECONSIDERATION 
Case Nos. 97-0576,99-1213, 
99-1214,01-1070,01-1071, 
01-1072,01-1073, & 02-0595 
Barnard & Burk and its workers' compensation insurance carrier, National Union Fire 
Insurance (referred to jointly as "Barnard" hereafter), ask the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor 
Commission to reconsider its prior determination awarding benefits to Johnny Albert under the Utah 
Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Ann.). 
The Appeals Board exercises jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-
46b-13. 
BACKGROUND AND ISSUE PRESENTED 
Judge La Jeunesse ordered Barnard to pay permanent partial disability compensation and 
medical expenses arising from a back injury Mr. Albert suffered at Barnard on January 21, 1991. 
Barnard then sought Appeals Board review of Judge La Jeunesse's decision on the grounds that Mr. 
Albert's claim for medical expenses is barred by §417(1) of the Act and his claim for permanent 
partial disability compensation is barred by § 417(2) of the Act. In response, Mr. Albert argued that, 
because Barnard failed to raise its §417 defenses in its answer to Mr. Albert's claim, Barnard waived 
those defenses. 
In its decision issued May 3,2004, the Appeals Board concluded that Barnard had waived its 
§417 defenses. The Appeals Board therefore affirmed Judge La Jeunesse's award of benefits to Mr. 
Albert. Barnard now asks the Appeals Board to reconsider its decision. Barnard argues that it: 1) 
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was under no obligation to raise its §417(1) defense in its answer to Mr. Albert's claim; and 2) did, 
in fact, adequately raise its §417 defenses. 
DISCUSSION 
Barnard's obligation to raise its $417(1) defense. Section § 417(1) of the Act contains the 
following restriction to an injured worker's right to receive medical treatment for work-related 
injuries (emphasis added): 
(1) Except with respect to prosthetic devices, in nonpermanent total disability 
cases an employee's medical benefit entitlement ceases if for a period of three 
consecutive years the employee does not: 
(a) incur medical expenses reasonably related to the industrial accident; and 
(b) submit the medical expenses incurred to the employee's employer or insurance 
carrier for payment. 
Barnard argues that it was not required to raise the foregoing statute's three year "incur and 
submit" requirement as a defense in its answer to Mr. Albert's claim because the defense only 
applies to "nonpermanent total disability cases," and at the time Barnard filed its answer, Mr. 
Albert's claim was for permanent total disability. 
As a preliminary matter, the Appeals Board notes that Barnard failed to raise this issue in its 
original motion for review. Section 63-46b-12(l)(b) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act 
requires a party seeking agency review to "state the grounds for review." This requirement is 
necessary to avoid piecemeal review proceedings. Because Barnard failed to raise this issue as a 
grounds for review in its initial motion for review, the Appeals Board declines to consider the issue 
for the first time as part of this reconsideration proceeding. 
But even if the Appeals Board were to consider the merits of Barnard's new argument, the 
Appeals Board would reject that argument. Mr. Albert's application for hearing made a claim for 
both permanent total disability compensation and medical benefits. The claim for medical benefits 
was not dependent upon the claim for permanent total disability compensation. It was therefore 
Barnard's obligation to raise in its answer all its defenses to the medical claim, including its §417(1) 
defense. 
Sufficiency of Barnard's S417 defenses. Having concluded that Barnard was required to raise 
its §417 defenses in its answer to Mr. Albert's claim, the Appeals Board must consider whether 
Barnard did so. Barnard's answer contained only vague and tentative references to statutes of 
limitation and notice provisions that might be found somewhere in the Workers' Compensation Act 
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or Occupational Disease Act. Barnard's answer did not "state all afEraiative defenses with sufficient 
accuracy and detail that an applicant may be fully informed of the nature of the defense asserted," as 
required by the Commission's Rule 602-2- LD. 
Barnard argues that even if its answer was riot sufficient under the Commission's Rule 602-2-
1 .D to preserve its §417 defenses, its answer was sufficient under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
and appellate precedent interpreting those rules. However, it is the Commission's rules that govern 
adjudicative process before the Commission. Consequently, the Appeals Board looks to the 
Commission's Rule R602-2-1.D, rather than the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to evaluate the 
sufficiency of Barnard's answer. 
For the reasons already discussed in this decision and in the Appeals Board's previous 
decision, the Appeals Board concludes that Barnard's answer did not raise its §417 defenses and that 
those defenses were, therefore, waived. 
ORDER 
The Commission reaffirms its previous decision and denies Barnard's request for 
reconsideration. It is so ordered. 
Dated this Jg_ day of October, 2004. 
Patricia S. Drawe 
iseph E. Hatch Jo 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may appeal this Order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a Petition For Review 
with that Court within 30 days of the date of this Order. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion For Reconsideration in the matter 
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FLOYD HOLM, ATTORNEY 
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392 EAST 6400 SOUTH 
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QUALITY PLATING 
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BARNARD & BURK GROUP INC 
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NATIONAL UNION FIRE INS. 
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LAS VEGAS NV 89109 
AMERITEMPSINC. 
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HARTFORD INS. 
P 0 BOX 22815 
DENVER CO 80222 
TRANSWEST CONSTRUCTION 
(address unavailable) 
ELLIOT LAWRENCE, ATTORNEY 
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS* FUND 
EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND 
P 0 BOX 146600 
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RICHARD BURKE, ATTORNEY 
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CARRIE TAYLOR, ATTORNEY 
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Sara Danielson 
Utah Labor Commission 
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Ameritemps' "Docketing Statement" dated November 
4, 2004. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
AMERITEMPS, INC. and/or HARTFORD 
INSURANCE, 
Petitioners/Appellants, 
vs. 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION; and 
JOHNNY ALBERT, 
Respondents/Appellees. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
 
DOCKETING STATEMENT 
Appeal No.: 20040953-CA 
Agency Case No. 991213, 
20011073 
COMES NOW the Petitioners, AmeriTemps, Inc. and Hartford Insurance, and pursuant to 
Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, files their Docketing Statement as follows: 
1. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: This appeal is from an order of the Labor 
Commission of Utah. 
2. JURISDICTION: The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated § 63-46(b)-16 (1988) and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
3. DATE OF ENTRY OF JUDGEMENT OR ORDER APPEALED FROM: 
May 3, 2004. 
4. DATE OF FILING PETITION FOR REVIEW: November 5,2004. 
5. DATE MOTIONS FILED PURSUANT TO RULES 50(B), 52(B), OR 59, UTAH 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULE 24, UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE, OR UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 77-13-6; AND THE DATE 
AN EFFECT OF ANY ORDERS DISPOSING OF SUCH MOTIONS: 
Not applicable. 
6. DATE AND EFFECT OF ORDER(S) DISPOSING OF POST JUDGMENT 
MOTION(S) AND ORDER OF DETERMINATION OF FINAL JUDGMENT 
UNDER RULE 54(B), UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: 
Not applicable. 
7. CLAIMS AND PARTIES REMAINING BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT: 
None - Barnard & Burk has filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Their case number is 20011071 and 
was brought by Respondent Johnny Albert for injuries sustained wliile in their employment. The 
Motion for Reconsideration was heard and the request was denied. 
8. STATEMENT OF FACTS: Respondent Johnny Albert, on November 4,1982, 
suffered an injury to his low back when a stack of trusses fell on him while he was employed by 
Transwest Construction. On June 18,1990, Respondent Albert, suffered an injury to his low back 
after lifting a stack of metal plates while employed by Quality Plating. On January 21, 1991, 
Respondent Albert, suffered an injury to his low back after falling on a pipe while employed by 
Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. On July 28,1991, Respondent Albert, suffered an injury to his right 
foot and heel after falling approximately twenty feet from a scaffolding while employed by American 
Asbestos Abatement. On June 16,1997, Respondent Albert, suffered an injury to his left great toe 
after getting it caught between a steel beam and a pallet jack while employed by Ameritemps. 
November 1998, Respondent Albeit, re-injured the left great toe when his daughter kicked his toe. 
In June 1999 Respondent Albert stepped on a worm hole wliile walking across the grass, in which he 
heard a snap injuring his right leg. 
9. ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW: The primary issue 
2 
for review by this Court is whether the injury incurred by the Respondent in his June, 1997 industrial 
accident is the direct cause of his permanent and total disability or is his disability the result of his 
pre-existing and unrelated industrial injuries. In order for an employee to be deemed permanently 
and totally disabled, he must show, in part, that his industrial accident was the direct cause of his 
disability. Utah Code Annotated § 34A-2-412(l)(b)(iii). This is a mixed question of law and fact 
and as such, this Court extends "heightened deference" to the Commission's determinations "with 
varying degrees of strictness, falling anywhere between a review of'correctness' and abroad 'abuse 
of discretion' standard." Drake v. Industrial Comm'n.. 939 P.2d 182 (Utah 1977). 
10. ASSIGNMENT OF CASE BY SUPREME COURT: Not applicable. 
11. RELATED APPEALS: Not applicable. 
12. ATTACHMENTS: Order On Motions for Review, Petition for Review, Order 
Extending Time For Reconsideration, and Order Denying Request for Reconsideration. 
DATED THIS $jj_ day of November, 2004. 
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
THEODORE E. KANELL 
»SEPH C. ALAMILLA 
Attorneys for Petitioners/Appellants 
2P 
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I hereby certify that on this $f day of November, 2004,1 sent, postage prepaid, a copy 
o£the.foregoing,-to the following: 
Richard Burke 
KING, BURKE & SCHAAP 
648 East 100 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorney for Respondent Johnny Albert 
Mr. Allen L. Hennebold 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
Post Office Box 146600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6600 
Floyd Holm 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND 
392 East 6400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Attn: Clerk of the Court 
P.O. Box 140230 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Carrie Taylor 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Post Office Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Elliot Morris 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND 
392 East 6400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Lorrie Lima 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE 
160 East 300 South, Third Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411 Is 
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ATTACHMENTS 
MAY / & ?'"•• 
PLAN*, GHBioTF-.: 
APPEALS BOARD / & KANE!..L 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
/ 
JOHNNY ALBERT, * 
* 
Applicant, * ORDER ON 
* MOTIONS FOR REVIEW 
v. * 
* 
AMERICAN ASBESTOS ABATEMENT * 
and WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND; * 
QUALITY PLATING and WORKERS . * 
COMPENSATION FUND; BARNARD & * Case Nos. 97-0576, 
BURK GROUP, INC and NATIONAL * 99-1213,99-1214 
UNION FIRE INS.; AMERITEMPS, INC. * 01-1070, 01-1071, 
and HARTFORD INS.; TRANSWEST * 01-1072,0M073, 
CONSTRUCTION; UNINSURED * and 02-0595 
EMPLOYERS' FUND; EMPLOYERS' * 
REINSURANCE FUND, * 
* 
Defendants. * 
Quality Plating, Barnard & Burk, and Ameritemps, by and through their respective insurance 
carriers, ask the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to review Administrative Law Judge 
La Jeunesse's decision regarding Johnny Albert's claim for benefits under the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Ann.)* 
The Appeals Board exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah Code 
'Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801(3) and Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1.M. 
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES PRESENTED 
Over the course of many years, while working for several different employers, Mr. Albert 
suffered a series of injuries to his low back, right foot and left foot In addition to these work 
injuries, Mr. Albert is intellectually and emotionally challenged. He now seeks disability and 
medical benefits under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. 
The parties agree that Mr. Albert's physical, intellectual and emotional problems have left 
him permanently and totally disabled. They disagree over the specific benefits Mr. Albert is entitled 
to receive, and their respective liabilities for those benefits. To resolve these questions, Judge La 
Jeunesse held an evidentiary hearing on December 17,2002. On July 22,2003, Judge La Jeunesse 
issued his decision, which can be summarized as follows: 
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-- •—Transwest,-the Uninsured Employers' Fund, and the Employers' Reinsurance Fund were 
relieved of any liability for Mr. Albert's claims. 
• Quality Plating and its insurance carrier, Workers Compensation Fund (referred to jointly 
as "Quality"), were ordered to pay temporary total disability compensation, permanent partial 
disability compensation and medical expenses for low back injuries Mr. Albert suffered while 
working for Quality on June 18,1990. 
• Barnard & Burk and its insurance carrier, National Union Fire Insurance ("Barnard"), 
were ordered to pay permanent partial disability compensation and medical expenses for a 
second low back injury that Mr. Albert suffered while working for Barnard on January 21, 
1991. 
• American Asbestos Abatement and its insurance carrier, Workers Compensation Fund 
("American"), were ordered to pay medical expenses for a third low back injury Mr. Albert 
suffered while working for American on July 28,1991. 
• Ameritemps and its insurance carrier, Hartford Insurance ("Ameritemps"), were ordered 
to pay permanent total disability compensation beginning June 16, 1997, and medical 
expenses for a left foot injury Mr. Albert suffered while working for American on June 16, 
1997. 
Quality, Barnard and Ameritemps now request review of Judge La Jeunesse's decision. 
Quality contests its liability for medical expenses. Barnard contests its liability for medical expenses 
and permanent partial disability compensation. Ameritemps contends it is not liable for Mr. Albert's 
permanent total disability compensation. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Commission affirms and adopts Judge La Jeunesse's findings of fact. Those facts are 
summarized below and are also supplemented by the Appeals Board's additional findings relative to 
'the specific issues raised in the parties' motions for review. 
Working for Quality on June 18, 1990, Mr. Albert injured his low back while lifting some 
metal plates. He received medical attention and was off work for one week. He incurred a 2 Vi % 
whole person impairment as a result of this back injury. Thereafter, Mr. Albert submitted no other 
medical expenses to Quality for payment. However, in his application for hearing against Quality, 
filed on October 3,2001, Mr. Albert claimed additional medical expenses. Quality's answer to Mr. 
Albert's application reported that "(t)he last benefits provided in this matter were paid on July 6, 
1990. Workers' Compensation Fund has received no other medical b i l l s . . . . " Quality's answer 
then denied liability for further medical expense on the grounds such liability was barred "by the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. Section 34A-2-417." 
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-While working for Barnard on January 21, 1991, Mr. Albert slipped, fell on a pipe and 
injured his low back. He received medical attention at the time, but did not miss any work. This 
injury resulted in an additional 2 XA % permanent whole person impairment. In his application for 
hearing against Barnard filed on October 3, 2001, Mr. Albert claimed additional medical and 
disability benefits for the January 1991 injury. Barnard's answer included as its "Seventh Defense" a 
statement that "Defendants affirmatively allege the applicant's claims are or may be ban-ed or limited 
by the statutes of limitation and/or notice provisions contained in Utah Code Annotated § 34A-2 et 
seq., § 34A-3 et seq. and § 35-1 et seq." 
On July 28, 1991, Mr. Albert injured his right foot while working at American Asbestos. 
This injury caused a 9% permanent whole person impairment. After a lengthy period of recovery, 
Mr. Albert was able to return to work, this time with Ameritemps. 
Nine months after beginning employment with Ameritemps, Mr. Albert crushed his left great 
toe in a work-related accident. This injury required four surgeries, over a period of 13 months. Mr. 
Albert did not reach medical stability until February 25, 1999, and them was left with a 4% 
permanent whole person impairment. Mr. Albert has been unable to work since the accident at 
Ameritemps on June 16, 1997. 
In addition to Mr. Albert's work-place injuries and resulting impairments, he has a low IQ 
and severe deficits in memory, concentration, judgment and other mental functions. He also suffers 
from significant depression that constitutes a 30% whole-person impairment, 1/3 of which is 
attributable to the injuries and chronic pain from his work accidents.. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
As already noted, Quality, Barnard and Ameritemps request review of Judge La jeunesse's 
decision. Their respective arguments are addressed separately below. 
Quality's liability for medical expenses. The only part of Judge La Jeunesse's Order 
challenged by Quality is the directive that Quality pay ongoing medical expenses necessary to treat 
Mr. Albert's back injuries from his accident at Quality on June 18,1990. In arguing that it has no 
further liability for these medical expense, Quality relies on the affirmative defense established by § 
417(1) of the Act: 
(1) Except with respect to prosthetic devices, in nonpermanent total disability 
cases an employee's medical benefit entitlement ceases if for a period of three 
consecutive years the employee does not: 
(a) incur medical expenses reasonably related to the industrial accident; and 
(b) submit the medical expenses incurred to the employee's employer or insurance 
carrier for payment. 
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Quality contends that, because Mr. Albert did not submit any medical expenses for payment 
after 1990, the "three year" provision of § 417(1) ends his right to future payments of medical 
expenses. In response, Mr. Albert argues that Quality cannot assert § 417(1) as an affirmative 
defense because Quality failed to adequately raise that defense in its answer to Mr. Albert's 
application. 
Commission Rule R602-2-1.D addresses the content requirements that apply to answers in 
workers' compensation proceedings: 
The employer or insurance carrier shall have 3 0 days following the date of the 
mailing of the application to file a written answer with the Commission, admitting or 
denying liability for the claim. The answer shall state all affirmative defenses with 
sufficient accuracy and detail that an applicant may be fully informed of the nature of 
the defense asserted.... (emphasis added) 
The objective of Rule R602-2-1.D is to give applicants reasonable advance notice of 
affirmative defenses so that they can investigate the facts and prepare a response. Quality asserted 
§417( 1) as an affirmative defense not only by citing § 417 itself, but also by stating the factual basis 
that supported the defense. The Appeals Board finds that Quality's answer contained "sufficient 
accuracy and detail" to allow Mr. Albert to be "fully informed of the nature of the defense asserted," 
and thereby satisfied Rule R602-2-1 ,D's requirements 
Having concluded that Quality properly raised its §417(1) defense, the Appeals Board turns 
to the merits of that defense. There is no evidence that Mr. Albert submitted any medical expenses 
to Quality after 1990. Therefore, by operation of § 417(1), Quality's obligation to pay for medical 
treatment related to Mr. Albert's accident of June 18, 1990, has now ended. Judge La Jeunesse's 
order will be modified accordingly. 
Barnard's liability for medical and disability benefits. Judge La Jeunesse ordered Barnard to 
pay permanent partial disability compensation and medical expenses arising from the back injury Mr. 
Albert suffered at Barnard on January 21,1991. Barnard challenges Judge La Jeunesse's Order on 
the grounds that Mr. Albert's claim for medical expenses is barred by §417(1), and his claim for 
permanent partial disability compensation is barred by § 417(2). Mr. Albert responds by arguing 
that, because Barnard failed to adequately raise its §417 defenses in its answer, those defenses are 
waived. 
As already discussed in the preceding section of this decision, § 417(1) establishes an 
affirmative defense to ongoing liability for medical care if the injured worker does not, for a period 
of three years, 1) incur medical expenses reasonably related to the industrial accident and 2) submit 
the medical expenses incurred to the employee's employer or insurance carrier for payment. 
Similarly, § 417(2) provides an affirmative defense to claims for permanent partial disability 
compensation if ho application for such compensation has been filed within six years from the date 
of the accident. But affirmative defenses are waived if not properly raised, and the Commission's 
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-Rule R602-2-i:D requires the employer or insurance carrier to state in their answers ". . . all 
affirmative defenses with sufficient accuracy and detail that an applicant may be fully informed of 
the nature of the defense asserted...." 
In the previous part of this decision, the Appeals Board concluded that Quality had raised its 
§417(1) defense with sufficient accuracy and detail to satisfy Rule R602-2-1.D, in that Quality 
specifically cited the statute and also set out the factual basis for application of the statute. In 
contrast to Quality's specificity, Barnard's answer does not reference § 417, but instead refers in very 
broad terms to old and current versions of the entire Workers' Compensation Act and the entire 
Occupational Disease Act. Furthermore, Barnard's answer states no factual basis to support its § 417 
defenses. 
It bears repeating that the purpose behind Rule R602-2-1.D is to require parties relying on 
affirmative defenses to provide reasonable advance notice of those defenses so that the parties who 
must respond to those defenses have time to investigate the facts and present their evidence. 
Barnard's answer was too vague to meet either the spirit or the letter of the rule and, therefore, failed 
to preserve the § 417 defenses that would otherwise have been available to Barnard. 
Barnard contends that, even if its answer was inadequate to raise its §417 defenses, it 
nevertheless proffered evidence during the evidentiary hearing that was sufficient to raise those 
defenses. The Appeals Board disagrees. Rule R602-2-1.D requires that affirmative defenses be 
raised in a party's answer, rather than at hearing. But assuming for discussion that the defenses can 
be presented for the first time at the evidentiary hearing, nothing in the proffer that Barnard made 
during the evidentiary hearing in this case can reasonably be viewed as raising Barnard's § 417 
defenses. 
Having concluded that Barnard waived its §417 defenses, the'Appeals Board turns to 
"Barnard's contention that a medical panel must be appointed to evaluate Mr. Albert's need for future 
medical treatment for the back injury in question. Barnard has not established any of the 
circumstances identified by Commission Rule R602-2-2 as justifying appointment of a medical 
panel. For that reason, the Appeals Board declines to require appointment of a medical panel. 
Ameritemps' liability for permanent total disability compensation. Ameritemps contends it 
is not liable for Mr. Albert's permanent total disability compensation because the injury Mr. Albert 
suffered while working for Ameritemps is not the cause of his inability to work. Mr. Albert's right 
to permanent total disability compensation is governed by § 34A-2-413(b) of the Act, as follows: 
To establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensation, the 
employee has the burden of proof to show by a preponderance of the evidence that: 
(i) the employee sustained a significant impairment or combination of 
impairments as a result of the industrial accident... that gives rise to the permanent 
total disability entitlement; 
JOHNNY ALBERT 
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(iii) the industrial accident . . . was the direct cause of the employee's 
permanent total disability. 
Ameritemps concedes Mr. Albert satisfies § 413(b)(ii)'s requirement that he is "permanently 
and totally disabled." Consequently, the Appeals Board turns to the two remaining requirements of§ 
413(b): subsection (i)'s requirement of a significant impairment resulting from the accident at 
Ameritemps that gives rise to the permanent total disability entitlement; and subsection (iii)'s 
requirement that the accident was the direct cause of Mr. Albert's permanent total disability. 
The Appeals Board agrees with and adopts Judge La Jeunesse's reasoning on the two points 
in question. Mr. Albert's accident at Ameritemps on June 16,1997, left him with a significant 4% 
whole person impairment and also contributed to his already-existing depression. Although Mr. 
Albert had other work-related impairments, mental limitations and emotional difficulties before his 
accident at Ameritemps, he still had been able to work. After the numerous surgeries, additional 
impairment, and extended time away from the labor force that resulted from the Ameritemps 
accident, he was no longer able to work. The Appeals Board therefore agrees with Judge La 
Jeunesse that Mr. Albert has established 1) a significant impairment resulting from the Ameritemps 
accident and 2) that the Ameritemps accident was the direct cause of his permanent total disability. 
ORDER 
The Appeals Board grants Quality's motion for review and hereby relieves Quality of liability 
for Mr. Albert's medical expenses by striking paragraph six of Judge La Jeunesse's "order," found 
at page 31 of Judge La Jeunesse's "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order." 
The Appeals Board affirms all other parts of Judge La Jeunesse's decision and denies the 
Motions for Review of Barnard and Ameritemps. 
It is so ordered. 
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NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to reconsider this 
Order. Any such request for reconsideration must be received by the Appeals Board within 20 days 
of the date of this order. Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals 
by filing a petition for review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the 
court within 30 days of the date of this order. 
THEODORE E. KANELL (1768) 
SCOTT S.SKEEN( 10022) 
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
Attorney for Defendant 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone (801) 363-7611 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
AMERITEMPS, INC. and/or HARTFORD * 
INSURANCE, * 
* 
Petitioner, * 
vs. * 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION; and * 
JOHNNY ALBERT, * 
Respondents. * 
* 
* 
* 
Notice is hereby given that Ameritemps, Inc., and its insurance earner, Hartford Insurance, 
Petitioners, pursuant to rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, petitions the Utah Court of 
Appeals to review the Order On Motions for Review, in this matter entered by the Utah Labor 
Commission on May 3, 2004. 
This petition seeks review of all parts of the order pertaining to Petitioners liability for permanent 
/ 
y i PETITION FOR REVIEW AND 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Appeal No.: JbDbfOHS'i 
Agency Case No. 97576, 991213. 
991214,20011070,20011071, 
20011072, 20011073 and 2002595 
total disability compensation. Petitioner requests the court to direct the respondent to prepare and certify 
to the court its entire record, which shall include all of the proceedings and evidence taken in this matter. 
DATED THIS %_ day of June, 2004. 
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
THEODORE E. KANELL 
SCOTT S. SKEEN 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this £. day of June, 2004,1 sent, postage prepaid, a copy of the 
foregoing PETITION FOR REVIEW, to the following: 
Richard Burke 
KING, BURKE & SCHAAP 
648 East 100 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorney for Respondent Johnny Albert 
Mr. Allen L. Hennebold 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
Post Office Box 146600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6600 
Carrie Taylor 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Post Office Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Elliot Morris 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND 
392 East 6400 South 
.Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Floyd Holm 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND 
392 East 6400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Lome Lima 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE 
160 East 300 South, Third Floor ^ S a u u k
=
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*
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RECEIVED 
APPEALS BOARD 
THE UTAH LABOR COMMISSION PLANT, CHFHSTa;'*£« 
&KAMRL 
JOHNNYALBERT, 
Applicant, * ORDER EXTENDING TIME 
* FOR RECONSIDERATION 
vs. * 
AMERICAN ASBESTOS ABATEMENT * 
and WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND; * 
QUALITY PLATING and WORKERS * 
COMPENSATION FUND; BARNARD & * Case Nos. 97-0576, 
BURK GROUP, INC. and NATIONAL * 99-1213,99-1214 
UNION FERE INS.; AMERITEMPS, INC. * 01-1070,01-1071, 
and HARTFORD INS.; TRANSWEST * 01-1072,01-1073, 
CONSTRUCTION; UNINSURED * and 02-0595 
EMPLOYERS' FUND; EMPLOYERS' * 
REINSURANCE FUND, * 
* 
Defendants. * 
On May 21, 2004, Barnard & Burk Constructors and its workers compensation 
insurance carrier, National Union Fire (referred to jointly as "Barnard &. Burk" filed a request 
for reconsideration, asking the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to reconsider 
its decision in this matter. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-13, the Appeals Board has 20 
days to rule on such a request. However, Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-l(9) allows the Appeals 
Board to extend the 20 day period for good cause. 
In order to allow other parties the opportunity to respond to Barnard & Burk's request 
for reconsideration, and to allow the Appeals Board sufficient time to consider the request, 
the period for determination of this request is extended as follows: 
1. Other parties may respond to the request for reconsideration no later than June 
11,2004. 
10003 
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2. The Appeals Board will issue its decision no later than June 30,2004. 
Dated this j£_ day of Cu^ruL . 2004. 
0 ^ 
Pallida S. Driwe ' rJ*-
Jos^hE.fifltch 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Extending Time for Reconsideration in the matter 
of Johnny Albert, CaseNos. 97T0576,99-1213,99-1214,01-10701-1071, 01-1072,01-1073, and 
02-0595, was mailed first class postage prepaid this ^ T day of Q&n/ , 2004, to the following: 
JOHNNY ALBERT 
2550 WEST 2780 SOUTH #171 
WEST VALLEY CITY UT 84119 
AMERICAN ASBESTOS ABATEMENT 
1575 WEST 2550 SOUTH 
OGDENUT 84401 
ELLIOT MORRIS, ATTORNEY 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND 
392 EAST 6400 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84107 
FLOYD HOLM, ATTORNEY 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND 
392 EAST 6400 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84107 
NATIONAL UNION FIRE INS. 
AIGCA 
PO BOX 26149 
LAS VEGAS NV 89126-0149 
LORRIE LIMA, ATTORNEY 
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND 
EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND 
P O BOX 146600 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-6600 
RICHARD BURKE, ATTORNEY 
648 EAST 100 SOUTH #200 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84102 
CARRIE TAYLOR, ATTORNEY 
PO BOX 2465 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84110-2465 
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THEODORE KANELL, ATTORNEY 
136 E SOUTH TEMPLE #1700 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
QUALITY PLATING 
(returned mail) 
BARNARD & BURK GROUP INC 
(returned mail) 
AMERITEMPS INC. 
(returned mail) 
HARTFORD INS. 
(returned mail) 
TRANSWEST CONSTRUCTION 
(address unavailable) 
Sara Danielson 
Labor Commission of Utah 
Sj/mr/recon/97-0576ab-ext 
RECEIVED 
^ H R I S T B I S E N 
vs. 
AMERICAN ASBESTOS ABATEMENT 
and WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND; 
QUALITY PLATTING CO and 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND; 
BARNARD & BURK GROUP, INC. and 
NATIONAL UNION FIRE INS,; 
AMERITEMPS, INC. and HARTFORD 
INS.; TRANSWEST CONSTRUCTION; 
UNTNSURANCED EMPLOYERS' FUND 
and EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND, 
Respondents. 
Barnard & Burk and its workers' compensation insurance carrier, National Union Fire 
Insurance (referred to jointly as "Barnard" hereafter), ask the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor 
Commission to reconsider its prior determination awarding benefits to Johnny Albert under the Utah 
Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Ann.). 
The Appeals Board exercises jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-
46b-13. 
BACKGROUND AND ISSUE PRESENTED 
Judge La Jeunesse ordered Barnard to pay permanent partial disability compensation and 
medical expenses arising from a back injury Mr. Albert suffered at Barnard on January 21, 1991. 
Barnard then sought Appeals Board review of Judge La Jeunesse's decision on the grounds that Mr. 
Albert's claim for medical expenses is barred by §417(1) of the Act and his claim for permanent 
partial disability compensation is barred by § 417(2) of the Act In response, Mr. Albert argued that, 
because Barnard failed to raise its §417 defenses in its answer to Mr. Albert's claim, Barnard waived 
those defenses. 
In its decision issued May 3,2004, the Appeals Board concluded that Barnard had waived its 
§417 defenses. The Appeals Board therefore affirmed Judge La Jeunesse's award of benefits to Mr. 
Albert. Barnard now asks the Appeals Board to reconsider its decision. Barnard argues that it: 1) 
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was under no obligation to raise its §417(1) defense in its answer to Mr. Albert's claim; and 2) did, 
in fact, adequately raise its §417 defenses. 
DISCUSSION 
Barnard's obligation to raise its $417(1) defense. Section § 417(1) of the Act contains the 
following restriction to an injured worker's right to receive medical treatment for work-related 
injuries (emphasis added): 
(1) Except with respect to prosthetic devices, in nonpermanent total disability 
cases an employee's medical benefit entitlement ceases if for a period of three 
consecutive.years the employee does not: 
(a) incur medical expenses reasonably related to the industrial accident; and 
(b) submit the medical expenses incurred to the employee's employer or insurance 
carrier for payment 
Barnard argues that it was not required to raise the foregoing statute's three year "incur and 
submit" requirement as a defense in its answer to Mr. Albert's claim because the defense only 
applies to "nonpermanent total disability cases," and at the time Barnard filed its answer, Mr. 
Albert's claim was for permanent total disability. 
As a preliminary matter, the Appeals Board notes that Barnard failed to raise this issue in its 
original motion for review. Section 63-46b-12(l)(b) of the Utiah Administrative Procedures Act 
requires a party seeking agency review to "state the grounds for review." This requirement is 
necessary to avoid piecemeal review proceedings. Because Barnard failed to raise this issue as a 
grounds for review in its initial motion for review, the Appeals Board declines to consider the issue 
for the first time as part of this reconsideration proceeding. 
But even if the Appeals Board were to consider the merits of Barnard's new argument, the 
Appeals Board would reject that argument. Mr. Albert's application for hearing made a claim for 
both permanent total disability compensation and medical benefits. The claim for medical benefits 
was not dependent upon the claim for permanent total disability compensation. It was therefore 
Barnard's obligation to raise in its answer all its defenses to the medical claim, including its §417(1) 
defense. 
Sufficiency of Barnard's §417<lefenses. Having concluded that Barnard was required to raise 
its §417 defenses in its answer to Mr. Albert's claim, the Appeals Board must consider whether 
Barnard did so. Barnard's answer contained only vague and tentative references to statutes of 
limitation and notice provisions that might be found somewhere in the Workers' Compensation Act 
ORDER DENYING REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION 
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or Occupational Disease Act Barnard 9s answer did not "state all affirmative defenses with sufficient 
accuracy and detail that an applicant may be folly informed of the nature of the defense asserted," as 
required by the Commission's Rule 602-2-1 D. 
Barnard argues that even if its answer was not sufficient under the Commission's Rule 602-2-
1 .D to preserve its §417 defenses, its answer was sufficient under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
and appellate precedent interpreting those rules. However, it is the Commission's rules that govern 
adjudicative process before the Commission. Consequently, the Appeals Board looks to the 
Commission's Rule R602-2-1.D, rather than the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to evaluate the 
sufficiency of Barnard's answer.. 
For the reasons already discussed in this decision and in the Appeals Board's previous 
decision, the Appeals Board concludes that Barnard's answer did not raise its §417 defenses and that 
those defenses were, therefore, waived 
ORDER 
The Commission reaffirms its previous decision and denies Barnard's request for 
reconsideration. It is so ordered. 
Dated this J t f^day of October, 2004. 
Colleen Colton, Chair 
Patricia S, Drawe 
tkfyh E. Hatch 
fitsK* 
Jo, 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may appeal this Order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a Petition For Review 
with that Court within 30 days of the date of this Order. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion For Reconsideration in the matter 
of Johnny Albert, CaseNos. 97-0576,99-1213,99-1214,01-1070,01-1071,01-1072,01-1073 & 02-
0959, was mailed, first class, postage prepaid this J ^ d a y of October, 2004, to the following: 
JOHNNY ALBERT 
2550 WEST 2780 SOUTH #171 
WEST VALLEY CITY UT 84119 
AMERICAN ASBESTOS ABATEMENT 
1575 WEST 2550 SOUTH 
OGDENUT 84401 
ELLIOT MORRIS, ATTORNEY 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND 
392 EAST 6400 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84107 
FLOYD HOLM, ATTORNEY 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND 
392 EAST 6400 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84107 
QUALITY PLATING 
2087 WEST 2425 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84097 
BARNARD & BURK GROUP INC 
POBOX117 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84110 
NATIONAL UNION FIRE INS. 
AIGCA 
101 CONVENTION CENTER #1100 
LAS VEGAS NV 89109 
AMERITEMPS INC. 
716 EAST 4500 SOUTH 
MURRAY UT 84107 
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HARTFORD INS. 
PO BOX 22815 
DENVER CO 80222 
TRANSWEST CONSTRUCTION 
(address unavailable) 
ELLIOT LAWRENCE, ATTORNEY 
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND 
EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND 
PO BOX 146600 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-6600 
RICHARD BURKE, ATTORNEY 
648 EAST 100 SOUTH #200 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84102 
CARRIE TAYLOR, ATTORNEY 
PO BOX 2465 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84110-2465 
THEODORE KANELL, ATTORNEY 
136 E SOUTH TEMPLE #1700 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
SaraDanielson 
Utah Labor Commission 
THEODORE E. KANELL (1768) 
JOSEPH C. ALAMILLA (9785) 
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
Attorney for Petitioners 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone (801) 363-7611 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
AMERITEMPS, INC. and/or HARTFORD * 
INSURANCE, * 
* 
Petitioners, * 
* 
vs. * 
COMMISSIONER OF THE UTAH LABOR * 
COMMISSION; and JOHNNY ALBERT, * 
Resnnnrfpntff * 
* 
* 
* 
Notice is hereby given that Ameritemps, Inc., and its insurance carrier, Hartford Insurance 
(hereinafter "Petitioners"), pursuant to Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and Utah 
Code Ann. § 34A-2-801, and hereby petitions the Utah Court of Appeals to judicially review the 
Order On Motions for Review, in this matter entered by the Utah Labor Commission on May 3, 
2004. 
Petitioners previously filed an appeal after the Respondent, Johnny Albert, filed amotion for 
review and the review was denied by the Labor Commission. This appeal number was 2004-0459 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
AND NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Appeal No.: 
Agency Case No. 991213 
20011073 
CA. After Petitioners filed their petitioner for review and their docketing statement, the Labor 
Commission accepted Respondent's request for-reconsideration thereby destroying appellate 
jurisdiction. The Labor Commission has since issued its order denying Respondent's request for 
reconsideration and, therefore, appellate jurisdiction has vested and the issues are ripe for appeal. 
Accordingly, Petitioners file this petitioner for review and notice of appeal. 
This petition seeks review of all parts of the order pertaining to Petitioners liability for 
permanent total disability compensation. Petitioner requests the court to direct the Labor 
Commission to prepare and certify to the court its entire record, which shall include all of the 
proceedings and evidence taken in this matter. 
DATED THIS T 'day of November, 2004. 
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
L.^ (L QDa.\.OQ 
JODbREE. KANELL ^ 
)SEPH C. ALAMDLLA 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this ijS. day of November, 2004,1 sent, postage prepaid, a copy 
of the foregoing to the following: 
Richard Burke 
KING, BURKE & SCHAAP 
648 East 100 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorney for Respondent Johnny Albert 
Mr, Allen L. Hennebold 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
Post Office Box 146600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6600 
Carrie Taylor 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Post Office Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Elliot Morris 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND 
392 East 6400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Floyd Holm 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND 
392 East 6400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Lorrie Lima 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE 
160 East 300 South, Third Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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APPENDIX 8 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-413. Permanent total 
disability - Amount of payments - Rehabilitation. 
34A-2-413. Permanent total disability - Amount of payments - Rehabilitation. 
(1) (a) In cases of permanent total disability resulting from an industrial accident or 
occupational disease, the employee shall receive compensation as outlined in this section. 
i 
(b) To establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensation, the employee has the 
burden of proof to show by a preponderance of evidence that: 
(i) the employee sustained a significant impairment or combination of impairments as a result 
of the industrial accident or occupational disease that gives rise to the permanent total disability 
entitlement; 
(ii) the employee is permanently totally disabled; and 
(iii) the industrial accident or occupational disease was the direct cause of the employee's 
permanent total disability. 
(c) To find an employee permanently totally disabled, the commission shall conclude that: 
(i) the employee is not gainfully employed; 
(ii) the employee has an impairment or combination of impairments that limit the employee's 
ability to do basic work activities; 
(iii) the industrial or occupationally caused impairment or combination of impairments 
prevent the employee from performing the essential functions of the work activities for which the 
employee has been qualified until the time of the industrial accident or occupational disease that 
is the basis for the employee's permanent total disability claim; and 
(iv) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably available, taking into consideration 
the employee's age, education, past work experience, medical capacity, and residual functional 
capacity. 
(d) Evidence of an employee's entitlement to disability benefits other than those provided 
under this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, if relevant, may be presented 
to the commission, but is not binding and creates no presumption of an entitlement under this 
chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
(2) For permanent total disability compensation during the initial 312-week entitlement, 
compensation shall be 66-2/3% of the employee's average weekly wage at the time of the injury, 
limited as follows: 
(a) compensation per week may not be more than 85% of the state average weekly wage at 
the time of the injury; 
© 2005 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group All rights reserved. Use of this product is subject to the 
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(b) compensation per week may not be less than the sum of $45 per week, plus $5 for a 
dependent spouse, plus $5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum 
of four dependent minor children, but not exceeding the maximum established in Subsection 
(2)(a) nor exceeding the average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury; and 
(c) after the initial 312 weeks, the minimum weekly compensation rate under Subsection 
(2)(b) shall be 36% of the current state average weekly wage, rounded to the nearest dollar. 
(3) For claims resulting from an accident or disease arising out of and in the course of the 
employee's employment on or before June 30, 1994: 
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for the initial 312 weeks of permanent total 
disability compensation except as outlined in Section 34A-2-703 as in effect on the date of 
injury. 
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay compensation for any 
combination of disabilities of any kind, as provided in this section and Sections 34A-2-410 
through 34A-2-412 and Sections 34A-2-501 through 34A-2-507 in excess of the amount of 
compensation payable over the initial 312 weeks at the applicable permanent total disability 
compensation rate under Subsection (2). 
(c) Any overpayment of this compensation shall be reimbursed to the employer or its 
insurance carrier by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund and shall be paid out of the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund's liability to the employee. 
(d) After an employee has received compensation from the employee's employer, its 
insurance carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund for any combination of disabilities 
amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at the applicable permanent total disability 
compensation rate, the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall pay all remaining permanent total 
disability compensation. 
(e) Employers' Reinsurance Fund payments shall commence immediately after the employer 
or its insurance carrier has satisfied its liability under Subsection (3) or Section 34A-2-703. 
(4) For claims resulting from an accident or disease arising out of arid in the course of the 
employee's employment on or after July 1,1994: 
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for permanent total disability compensation. 
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay compensation for any 
combination of disabilities of any kind, as provided in this section and Sections 34A-2-410 
through 34A-2-412 and Sections 34A-2-501 through 34A-2-507, in excess of the amount of 
compensation payable over the initial 312 weeks at the applicable permanent total disability 
compensation rate under Subsection (2). 
© 2005 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. Use of this product is subject to the 
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(c) Any overpayment of this compensation shall be recouped by the employer or its insurance 
carrier by reasonably offsetting the overpayment against future liability paid before or after the 
initial 312 weeks. 
(5) Notwithstanding the minimum rate established in Subsection (2), the compensation 
payable by the employer, its insurance carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, after an 
employee has received compensation from the employer or the employer's insurance carrier for 
any combination of disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at the applicable total 
disability compensation rate, shall be reduced, to the extent allowable by law, by the dollar 
amount of 50% of the Social Security retirement benefits received by the employee during the 
same period. 
(6) (a) A finding by the commission of permanent total disability is not final, unless 
otherwise agreed to by the parties, until: 
(i) an administrative law judge reviews a summary of reemployment activities undertaken 
pursuant to Chapter 8, Utah Injured Worker Reemployment Act; 
(ii) the employer or its insurance carrier submits to the administrative law judge a 
reemployment plan as prepared by a qualified rehabilitation provider reasonably designed to 
return the employee to gainful employment or the employer or its insurance carrier provides the 
administrative law judge notice that the employer or its insurance carrier will not submit a plan; 
and 
(iii) the administrative law judge, after notice to the parties, holds a hearing, unless otherwise 
stipulated, to consider evidence regarding rehabilitation and to review any reemployment plan 
submitted by the employer or its insurance carrier under Subsection (6)(a)(ii). 
(b) Prior to the finding becoming final, the administrative law judge shall order: 
(i) the initiation of permanent total disability compensation payments to provide for the 
employee's subsistence; and 
(ii) the payment of any undisputed disability or medical benefits due the employee. 
(c) The employer or its insurance carrier shall be given credit for any disability payments 
made under Subsection (6)(b) against its ultimate disability compensation liability under this 
chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
(d) An employer or its insurance carrier may not be ordered to submit a reemployment plan. 
If the employer or its insurance carrier voluntarily submits a plan, the plan is subject to 
Subsections (6)(d)(i) through (iii). 
(i) The plan may include retraining, education, medical and disability compensation benefits, 
job placement services, or incentives calculated to facilitate reemployment funded by the 
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employer or its insurance carrier. 
(ii) The plan shall include payment of reasonable disability compensation to provide for the 
employee's subsistence during the rehabilitation process. 
(iii) The employer or its insurance carrier shall diligently pursue the reemployment plan. The 
employer's or insurance carrier's failure to diligently pursue the reemployment plan shall be cause 
for the administrative law judge on the administrative law judge's own motion to make a final 
decision of permanent total disability. 
(e) If a preponderance of the evidence shows that successful rehabilitation is not possible, the 
administrative law judge shall order that the employee be paid weekly permanent total disability 
compensation benefits. 
(7) (a) The period of benefits commences on the date the employee became permanently 
totally disabled, as determined by a final order of the commission based on the facts and 
evidence, and ends: 
(i) with the death of the employee; or 
(ii) when the employee is capable of returning to regular, steady work. 
(b) An employer or its insurance carrier may provide or locate for a permanently totally 
disabled employee reasonable, medically appropriate, part-time work in a job earning at least 
minimum wage provided that employment may not be required to the extent that it would 
disqualify the employee from Social Security disability benefits. 
(c) An employee shall fully cooperate in the placement and employment process and accept 
the reasonable, medically appropriate, part-time work. 
(d) In a consecutive four-week period when an employee's gross income from the work 
provided under Subsection (7)(b) exceeds $500, the employer or insurance carrier may reduce the 
employee's permanent total disability compensation by 50% of the employee's income in excess 
of$500. 
(e) If a work opportunity is not provided by the employer or its insurance carrier, a 
permanently totally disabled employee may obtain medically appropriate, part-time work subject 
to the offset provisions contained in Subsection (7)(d). 
(f) (i) The commission shall establish rules regarding the part-time work and offset. 
(ii) The adjudication of disputes arising under Subsection (7) is governed by Part 8, 
Adjudication. 
(g) The employer or its insurance carrier shall have the burden of proof to show that 
medically appropriate part-time work is available. 
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(h) The administrative law judge may: 
(i) excuse an employee from participation in any job that would require the employee to 
undertake work exceeding the employee's medical capacity and residual functional capacity or 
for good cause; or 
(ii) allow the employer or its insurance carrier to reduce permanent total disability benefits as 
provided in Subsection (7)(d) when reasonable, medically appropriate, part-time employment has 
been offered but the employee has failed to fully cooperate. 
(8) When an employee has been rehabilitated or the employee's rehabilitation is possible but 
the employee has some loss of bodily function, the award shall be for permanent partial 
disability. 
(9) As determined by an administrative law judge, an employee is not entitled to disability 
compensation, unless the employee fully cooperates with any evaluation or reemployment plan 
under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. The administrative law judge 
shall dismiss without prejudice the claim for benefits of an employee if the administrative law 
judge finds that the employee fails to fully cooperate, unless the administrative law judge states 
specific findings on the record justifying dismissal with prejudice. 
(10) (a) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use of both hands, both arms, both 
feet, both legs, both eyes, or any combination of two such body members constitutes total and 
permanent disability, to be compensated according to this section. 
(b) A finding of permanent total disability pursuant to Subsection (10)(a) is final. 
(11) (a) An insurer or self-insured employer may periodically reexamine a permanent total 
disability claim, except those based on Subsection (10), for which the insurer or self-insured 
employer had or has payment responsibility to determine whether the worker remains 
permanently totally disabled. 
(b) Reexamination may be conducted no more than once every three years after an award is 
final, unless good cause is shown by the employer or its insurance carrier to allow more frequent 
reexaminations. 
(c) The reexamination may include: 
(i) the review of medical records; 
(ii) employee submission to reasonable medical evaluations; 
(iii) employee submission to reasonable rehabilitation evaluations and retraining efforts; 
(iv) employee disclosure of Federal Income Tax Returns; 
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(v) employee certification of compliance with Section 34A-2-110; and 
(vi) employee completion of sworn affidavits or questionnaires approved by the division. 
(d) The insurer or self-insured employer shall pay for the cost of a reexamination with 
appropriate employee reimbursement pursuant to rule for reasonable travel allowance and per 
diem as well as reasonable expert witness fees incurred by the employee in supporting the 
employee's claim for permanent total disability benefits at the time of reexamination. 
(e) If an employee fails to fully cooperate in the reasonable reexamination of a permanent 
total disability finding, an administrative law judge may order the suspension of the employee's 
permanent total disability benefits until the employee cooperates with the reexamination. 
(f) (i) Should the reexamination of a permanent total disability finding reveal evidence that 
reasonably raises the issue of an employee's continued entitlement to permanent total disability 
compensation benefits, an insurer or self-insured employer may petition the Division of 
Adjudication for a rehearing on that issue. The petition shall be accompanied by documentation 
supporting the insurer's or self-insured employer's belief that the employee is no longer 
permanently totally disabled. 
(ii) If the petition under Subsection (1 l)(f)(i) demonstrates good cause, as determined by the 
Division of Adjudication, an administrative law judge shall adjudicate the issue at a hearing. 
(iii) Evidence of an employee's participation in medically appropriate, part-time work may 
not be the sole basis for termination of an employee's permanent total disability entitlement, but 
the evidence of the employee's participation in medically appropriate, part-time work under 
Subsection (7) may be considered in the reexamination or hearing with other evidence relating to 
the employee's status and condition. 
(g) In accordance with Section 34A-1-309, the administrative law judge may award 
reasonable attorneys fees to an attorney retained by an employee to represent the employee's 
interests with respect to reexamination of the permanent total disability finding, except if the 
employee does not prevail, the attorneys fees shall be set at $1,000. The attorneys fees shall be 
paid by the employer or its insurance carrier in addition to the permanent total disability 
compensation benefits due. 
(h) During the period of reexamination or adjudication if the employee fully cooperates, each 
insurer, self-insured employer, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall continue to pay the 
permanent total disability compensation benefits due the employee. 
(12) If any provision of this section, or the application of any provision to any person or 
circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of this section shall be given effect without the 
invalid provision or application. 
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History: C. 1953,35-1-67, enacted by L. 1988, ch. 116, § 4; 1988 (2nd S.S.), ch. 12, § 1; 1991, 
ch. 136, § 12; 1992, ch. 53, § 2; 1994, ch. 266, § 2; 1995, ch. 177, § 2; renumbered by L. 
1996, ch. 240, § 156; renumbered by L. 1997, ch. 375, § 121. 
Repeals and Reenactments. - Laws 1988, ch. 116, § 4 repeals former § 35-1-67, as last amended 
by Laws 1985, ch. 160, § 1, relating to permanent total disability, effective July 1, 1988, and enacts the 
present section. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this section, which 
formerly appeared as § 35A-3-413 ; substituted "commission" and "administrative law judge" for 
"department" where the terms appear; inserted references to "Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act" 
in Subsections (1)(d) and (9) and as a substitute for "Chapter 3a" in Subsection (6)(c); substituted 
"34A-2-703" for "35A-3-703" in Subsections (3)(a) and (3)(e), "34A-2-410 through 34A-2-412" and 
"34A-2-501 through 34A-2-507" for "35A-3-410 through 35A~3-412" and "35A-3-501 through 35A-3-507" in 
Subsections (3)(b) and (4)(b), "Chapter 8" for Chapter 9, Part 2" in Subsection(6)(a)(i), "34A-2-110" for 
"35A-3-114" in Subsection (11)(c)(v), and M34A-1-309n for "35A-3-805" in Subsection (11)(g); addecTis 
governed by Part 8, Adjudication" at the end of Subsection (7)(f)(ii); substituted "Division of Adjudication" 
for "department" in Subsection (11)(f)(i); inserted "as determined by the Division of Adjudication" in 
Subsection (11)(f)(ii); and made stylistic changes. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Analysis 
Arm injuries. 
Commencement of benefits. 
Determination of character of disability. 
Estoppel. 
Evidence. 
Eye injuries. 
Final order. 
Findings. 
Law in effect. 
Maximum benefits. 
Multiple injuries. 
Odd-lot doctrine. 
Permanent disability. 
- Benefits. 
Prior accidents contributing to disability. 
Proceedings before commission. 
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Refusal to submit to operation. 
Review of plan. 
Statute of limitations. 
Total disability. 
- Question of fact. 
Cited. 
Arm injuries. 
Where there was no complete and permanent loss or loss of use of both arms so that claimant would 
be permanently disabled as matter of law, it was for commission to decide from all the facts and 
circumstances in evidence whether he was so disabled. Johnson v. Industrial Comm'n, 93 Utah 493, 73 
P.2d 1308 (1937). 
Commencement of benefits. 
It is within the sound discretion of the commission to determine the commencement date of benefits 
for total permanent disability so long as the determination is supported by substantial evidence and not 
patently unreasonable. Oman v. Industrial Comm'n, 735 P.2d 665 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 
1277 (Utah 1987). But see Heaton v. Second Injury Fund, 796 P.2d 676 (Utah 1990), noted under 
catchline "Permanent disability - Benefits," below. 
Determination of character of disability. 
Whether an employee is totally disabled or permanently disabled are ultimate matters to be decided 
by the commission, as is also amount and time compensation may be awarded upon all the evidence; and 
upon these ultimate questions expert witnesses may not properly express opinions, nor may such 
opinions relating to loss of bodily function become measure of compensable function possessed by an 
employee prior to his injury. Spencer v. Industrial Comm'n, 87 Utah 336, 40 P.2d 188, affd, 87 Utah 358, 
48 P.2d 1120 (1935). 
Where there had never been a determination by the commission that the injured employee was 
permanently disabled, and where he did not have injuries which entitled him to a conclusive presumption 
of permanent disability, whether or not he was permanently disabled is a question of fact to be decided by 
the commission on all the evidence after notice to and hearing of the parties. Utah State Rd. Comm'n v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 109 Utah 553,168 P.2d 319 (1946). 
Estoppel. 
Although state insurance fund, the insurance carrier, apparently without any decision of the 
commission, voluntarily paid the medical and hospital expenses and $16 per week to applicant for a 
period of six years from date of accident, defendant was not estopped from claiming that applicant was 
not totally and permanently disabled. Crow v. Industrial Comm'n, 104 Utah 333, 140 P.2d 321, 148 A.L.R. 
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316(1943). 
Evidence. 
Commission could not overturn an administrative law judge's decision granting benefits on the sole 
basis of a vocational evaluation because the report, although admissible in the Commission's 
proceedings, was hearsay, and a residuum of other non-hearsay, legally competent evidence was 
required to support rehabilitation. Hoskings v. Industrial Comm'n, 918 P.2d 150 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), cert, 
denied, 925 P.2d 963 (Utah 1996). 
Eye injuries. 
Injury to vision of employee from electric flash was not permanent total disability within this section. 
Moray v. Industrial Comm'n, 58 Utah 404, 199 P. 1023 (1921). 
Final order. 
Because an order to initiate temporary subsistence payments was based on the initial finding, it was 
not a "final order" from which an abstract could have been issued. While §§ 34A-1-303 and 34A-2-801 set 
forth a broad definition of what constitutes a final order, § 34A-2-413 excepts an initial finding of 
permanent total disability from the broad definition of "final order" by expressly stating that the initial, 
tentative finding is not final. Thomas v. Color Country Mgmt, 2004 UT 12, 492 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 84 P.3d 
1201. 
Findings. 
Finding of commission upon ultimate fact of total and permanent disability, where evidence is 
conflicting, will not be disturbed on appeal. Commission is not bound by opinions of expert witnesses upon 
such question. Kelly v. Industrial Comm'n, 80 Utah 73, 12 P.2d 1112 (1932). 
Where employee's leg was shorter than other, and he needed crutches to get about, commission's 
finding that he was not totally and permanently disabled was supported by evidence since loss of use of 
one limb is not a permanent total disability. Mijat v. Industrial Comm'n, 86 Utah 371, 44 P.2d 705 (1935). 
If there is no substantial conflict in the evidence, an award of the commission as and for total and 
permanent disability will be sustained. Caillet v. Industrial Comm'n, 90 Utah 8, 58 P.2d 760 (1936). 
Where committee of physicians examined claimant and found 75% disability in one arm and 25% in 
other, with which findings claimant's physician agreed but contended also that claimant was totally and 
permanently disabled, evidence did not compel finding of total permanent disability. Johnson v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 93 Utah 493, 73 P.2d 1308 (1937). 
Order of the commission denying additional compensation on ground workman had not become totally 
and permanently disabled since original finding and award for temporary disability was affirmed although 
medical testimony was in conflict; failure to recover within six years after an accident is not conclusive that 
injury is permanent and total. Spencer v. Industrial Comm'n, 97 Utah 140, 91 P.2d 439 (1939). 
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Although there was substantial evidence from which the commission could reasonably find that the 
applicant was not totally and permanently disabled, the case was reversed inasmuch as the only 
commissioner who heard the evidence did not participate in the decision. Crow v. Industrial Comm'n, 104 
Utah 333, 140 P.2d 321, 148 A.LR. 316 (1943). 
Law in effect. 
The law in effect when the injury was sustained governs the amount of the award for a permanent 
total disability. Utah State Rd. Comm'n v. Industrial Comm'n, 109 Utah 553, 168 P.2d 319 (1946). 
An administrative rule promulgated after claimant's industrial accident, but before claimant's 
application for a hearing in the matter, which purports to modify this section by adding a quantitative 
requirement to the causation of the disability analysis when an injured worker has already qualified for 
Social Security disability benefits, could not be applied retroactively. Rather, the board should have applied 
this section, the law existing at the time of claimant's injury. Abel v. Industrial Comm'n, 860 P.2d 367 (Utah 
CtApp. 1993). 
Maximum benefits. 
Plaintiff, who received temporary total disability compensation commencing with the date of his injury 
and later was paid permanent total disability benefits prior to his return to work, was not entitled to 
maximum compensation for both temporary total and permanent partial disability but was entitled only to 
permanent partial disability benefits subject to the limitations set forth in this section. Johnson v. 
Harsco/Heckett, 737 P.2d 986 (Utah 1987). 
Multiple injuries. 
A motorman, 64 years old at the time he was injured while uncoupling cars on an underground 
railroad in a mine, who lost his leg and suffered additional injuries including fracture of shoulder blade, 
dislocation of breastbone-collarbone joint, severe internal injuries to the chest and lung, including 
comminuted fractures of ribs three through seven on right side with attending traumatic pneumonia, and 
injuries to the scrotum and perineum, was entitled to compensation on basis of total and permanent 
disability. United Park City Mines Co. v. Prescott, 15 Utah 2d 410, 393 P.2d 800 (1964). 
Odd-lot doctrine. 
When an employee demonstrates that he can no longer perform his normal duties as a result of a 
work-related accident, and that he cannot be rehabilitated, the burden shifts to the employer to prove that 
suitable, steady work is available, considering the age, mental capacity, and education of the employee, in 
order to> preclude a determination of total and permanent disability under the odd-lot doctrine. Marshall v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 681 P.2d 208 (Utah 1984). 
For discussion of the odd-lot doctrine, see Hardman v. Salt Lake City Fleet Mgt. & Second Injury 
Fund, 725 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1986); Zimmerman v. Industrial Comm'n, 785 P.2d 1127 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); 
Smith v. Mity Lite, 939 P.2d 684 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), cert, granted, 945 P.2d 1118 (Utah 1997). 
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Employee presented a prima facie case entitling him to permanent total disability benefits under the 
odd-lot doctrine, where the record was replete with evidence that he was unable to perform the normal 
duties of his occupation, that he required the aid of his fellow employees who performed the bulk of his 
work for him, and that he suffered continual pain as a result of his industrial injuries. Peck v. Eimco 
Process Equip. Co., 748 P.2d 572 (1987). 
For the odd-lot doctrine to apply, the commission must first determine that there is medical causation 
between the petitioner's industrial accident and his now-claimed permanent total disability. Zupon v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 860 P.2d 960 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Permanent disability. 
If injured employee's earning power is wholly and permanently destroyed, and because of his injuries 
he is incapable of performing remunerative employment, such employee is permanently totally disabled 
and to make out a case of total disability, the employee is not required to show that he is incapacitated 
from performing any and all kinds of work. He is required, however, to put forth an active effort to procure 
such employment as he is able to perform, for if injured employee is not prevented from securing and 
retaining employment because of his injuries, and if he can perform the duties of such employment 
without pain or suffering and without unduly endangering his health, life, or limb, the employee is not totally 
disabled. Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 74 Utah 103, 277 P. 206 (1929). 
An injured employee in not permanently and totally disabled if, by putting forth a reasonable effort, he 
is able to prepare himself by training or otherwise to secure and retain remunerative employment. 
Accordingly, a disability which may be overcome by a reasonable effort is not permanent, and it is the duty 
of an injured employee, just as it is the duty of every person sustaining an injury, to put forth a reasonable 
effort to minimize his injury. If, however, that injured employee cannot by training or otherwise secure and 
retain remunerative employment, the injured employee is excused from exerting an effort which of 
necessity must result in failure. Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 76 Utah 141, 287 P. 931 (1930). 
A moron was regarded as having been permanently and totally disabled where he was rendered unfit 
to perform manual labor, and because of his mental condition was incapable of learning a trade which 
would fit him for employment in any line of industry. Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 76 Utah 141, 287 
P. 931 (1930). 
Where evidence conclusively shows that employee is permanently and totally disabled from either 
securing or performing work of the general character that he was performing when injured, he by such 
evidence establishes a prima facie case; and in the absence of any showing that he is able to secure and 
perform work of a special nature not generally available, he is, as a matter of law, entitled to an award as 
and for permanent total disability. Caiilet v. Industrial Comm'n, 90 Utah 8, 58 P.2d 760 (1936). 
Rule that there is permanent and total disability as a matter of law when it appears that applicant for 
compensation cannot secure or perform work of general character he has been doing, and there is no 
showing that he is able to secure and perform work of a special nature not generally available, does not 
operate where specific compensation for loss of a member or function of a member in provided by statute 
for permanent partial disability. Babickv. Industrial Comm'n, 91 Utah 581, 65 P.2d 1133 (1937). 
Award on basis of total and permanent disability is justified where workman's injuries precluded his 
doing any work requiring that he walk, stand, or sit for long periods of time, and he was not of sufficient 
mental training to enable him to rehabilitate himself in purely mental work. Carbon Fuel Co. v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 92 Utah 410, 68 P.2d 894 (1937). 
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- Benefits. 
Employee who was totally and permanently impaired from the time of his injury in 1975 to the time 
when permanent partial payments terminated, when it had been stipulated that referral to the division of 
vocational rehabilitation was unnecessary, was entitled to permanent total benefits on termination of the 
permanent partial benefits Heaton v Second Injury Fund, 796 P 2d 676 (Utah 1990) 
Prior accidents contributing to disability. 
Employee who was permanently and totally disabled due to a combination of prior and present 
accidents was entitled to lifetime benefits payable from the special fund provided for in § 35-1-68 McPhie 
v Industrial Comm'n, 567 P 2d 153 (Utah 1977) 
Proceedings before commission. 
In proceeding before commission, doctors may testify as to amount of functional disability of bodily 
member of human being and impairment person would suffer in ordinary and common activities of life, but 
not as to percentage of industrial or economic impairment consequent on loss ol certain physical functions 
unless it is clear they know what bodily activities or functions a vocation or work embraces, and they 
cannot testify as to ultimate question as to whether applicant is economically totally disabled Price v 
Industrial Comm'n, 91 Utah 152, 63 P 2d 592 (1937) 
Refusal to submit to operation. 
Finding of commission that employee was permanently and totally disabled was sustained by 
evidence, and by refusing to submit to operation employee did not lose his right to compensation where 
employee had undergone three major operations which did not prove successful and there was no definite 
assurance that another would result differently Standard Coal Co v Industrial Comm'n, 81 Utah 118, 16 
P 2d 926 (1932) 
Review of plan. 
In requiring a "review" of an employer's reemployment plan (see Subsection (6)(a)(m)), the Legislature 
intended an independent evaluation and approval of the plan Color Country IVlgmt v Labor Comm'n, 
2001 UT App 370, 38 P 3d 969, cert denied, 42 P 3d 951 (Utah 2002) 
Statute of limitations. 
This section governs permanent total disability claims and contains no statute of limitations for such 
claims, therefore, where employee suffered an injury in October of 1961 and notice of injury and claim was 
properly given and filed in accordance with requirements of former §§ 35-1-99 and 35-1-100, and 
employee was found to have suffered permanent partial disability and received 40 weeks of compensation 
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through December of 1964 and payment of medical bill through 1966, employee's claim filed in December 
of 1982 for permanent total disability resulting from the slow deterioration of a condition caused by 1961 
injury was timely filed under this section and, under § 35-1-78, commission had continuing jurisdiction to 
award permanent total disability compensation. Mecham v. Industrial Comm'n, 692 P.2d 783 (Utah 1984). 
Total disability. 
Although employee is incapacitated from performing the kind of labor required in his former 
employment, if he is able to perform the work of some other employment, he is not totally disabled. Spring 
Canyon Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 74 Utah 103, 277 P. 206 (1929). 
If employee suffers an injury which permanently and totally disables him, he is entitled to the 
compensation provided for in the act without regard to his physical or mental condition before he received 
such injury. Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 76 Utah 141, 287 P. 931 (1930). 
Workman may be found totally disabled if by reason of the disability resulting from his injury he cannot 
perform work of the general character he was performing when injured or any other work which a man of 
his capabilities may be able to do or learn to do. United Park City Mines Co. v. Prescott, 15 Utah 2d 410, 
393 P.2d 800 (1964). 
Employee, who was almost 60, with a limited education and an even more limited work background, 
presented a prima facie case of tentative permanent total disability, where he suffered from headaches 
and dizziness after sustaining a skull fracture, and despite his employer's contentions that it offered 
various jobs to employee, the record was devoid of any concrete evidence that he was offered work of the 
general nature that he had been performing. Hardman v. Salt Lake City Fleet Mgt. & Second Injury Fund, 
725 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1986). 
- Question of fact. 
The question of whether an employee was totally and permanently disabled was one of fact to be 
decided by the commission, upon all of the evidence in the case. Kerans v. Industrial Comm'n, 713 P.2d 
49 (Utah 1985). 
Cited in Booms v. Rapp Constr. Co., 720 P.2d 1363 (Utah 1986); American Roofing Co. v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 752 P.2d 912 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Large v. Industrial Comm'n, 758 P.2d 954 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988); Ortiz v. industrial Comm'n, 766 P.2d 1092 (Ct. App. 1989). 
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APPENDIX 9 
AMENDED APPLICATIONS FOR HEARING 
1. Transwest Construction (Out of 
Business), ax. November 18,1982 
2. Transwest Construction (Out of 
Business), ax. 1986 
3. Quality Plating and Workers 
Compensation Fund, ax. June 18, 
1990 
4. Barnard & Burk, and National Union 
Fire, ax. January 21,1991 
5. American Asbestos Abatement and 
Workers Compensation Fund, as. 
July 28,1991 
6. Ameritemps and Hartford Insurance, 
ax. June 16,1997 
Form 00! Revised 07/0! State of Utah r JL abor Cbnimisscon 
Division of Adjudication 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor, P.Q. Box 14,6615. 
Salt Lake Cify*U^h8411M61|5; I * I 
Note: PLEASE TYPE: GR PRINT ftf #LACjK?N<K* 
- Applicant ^ Employee) 
Maiden Name and/or Other Name(s) Used by Employee 
% M > V t o QlrinnMiQ!r\ 
Employer :mployer . , 
Employer's JStreet Address 
Ml&i 
AM0M££D 
^JPlifclCATION F O R H E A R I N G 
$j I Industrial Accident Claim 
£>• • Occupational Disease Claim 
(NOTE: Include all supporting documentation when this 
form is filed with the Labor Commission. Please check 
the appropriate box above for the industrial accident 
claim (a specific date for the injury), or an occupational 
disease claim (the illness developed over time due to an 
exposure at work). 
City State Zip Code 
Employer's Phone Number 
* 
* 
Employer's Workers' Compensation Insurance Carrier 
** I request to have a "Claims Resolution Conference" 
scheduled to resg>e the issues checked below (#5). 
Yes £fo 
viv
EMPLOYEE ALLEGES AND REQUESTS RESOLUTION CONCERNING THE FOLLOWING UNDER TITLE 34A: 
1. I sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment with the Employer onrr.j^jl — lY^  
19 Q1 . /20 at the following location- (frVMOYV 
2. The accident occurred as follows: QfrV V\VV fo\ (\ ^C\k<^>. Z . 
3. The injuries I sustained are: Y)flC/V£ . 
4. The injury caused time off work from, flpprMiWtt\rtu IWttfc, to j . and. 
5. I claim: [Please mark an "X'1 next to any issue you want an immediate hearing on and attach supporting documentatibr 
for each issue marked - see reverse side.] 
A. X - Medical Expenses D.« Temporary Partial Compensation G. A \ Travel Expenses 
' B. X - Recommended Medical Care E.-" Permanent Partial Compensation H.' _X_ Interest. 
C. 1 Temporary Total Compensation F. X Permanent Total Compensation
 m I. Other (Specify) fc 
—6-—My-date-o-f-birth-iS;;; 44^ . At the time of injury my wage was $ H.OO p e r |f\(M/"~ ; and I was 
working 4ft hours per week. Also, I was/was not married and had () dependent chiiaren under age < 
injured. _ 
[If you need additional space to provide the information requested 
on either side of this form, you may attach additional pages.] 
l^"\7heirl-was—r-
Date: (/fj/* >Z- CTftWvl frfer V 
RdnfflfA^eartgr. OftMrS 
ApplicanffSmployee) 
Printed Name of Attorney State Bar # 
Signature of Attorney 
Street Address for Attorney 
City/State/Zip Codev Telephone # 
Signature of Applicant 
treet Address oi Applicant 
:ity/Statc/Zip Cocklof Applicant City/State/Zip 
(&o h «&> - ^Vfo 92fl - OH- W * 
Applicant's Telephone # Social Security # 
UNSIGNED OR INCOMPLETE FORMS, AND FORMS NOT INCLUDING EMPLOYEE'S SUPPORTING 
DOCUMENTATION AND INFORMATION REFERENCED ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS 
cr\nAA ^ i / t i 
DOCUMENTS/WHICH MUST ACCOMPANY TTTTK TTOKM 
A. List of all he?l*h care providers who treated the worker during the last 15 years, and identify the body part(s) 
treated, date of treatment, and nature of treatment. 
B. Signed and notarized medicnl authorization. 
C. Copies of medical records summaries or medical documentation supporting claim(s). 
D. In permanent total disability claims only, include copy of Social Security Award Certificate, Decision of 
Administrative Law Judge or Appeals Council and/or disability Determination and Transmittal Sheet (Form SS A 
831-U:5), if Social Security total disability has been awarded. 
E. If represented by an attorney, include completed and signed Appointment of Counsel form. 
PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY CLAIMS ONLY 
1
 00326 
Date disability began: ^^VCo\ ^ ^ 
B. Age when disability began:_ Present Age: 3 ^ 
C. Grade completed in school: \ \ ^ 
D. Diplomas/degrees/special education classes: vlSvfcj . 
E. English language difficulties: (Vffftfj -
F. Writing and/or reading difficulties:
 m 
< -
G. Treating physician's opinion regarding applicant's ability to return to work: PQflV* 
H. Social Security Total Disability Award Information: Application Date;6\2lo\^ ; Award Date: $ p i | fin 
Current status of pending claim: . 
I. Vocational rehabilitation efforts: U^lffrifrfolL ft£fe\f i f o ^ (ft^MtA • 
J. Names of Employers - Years worked and description of work performed:. 
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© * e * ' • 
State of Utah - Labor Commissionc I c *
 9 
Division of Adjudication 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor, P.O. Box 146615 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615 j . r
 c <• e , j 
Note: PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT IN BLAGKJNK
 #» • 
• • • • 
• • • • 
• • • 
Emplo -Applicant. ( yee) 
Maiden Name and/or Other Name(s) Used by Employee 
Employer 
Employer's Street Address 
City State Zip Code 
Employer's Phone Number 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Employer's Workers' Compensation Insurance Carrier 
APPLICATION FORBEARING 
ST Industrial ^ccidfcnt Claim 
D Occupational DiJease Claim 
(NOTE: Include all supporting documentation when this 
form is filed with the Labor Commission. Please check 
the appropriate box above for the industrial accident 
claim (a specific date for the injury), or an occupational 
disease claim (the illness developed over time due to an 
exposure at work). 
** I request to have a "Claims Resolution Conference' 
scheduled to resolve the issues checked below (#5). 
Yes No 
EMPLOYEE ALLEGES AND REQUESTS RESOLUTION CONCERNING THE FOLLOWING WH'DER TITLE 34A: 
1. I sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment with the Employer cm^
 f 
19 8 6 /20 at the following location: *jh uOcnfk~ ' ' 
2. The accident occurred as follows: /*6(*Pt\****j-y~v^4*4lA*4 f^uC &*\ M J L : J^ _ 
3. The injuries I sustained are- Lpt^J ^f^^fci ' 
4. • The injury caused time off work from cJ^crvdh I i*J*4*4t~ to •and 
5. I claim: [Please mark an "X" next to any issue you want an immediate hearing on and attach supporting documentatibr 
for each issue marked - see reverse side.] 
A. }c Medical Expenses D.. Temporary Partial Compensation G. X Travel Expenses 
' B. JC . Recommended Medical Care E.-' Permanent Partial Compensation H." j£- Interest 
C. '_ Temporary Total Compensation "F. \ L Permanent Total Compensation . I. Other (Specify)
 t_ 
-6:—My-date^birfch-is- . At the time of injury my wage was $ 7 •& per Uouw \ and I was'" 
.working ^0 hours per week. Also, I was/was not married and had _J2L__ dependent children under age oftS~wben-I-was;—r-
injured. • . ^ 
[If you need additional space to provide the information requested 
on either side of this form, you may attach additional pages.] 
Date: 5/^o/ 0-Z-
ftcW&E.&jirV^ (rtHr3 Applicant (Employee) 
Printed Name of Attorney State Bar # 
Signature of Attorney . • ' .. 
Street Address for Attorney 
City/State/Zip Code* Telephone # 
Signature of Applicant 
Street-Address of Applicant 
City/State/Zip Code of Applicant 
L ) _ : 
Applicant's Telephone # Social Security # 
UNSIGNED OR INCOMPLETE FORMS, AND FORMS NOT INCLUDING EMPLOYEE'S SUPPORTING . 
DOCUMENTATION AND INFORMATION REFERENCED ON THE REVERSE SIDE OFT^IIS 
FORM WILL BE FILED, BUT RETURNED PORCOMPl.FTihN TN TTTH T I if US*Ji\ 
DOCUMENTS WHICH MUST ACCOMPANY THTS FOKM 
A. List of 1^1 health cave providers who treated the worker during the last 15 years, and identity the body part(s) 
lreated,rtfatercrf treatment, and nature of treatment. 
B. Signed and notarized medical authorization. 
C Copies of medical records summaries or medical documentation supporting ciaim(s), 
D- In permanent total disability claims onlv, include copy of Social Security Award Certificate, Decision of 
Administrative Law Judge or Appeals Council and/or disability Determination and Transmittal Sheet (Form SS^ 
831-U:5), if Social Security total disability has been awarded. 
E. If represented by an attorney, include completed and signed Appointment of Counsel form. 
PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY CLAIMS ONLY 
A. Date disability began: Q / (fr f ^ 7 
B. Age when disability began: 3 * / Present Age: S y 
C. Grade completed in school: / / 
H. 
D. Diplomas/degrees/special education classes: c^t 
E. English language difficulties: 
F. Writing and/or reading difficulties: ( 
G. Treating physician's opinion regarding applicant's ability to return to work: jP*Gry~ 
Social Security Total Disability Award Information: Application Date:. /Award Date: j f j ^ j f t 
Current status of pending claim: , , 
I. Vocational rehabilitation efforts: uusv<bvCOi4><Z f*~A *ffr£<-~~ 7f1^/*} t / U ^ ^ w j , 
Names of Employers - Years worked and description of work performed:, 
CH^t^ - i /z^/tf^w co^c^^r^^— J*^~% ( 
Form 001 Revised 07/01 State of Utah - Labor Commission I 
Division of Adjudication c 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor, P.O. Box 146615 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615 
Note: PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT IN BLACK INK c c 
'^LrUrtvun fHlw/h 
' ArjpIicanr(Emproyee) tew 
Maiden Name and/or, Other Name(s) Used by Employee 
loyer ~ 0 Emp ] 
(AA*~k><A>*~J>s 
Employer's Street Address 
City State Zip Code 
Employer's Phone Number 
Employer's Workers' Compensation Insurance Carrier 
APPLICATION FOR HEARING 
£T Industrial Accident Claim* 
D Occupational Disease Qaipi 
(NOTE: Include all supporting Tlbcufhentation when this 
form is filed with the Labor Commission. Please check 
the appropriate box above for the industrial accident 
claim (a specific date for the injury), or an occupational 
disease claim (the illness developed over time due tn sn 
exposure at work). 
** I request to havea/'CIaims Resolution Conference" ' 
scheduled to reserve the issues checked below (US). 
Yes -No 
EMPLOYEE ALLEGES AND REQUESTS RESOLUTION CONCERNING THE FOLLOWING UNDER TITLE 34A: 
1. I sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment with the Employer cm^fey / & 
19j^0 / 20 at the following location: *sf- vj a-K^fe-
2. The accident occurred as follows: £l£h\u* j^LaJ^n e^^Jl fi*j4- *. *af OH^H'lp>^^ A^ LxK~a4t-~ 
3. The injuries I sustained are: Lp*^^sJfl&~ _ " 
4. The injury caused time off work from A, 4-+*J JL+y^ to j . and. 
5. I claim: fPlease mark an "X" next to any issue you want an immediate hearing on and attach supporting documentatfoi 
for each issue marked - see reverse side.] 
A. X - Medical Expenses D.. Temporary Partial Compensation G. K Travel Expenses 
B. j£_ 'Recommended Medical Care E.- Permanent Partial Compensation H.' \^ Interest. 
C. _J_ Temporary Total Compensation 'F. _^£ Permanent Total Compensation
 m I. Other (Specify) fc 
-6:—My-datenatbiFth-is 
working l¥t> hours per 
injured. 
i ( I /fr 3 • Atthe time of injury my wage was $ Jf^_ per UcK<u^ ; and I was 
 week. Also, I was/was(ncffrnarried and had" / dependent children under age Q'fi^~wrjeirHyas—7 
Date: s/**/a 
[If you need additional space to provide the information requested 
on either side of this form, you may attach additional pages.] 
/n-
WMTftE-frnrfr, QA4-3 
Applicant (Employee) 
Printed Name of Attorney 
c 
State Bar # Signature of Applicant 
Signature of Attorney 
Street Address for Attorney 
City/State/Zip Code1 Telephone # 
Street Address of Applicant 
City/State/Zip Code of Applicant 
( ) 
Applicant's Telephone # Social Security # 
UNSIGNED OR INCOMPLETE FORMS, AND FORMS NOT INCLUDING EMPLOYEE'S SUPPORTING 
DOCUMENTATION AND INFORMATION REFERENCED ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS 
FORM WILL BE FILED, BUT RETURNED FOR COMPLETION IN wni 1 ^ ^ ^ -
DOCUMENTS WHICH MUST ACCOMPANY THIS FORM 
| A. l i s t cf all health care providers who treated the worker during the last 15 years, and identify the body part(s) 
J sa estcd, dater of treatment, and nature of treatment 
B. Signed and notarized medical authorization. 
C. Copiec of medical records summaries or medical documentation supporting claim(s). 
D. In permanent total disability claims only, include copy of Social Security Award Certificate, Decision of 
Administrative Law Judge or Appeals Council and/or disability Determination and Transmittal Sheet (Form SSt 
831-U:5), if Social Security total disability has been awarded. 
E. If represented by an attorney, include completed and signed Appointment of Counsel form. 
PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY CLAMS ONLY 
A. Date disability began: C?( fte ( QT7 
B. Age when disability began:_ Present Age: 3*? 
C. Grade completed in school: f ( **-*"* _ 
D. Diplomas/degrees/special education classes: 
E. English language difficulties: 
F. Writing and/or reading difficulties: 
< -
G. Treating physician's opinion regarding applicant's ability to return to work: 0*&?r 
BL Social Security Total Disability Award Information: Application Date: ^Z_yftfr : Award Date: J L * ^ / & 
Current status of pending claim: , . 
Vocational rehabilitation efforts 
J. Names of Employers - Years worked and description of work performed:. 
pLi^^^^Ji 4r )&**i/£^ m _________£__! 
f)2 79 
'JzJd^LLl^JLI 
Form 00! Revised 07/01 State of Utah - Labor Commission
 ( 
Division of Adjudication 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor, P.O. Box 146615 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411^6615
 c< f . ; 
Note: PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT Ifl^LAC^FNK; 
Cfikwu Mfa^f~ 
.Applicant (Enjployee)" 
Maiden Name and/or Other Name(s) Used by Employee 
DIOY 
\A+W*C 
Employer 
/^c 1(1 
Employer's Street Address 
? £ E (JJL 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
mi(o 
A^LICATIONJFOR HEARING 
Br InduJtrialJAtcident Claim 
• OcciipaticShaJ Disease Claim 
(NOTE: Inclucfe'all supporting documentation when this 
form is filed with the Labor Commission. Please check 
the appropriate box above for the industrial accident 
claim (a specific date for the injury), or an occupational 
disease claim (the illness developed over time due to an 
exposure at work). 
City p State 
(got )^°t* 1Z1H 
Zip Code 
Employer's Phone Number 
Employer's Workers' Compensation Insurance Carrier 
** I request to have a "Claims Resolution Conference" 
scheduled to respive the issues checked below (#5). 
Yes No 
t vi
IT 
EMPLOYEE ALLEGES AND REQUESTS RESOLUTION CONCERNING THE FOLLOWING UNDER TITLE 34A: 
1. I sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment with the Employer o n ^ / / ^ / 
19?f /20 at the following location: **/» uJtviL 
2. The accident occurred as follows: $[}***J} CUs^I£±U ^ (^^^OJ^ /sVv. fa.tfc-
3. The injuries I sustained are: Lm*J loe^Lft* 
4. The injury caused tune off work from <x. c/ruvpJLe. j . and. 
5. I claim: [Please mark an "X" next to any issue you want an immediate hearing on and attach supporting documentatibr 
for each issue marked - see reverse side.] 
A. 2___ Medical Expenses D.. Temporary Partial Compensation G. Travel Expenses 
* B. j _ \ _ Recommended Medical Care E.- Permanent Partial Compensation H.* )C Interest. 
C. 1 Temporary Total Compensation ' F. J J L Permanent Total Compensation
 m I. Other (Specify) fc 
—6:—My-date-of-birth-is—L/JL / fa 3 . At the time of injury my wage was $ 7 V 3 2& 
-Per. M&JC- j and I was' 
Date 
working -yO hours per week. Also, I was/was^no?Varried and had | dependent cnilHren under age"o^'8"when"f-was" 
injured. 
[If you need additional space to provide the information requested 
on either side of this form, you may attach additional pages.] 
^/u/d2^ .
 : 
g\cWAE.&urW>. W3 
Applicant (Employee) 
State Bar # rrmted iName\ot Attorney 
Signature of Attorney 
Street Address for Attorney 
City/State/Zip Codev Telephone # 
Signature of Applicant 
Street Address of Applicant 
City/State/Zip Code of Applicant 
( ) \ : 
Applicant's Telephone # Social Security # 
UNSIGNED OR INCOMPLETE FORMS, AND FORMS NOT INCLUDING EMPLOYEE'S SUPPORTING 
DOCUMENTATION AND INFORMATION REFERENCED ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF T K J S ^ O P N r k 
FORM WILL BE FILED, BUT RETURNED FOR miVTPT r n n M 
DOCUMENTS WHICH MUST ACCOMPANY THIS FORM 
A. LLt oC all health care providers who treated the worker during the last 15 years, and identify the body part(s) 
ti ekted, date uf ireauuent, md nature of treatment. 
B. Signed and notarized medical authorization. 
C. Copies of medical records summaries or medical documentation supporting claim(s). 
D« In permanent total disability claims only, mclude copy of Social Security Award Certificate, Decision of 
Administrative Law Judge or Appeals Council and/or disability Determination and Transmittal Sheet (Form SS A 
831-U:5), if Social Security total disability has been awarded. 
E. If represented by an attorney, include completed and signed Appointment of Counsel form. 
PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY CLAIMS ONLY 
A. Date disability began: Cr//6 / T "7 
B. Age when disability began: 5 7 Present Age: 3ft 
C. Grade completed in school: \ltf\ 
D. Diplomas/degrees/special education classes: /U^»X-» 
E. English language difficulties:. 
F. Writing and/or reading difficulties: ( _ 
G. Treating physician's opinion regarding applicant's ability to return to work: ^£+01^ 
H. Social Security Total Disability Award Information: Application Date: ^rZj/Wx Award DaterS^^a? 
Current status of pending claim: , , 
I. Vocational rehabilitation efforts: U^i<*c^£-^ S 
J. Names of Employers - Years worked and description of work performed:. 
7~~*7*~<T+rtS^ - CeYp«~4*^/6***ch«+>dhl*x-* 
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Form 001 Revised 07/01 State of Utah - Labor Commissi©*?' ; 
Division of Adjudication 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor, P.O. Box 146615 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615^ ec 
Note: PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT IN BLA€K INK 
<TMIAUUA ffUn^h 
.Appl icant (Employee J 
AP£LI 
Maiden N a m e and/or Other Name(s ) Used by Employee * 
vs
* *\ * / 
Employer r 
Employer ' s Street Address 
&}&**-. &m+o\ 
CATION FOR HEARING 
Industrial ^ccickrrt Claim 
D Occupational Disease Claim 
(NOTE: Include all supporting documentation when this 
form is filed with the Labor Commission. Please check 
the appropriate box above for the industrial accident 
claim (a specific date for the injury), or an occupational 
disease claim (the illness developed over time due to an 
exposure at work). 
City
 r State Zip Code 
Employer's Phone Number * 
Employer's Workers1 Compensation Insurance Carrier 
** I request to have a "Claims Resolution Conference" 
scheduled to resolve the issues checked below (#5). 
\y^ Yes No 
EMPLOYEE ALLEGES AND REQUESTS RESOLUTION CONCERNING THE FOLLOWING UNDER TITLE 34A: 
1. I sustained an injury by accident arising out of and m the course of employment with the Employer o n ^ / z . 6 
19*?f /20 at the following location: a/h tAJ&i/k-
2. The accident occurred as fo l lows: -fjJUL f-w<r*>*+ 5 ^ ^ m$L 
3. The injuries I sustained are: r / y C^jh 4-A*f~t •* ** J*>J^ L**~€A- ; / / t v J &€>»£&-. H ^ t ^ A ^ k /y> 
"to n/zof+X :.and 4. The injury caused time off work from 7 / ^ g / q / 
5. I claim: [Please mark an "X" next to any issue you want an immediate hearing on and attach supporting documentati'or 
for each issue marked - see reverse side.] 
A. }C Medical Expenses D.. Temporary Partial Compensation G. XL Travel Expenses 
' B. J<_ Recommended Medical Care E.-' Permanent Partial Compensation EL* X Interest. 
C. 1 Temporary Total Compensation " F. J ^ Permanent Total Compensation
 m I. Other (Specify) fc_ 
j—€-.—M-y-date-of-birth-is^ At the tune of injury m y a v a g s was : and I was 
workingffi* hours per week. Also. I was/was^no'hnarned and had | dependent children under age ofll^whegi-wai 
injured. _ / 
Date: 5~/W< 
[If you need additional space to provide the information requested 
on either side of this form, you may attach additional pages.] atv"TiJU*s 
Cr^_ 
P\d\ft^£-EwVf, CjflMrS 
Appl icant (Employee) 
Printed N a m e of At torney State Bar # Signature of Appl icant 
Signature of At torney 
Street Address for At torney 
City/State/Zip C o d e ^ Telephone # 
Street Address of Appl icant 
City/State/Zip Code of Appl icant 
L_J 
Applicant's Telephone # Social Security # 
UNSIGNED OR INCOMPLETE FORMS, AND FORMS NOT INCLUDING EMPLOYEE'S SUPPORTING 
DOCUMENTATION AND INFORMATION REFERENCED ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS 
FORM WILL BE FILED, BUT RETURNED FOR COMPLETION IN FT IT I 
DOCUMENTS WHICH MUST ACCOMPANY THIS FORM 
A. List of dl health care providers who treated the worker during the last 15 years, and identify the body part(s) 
jreated,;date cf treatment, and nature of treatment. 
B. Signed *md notarized medical authorization. 
C. Copiec of medical records summaries or medical documentation supporting claim(s). 
D. In permanent total disability claims only, include copy of Social Security Award Certificate, Decision of 
Administrative Law Judge or Appeals Council and/or disability Determination and Transmittal Sheet (Form SS^  
831-U:5), if Social Security total disability has been awarded. 
E. If represented by an attorney, include completed and signed Appointment of Counsel form. 
PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY CLAIMS ONLY 
A. Date disability began: Gf Ibf^ 7
 : ; _J • 
B. Age when disability began: jgy Present Age: 3°f 
C. Grade completed in school: /(^0mmm^ 
D. Diplomas/degrees/special education classes: ^ t ^ ^ C -
E. English language difficulties:: 
F. Writing and/or reading difficulties:
 m 
< 
G. Treating physicianfs opinion regarding applicant's ability to return to work: It o&V 
H. Social Security Total Disability Award Information: Application Date: ffifr/f ? : Award Date: /Zf/di 
Current status of pending claim: 1 i • . 
I. Vocational rehabilitation efforts: UtAjSt**jOL?»* 
<T~&— 
Names of Employers - Years worked and description of work performed:. 
fiu**<A<L*~- A9jit<fa M-de***-^ -a*3A*4&* a4*fc*«+-^' 
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Note: PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT IN BLACK iftfe 
e <r « • 
-Applicant ^Employee)! 
Maiden Name and/or Oilier Name(s) Used by Employee 
vs. 
&CY\ JL'iS'i 
Employer 
u^^ 
nployer r 
tJT M/07 
Employer's Street Address 
City v 4>tate Zip Code (Jon 2$ ( - Tis-^p 
Employer's Phone Number 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
AMPLICATION FOR HEARING 
w Industrial Accident Claim 
D Occupational Dj^sfc.Claim 
(NOTE. Include all supporting documentation when this 
form is filed with the Labor Commission. Please check 
the appropriate box above for the industrial accident 
claim (a specific date for the injury), or an occupational 
disease claim (the illness developed over time due to an 
exposure at work). 
Employer's Workers1 Compensation Insurance Carrier 
** I request to have a "Claims Resolution Conference" 
scheduled to rescue the issues checked below (#5). 
Yes No 
pkf
EMPLOYEE ALLEGES AND REQUESTS RESOLUTION CONCERNING THE FOLLOWING Ws'DER TITLE 34A: 
1. I sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment with the Employer Qfl_/%;/ / A 
19 ^n /20 at the following location: *J~ toofh-
2. The accident occurred as follows: St^<^J-^J JLejf-'f- /*A£ fa-f~L*>€4U^ **AuJ-jc*.£,k, ~kt**sf !T- ^ u > v 
3. The injuries I sustained are: Ltd-h *P&*f~ 
4. The injury caused time off work from fa/f^fo "7 to 2/B/<rt _;.and
 m 
5. I claim: [Please mark an "X" next to any issue you want an immediate hearing on and attach supporting documentatibi 
for each issue marked - see reverse side.] 
A. _Vw_ Medical Expenses D.. Temporary Partial Compensation G. X ^ Travel Expenses 
* B. %£_ Recommended Medical Care E.-' Permanent Partial Compensation EL' J C Interest. 
G 1 Temporary Total Compensation " F. \/_ Permanent Total Compensation
 m I. Other (Specify) 
-6:—Mv-date-o-f-birth-is—/-/ ( / fc ^ 
working hours per week. Also, I was/was not married and had 
- injured. 
f*£-
. At the time of injury my wage was $ > » 7 ^ * * > per • and I was" 
Date: $A 
[If you need additional space to provide the information requested 
on either side of this form, you may attach additional pages.] 
K>/<fZ^ 
Eidnflr&g.gmrVf. ^4 -3 
Applicant (Employee) 
Printed Name of Attorney 
-&JjJLp2^ State Bar # Signature of Applicant 
Signature of Attorney 
Street Address for Attorney 
Street Address of Applicant 
City/State/Zip CodeX Telephone # 
City/State/Zip Code of Applicant 
L ) 
Applicant's Telephone # Social Security # 
UNSIGNED OR INCOMPLETE FORMS, AND FORMS NOT INCLUDING EMPLOYEE'S SUPPORTING 
DOCUMENTATION AND INFORMATION REFERENCED ON THF PTTWDCIT cmn — > 
DOCUMENTS WHICH MUST ACCOMPANY THTS FOKM 
A. List of all health ?are providers who treated the worker during the last 15 years, and identify the body part(s) 
treated, date of treatment, and nature of treatment. 
B. S'gned af<d notarized medical authorization. 
C. Copies of medical records summaries or medical documentation supporting claim(s). 
D. In permanent total disability claims only, include copy of Social Security Award Certificate, Decision of 
Administrative Law Judge or Appeals Council and/or disability Determination and Transmittal Sheet (Form SSt 
831-U:5), if Social Security total disability has been awarded. 
E. If represented by an attorney, include completed and signed Appointment of Counsel form. 
PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY CLAIMS ONLY 
A. Date disability began: (*(((? I v"7 
F. 
B. Age when disability began: %*{ Present Age: S ? 
C. Grade completed in school: / / ^ \ . 
D. Diplomas/degrees/special education classes: A 
E. English language difficulties: / I 
Writing and/or reading difficulties: ( __ 
G. Treating physician's opinion regarding applicant's ability to return to work:. 
'-?• 
H. Social Security Total Disability Award Information: Application Date:. ; Award Date: fyfe//* 
Current status of pending claim: , , 
L Vocational rehabilitation efforts: UU^*J~CCJLJZZ£~A €L^M**~ ? / * - & / ^ ( )^\U^L 
J. Names of Employers - Years worked and description of work performed:. 
fiu^l*^. /fcfa&A ALJ&a^J^ - ~*U<fo* *AdtM~^-
